Contradictory signs .. Can Al-Kazemi disarm the factions and confine them to the state’s hand?

Ahmed Al-Dabbagh-Al Jazeera Net

These are contradictory signals made by the Iraqi Prime Minister, Mustafa Al-Kazemi, regarding the implementation of his government program that included keeping weapons in the hands of the state.

At a time when the government closed - about a week ago - the headquarters of the Islamic "Revenge of God" party (claiming to belong to the Popular Mobilization) and arrested all of it in the city of Basra (in the south of the country) after the killing of one of the demonstrators, Al-Kazemi’s visit came to the headquarters of the Popular Mobilization Authority two days ago to confirm during it The crowd is an official security force in the country, which has further blurred its government program.

Restrict the weapon

The spokesman for the Commander-in-Chief of the Iraqi Armed Forces, Brigadier General Yahya Rasul, confirms in his interview with Al-Jazeera Net that Al-Kazimi - through his government program - works to build a strong state with security institutions that restore the state's prestige.

With regard to the Popular Mobilization Forces, Rasul explained that the Mobilization Foundation is one of the security services of the state, and it has a law approved by Parliament for years that regulates its work, pointing out that Al-Kazemi continues to confine arms to the state, but that needs a mechanism - describing it in minutes - to establish the principle of justice in The country, according to him.

For his part, the deputy in Parliament reveals the alliance of Sunni forces Raad Al-Dahlaki that their bloc has great confidence in Al-Kazemi regarding the restriction of weapons in the hands of the state, especially that there is a great fear that escaped weapons and the return of the state’s organization activity may lead to a near security collapse in some areas.

Despite the great obstacles facing Al-Kazemi, Al-Dahlaki said in his interview with Al-Jazeera Net that the prime minister will be able to limit the relatively loose weapons during the coming period, especially if the national Shiite blocs support his endeavors, knowing that his establishment of such a stage would be a major achievement.

The power of the factions

Article 9 of the Iraqi constitution (first) provides for the prohibition of the formation of military militias outside the framework of the state, and members of the military forces in all ministries and security institutions may not run for elections or support specific parties.

However, since the founding of the popular crowd since its founding in 2014, there has been a steady increase in its strength, armament, spread, and political entry as well, as security and strategic expert Hisham al-Hashemi reveals that there are seven factions that possess the same weapons that the army possesses except for the planes, which are Badr (the largest and most powerful) and Hezbollah and Asa'ib brigades. Alnogaba and the master of martyrs and the Peace Brigades and the brigades of thresholds.

He considers that Al-Kazemi’s view of the armed factions revolves around that the PMF factions that do not have military arms outside it have a special law issued in accordance with the Diwaniyah Order (40) for the year 2016, and therefore any new procedures related to them need new burial orders.

Al-Hashemi considered that the Prime Minister classifies the rest of the factions into three categories, the first of which is active and influential within the crowd and has a political and military wing (inside and outside the crowd) such as Asa’ib al-Haqq and Badr, believing that these factions will be given the choice either to disarm them in exchange for money, or to inventory their weapons and store them under the supervision of a joint committee managed by them. .

The second category is those factions outside the crowd and do not have political arms, but they have strong armament, such as the Hezbollah and Al-Najaba brigades. These factions will be dealt with by opening a national dialogue window and trying to find common ground for disarmament and not implementing the Iranian agenda, according to him.

Al-Hashemi concluded his talk to Al-Jazeera Net by pointing out that the last category are those small factions that claim their affiliation with the crowd, but they are working for their own interests and loyal to Iran as well, and this will lead to a certain period and then the government will move towards it security, as happened with the "God's Revenge" faction in Basra.

In contrast, journalist and researcher Maher Al-Hamdani believes that it is not in Al-Kazemi’s interest for the crowd to disband or disarm, as the prime ministers after 2014 reached their positions with fragile compromises and alliances, which are weaker than confronting or alienating the crowd.

Al-Hamdani goes on to point out that because of the strength of the crowd, its sophisticated fighters, and their arming and strong beliefs, its dissolution would be similar to the decision to disband the former Iraqi army in 2003.

In his interview with Al-Jazeera Net, Al-Hamdani stated that laying off tens of thousands of fighters would force the state to confront them as gangs, mafias, and organizations as happened with Sunni officers from the former army, in addition to the fact that, in light of the economic decline, it is not logical for the Hashd fighters to be added to the armies of the unemployed waiting for state aid.

According to Al-Hamdani, Al-Kazemi’s visit to the crowd’s headquarters painted the features of his plan, as he would take advantage of internal differences between the factions and American pressure and the retreat of Iranian support, and thus impose his will to restructure the crowd in proportion to the government's vision to manage the security file in the next stage.

The visit also sent a clear message to the rebel Shiite factions, stating that the crowd is not a military system independent of the state, and that it has the authority over it formally and legally.