Foreign Policy: The Iraqi popular crowd is getting fiercer ... and this is its future and its options

American journal Foreign Policy said that Shiite militias, like the PMF, have been playing a new role in Iraq since the assassination of the Quds Force commander, Qassem Soleimani, in early January.

The writer, Seth Franzman, said in a report published by the magazine, that the PMF is redefining its future role in Iraq, and it is playing an important role in the war against the Islamic State, noting that the PMF leaders and their allies share the same geopolitical ambitions.

The writer mentioned that some of the Popular Mobilization militias were affiliated under previous organizations, similar to the Badr Organization, led by Hadi al-Amiri, who was active alongside the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard in the 1980s. These militias were considered more moderate than the other militias that are not part of the crowd.

The writer added that the strength of the crowd was strengthened, especially during the war against the Islamic State, through the recruitment of large numbers of fighters, in addition to the annexation of 50 brigades, which strengthened its contribution to the social, military and economic life of the country.

In 2017, flags of Shiite militias were raised at checkpoints after the liberation of the outskirts of Mosul from ISIS. It then merged with the Iraqi security forces as an official paramilitary force.

Threat of influence
As tensions between the United States and Iran worsened after Washington withdrew from the nuclear deal in May 2018, tensions between American forces in Iraq and the PMF also escalated. The two sides exchanged more than 12 missile attacks to retaliate America with the strike that killed Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, deputy chief of the PMF.

After unrest erupted between the demonstrators and the Iraqi government in late November, which led to the killing of many protesters in clashes with the security forces, the leader of the Sadrist movement, Muqtada al-Sadr, called for the selection of the next prime minister through a popular referendum.

Al-Sadr also issued other statements to support the demonstrators, all of which helped to topple Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi in early December 2019. After that, Al-Sadr canceled his support for the protesters, but its impact is still visible.

The writer pointed out that the anti-government protests provided an opportunity for the popular crowd to test its influence in the country, and some of its factions were openly involved in suppressing the protests. Its opposition to the protests is likely to stem from its belief that it represents a major threat to its new influence and power.

The influence of the PMF grew after the war against the Islamic State, and was hoping to establish itself in Iraqi society after that. But the protests reflected the aspirations of the younger generation, who wanted a comprehensive change in the system. At that time it served the interests of the PMF.

An important development
The writer believes that the growing role of al-Sadr and the popular crowd during the protests is an important development in Iraqi politics, because it indicates a gradual shift in power away from the civil government towards actors not only accountable to the public, but also owes more loyalty to Iran's aspirations than to the Iraqi government. This applies to many factions of the PMF.

The writer emphasized that in the wake of the assassination of both Soleimani and the engineer, the PMF preferred to temporarily limit its activity in the country, while Sadr continued to cause problems by calling for major protests against American forces in Iraq. Indeed, Sadr's political maneuvers are one of the many challenges that the PMF must reconcile.

The death of Soleimani, the writer continues, indicates the loss of a key ally, which could endanger the unity of the crowd and its relationship with Tehran. Moreover, the death of the engineer resulted in the loss of someone with basic and tactical knowledge and strategies that would be difficult to replace.

The future of the crowd
As the specter of social and political turmoil grows in Iraq, the crowd has important decisions to make regarding its future, as it is likely that it will choose to continue to direct a wave of public anger against the United States over its role in Iraq.

The writer pointed out that the PMF is part of the security forces and is associated with prominent religious and political leaders, and it now plays a major role in many aspects of Iraqi civil society. The role played by some factions of the popular crowd in suppressing the protests, and its attempt to force US forces to leave the country, and influence the appointment of a new prime minister, reveals that it has become a central force in Iraq's political and security architecture.

Ultimately, the PMF can extend its influence to become a force similar to the Revolutionary Guards in Iran.

Simultaneously, the PMF should decide whether to follow a more independent course or whether it will continue to implement policies that serve Iran's interests. This point will be crucial, because if the crowd remains a mirror that reflects Tehran’s regional agenda, this will make it confront a large segment of the Iraqi people, and this may lead him to enter into a conflict with the United States or other groups in Iraq.