Iran is trying to engage in the Idlib crisis to avoid marginalization

Iran was not satisfied with the call to contain the escalation between Turkey and Syria over Idlib, which reached the point of the outbreak of a military confrontation between the two parties, but rather sought to mediate between the two parties, and expressed its readiness to facilitate a dialogue between them, in parallel with the emergence of reports indicating the involvement of militias loyal to it in operations Military launched by the Syrian army. This may not be due in the first place to Iran's view of the Idlib position in the equation of the conflict in Syria, but rather to its keenness to take advantage of the current escalation in Idlib to achieve political gains in other files, especially in light of the regional and international pressures it is currently facing, as a result of the escalation of intensity Tensions with the United States of America, and widening differences with European countries.

Several considerations

Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, confirmed on February 10, Iran's willingness to mediate in order to reduce the severity of the escalation between Turkey and Syria, and to facilitate talks between the two parties, the same invitation that Iranian officials who met the UN envoy to Syria, other than Pederson, who He visited Tehran two days earlier. It was noticeable that this came after the emergence of media reports revealing the participation of elements of the Afghan "Fatimid" militia, which is loyal to Tehran, in the clashes taking place in Idlib at the present time, similar to the report of the British newspaper "Telegraph" on January 26 last year.

Indeed, these moves cannot be separated from Iran's vision of the developments in the Syrian arena, on the political and security levels, and the options available to it to deal with the international and regional pressures it is exposed to at the current stage. It can be said that there are four main considerations that pushed Iran to engage in the Idlib crisis in the current period specifically, and they are:

1 Unlock isolation

Iran believes that the stage of the military conflict inside Syria is about to end, after the balance of powers has changed in favor of the Syrian army, which has been supported by Russia, Iran, and the militias loyal to it. Hence, removing the isolation from the Syrian government is gaining a priority for Iran in the current period, especially in light of the regional and international isolation that it may be exposed to in the coming stage, as one of the repercussions of the widening scope of its differences with Western countries.

In light of this, facilitating a dialogue between Syria and Turkey can serve Iran's goals in this regard, especially in light of the strong ties that Tehran is establishing with the two parties.

2 preempt Washington

Iran's rush to call for a dialogue between Turkey and Syria cannot be separated from the eagerness of the US President Donald Trump's administration to engage in the Idlib crisis, by endorsing Ankara's position as an NATO ally, according to US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, on February 4. The current, in which he said that “the United States condemns the brutal and unjustified attacks against Idlib residents,” adding: “We stand with Turkey, our ally in NATO, in the wake of the attack that killed several Turkish soldiers serving in observation posts to coordinate and stop the escalation, and we support Fully support Turkey's justified moves to defend itself A response ».

In other words, Iran was quick to engage in the crisis to anticipate the potential entitlements that could result from it, especially with regard to raising the level of security and military coordination between Washington and Ankara, and perhaps pushing the first to strengthen its presence as an international party concerned with the repercussions of that crisis, thus confusing political and military accounts Iran is in Syria again, which has begun to reformulate it based on the assumption of a gradual American withdrawal from the latter.

3 directing counter messages

By engaging in the crisis, Iran is trying to send messages that it has the ability to enhance its role as a party that cannot be ignored in the files that have not yet been resolved inside Syria, foremost of which is the Idlib file, which still represents the so-called "terrorist reservoir", as a result of the terrorist organizations' control over it. Undoubtedly, this is linked, in part, to Iran's attempt to adopt a different policy of repositioning in order to deal with the new data imposed by the killing of the leader of the "Quds Force" of the Revolutionary Guards, Qassem Soleimani, with the deputy head of the "Popular Mobilization" Iraq, Abu Mahdi Engineer, during the military strike launched by the United States of America on January 3.

As this strike clearly contributed to the confusion of Iran's regional accounts, and prompted it to review again the options available to it to deal with developments in the files that are most important to them at the political and security levels. Hence, it rushed to engage in the Idlib file in order to reduce the possibilities of crystallization of new regional data that may not necessarily coincide with its attempts to set limits for the confusion that characterized its regional interventions in the post-Soleimani killing.

4 contain the role of Moscow

Tehran does not express a clear satisfaction with the continuous coordination between Moscow and Ankara at the political and military levels inside Idlib, whose main title during the last period was "the Sochi Agreement", on the basis that this contributes to strengthening the role of the first as the main party that has the ability to manage conflict paths within Syria, as evidenced by its ability to reach security understandings with all regional and international powers involved in this conflict, including Iran's opponents.

Hence, it cannot be ruled out that Iran is trying to take advantage of the current escalation in order to enhance its role at the expense of Russia, whose differences with Turkey have expanded due to its clear support for the military measures taken by the Syrian government, which in turn Iran is participating in this approach, which is based on supporting the prospects of collapse. The Sochi Agreement »reached by Russia and Turkey on September 17, 2018, and faces difficult testing in the current period due to the continuous escalation in Idlib. This Iranian approach was reflected in the statements of the Foreign Ministry spokesman, Abbas Mousavi, on February 3, in which he said that the “Astana track (in which Iran participates alongside both Turkey and Russia) is the only possible path to solve the Syrian crisis, and it should be preserved ».

Nevertheless, the continued military escalation in Idlib may confuse Iran’s cards, especially as its call to mediate between the two sides may not receive support from Ankara, especially in the event that it tends to take more measures to support the Syrian army in that region.

- Tehran does not express a clear satisfaction with the continuous coordination between Moscow and Ankara at the political and military levels inside Idlib, whose main title during the recent period was "The Sochi Agreement".

- Iran was quick to engage in the crisis to anticipate the potential benefits that could result from it, especially with regard to raising the level of security and military coordination between Washington and Ankara, and perhaps pushing the first to strengthen its presence as an international party concerned with the repercussions of that crisis, thus confusing the political and military accounts of Iran in Syria Again, which it began to reformulate based on the assumption of a gradual American withdrawal from the latter.