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by Pierluigi Mele 27 January 2020 The Libyan scenario is increasingly unstable. Continued are the violations of the truce. Clashes also took place yesterday.These occurred in the coastal cities of Al Hisha, Wed Zumzum and Abu Qurain south of the city located 200 kilometers east of Tripoli. This was reported by sources of allied militias in the internationally recognized government of Tripoli.
Haftar's forces are advancing about 120 kilometers east of Misurata near the city of Abugrain.
At the same time, an officer of the Haftar forces said it had snatched control of two cities, Qaddaheya and Wadi Zamzam, right on the road to Abugrain.
In this context, the possibility of a solution to the great libido chaos becomes increasingly complicated and difficult. We try to take stock with Professor Michela Mercuri.
Michela Mercuri is a university professor, member of the Observatory on religious fundamentalism and terrorism of a jihadist matrix (OFT). Foreign policy analyst, consultant, author, columnist and commentator for national TV and radio programs. Its activities focus on the Mediterranean and the Middle East, analyzing the impact of history on current issues. He has signed several publications, including the book Incognita Libya - chronicles of a suspended country (2017).
Professor Mercuri, after Berlin, that is the international conference dedicated to Libya, is increasingly characterized as a fake truce between the parties. In recent days there have been fights south of Tripoli, but above all General Haftar has turned off the oil taps (causing damage for $ 318 million so far), but on Haftar's oil blackmail we will return later. Let's go back to the Berlin Conference. In commenting on the results of the summit, some international observers had spoken of "half-full glass". It seems to me, looking at the behavior of the "warlords", that the glass is completely empty. I exaggerate?
I would say even more: the glass has fallen and broken into a thousand shards and this should not surprise us. In Berlin, while the "greats of the world" approved the German plan for an embargo on the arrival of new weapons and for a political and institutional path - with the creation of a new Presidential Council, prelude to elections and a new constitution - in ex Jamahiriya was fought and weapons still continued to arrive undisturbed in the country. The fragile truce, mediated by Russia and Turkey a few days earlier, was already starting to creak, while General Khalifa Haftar ordered the blockade of oil terminals in the east. Unfortunately, the Berlin conference failed even before it started and this was foreseeable. Haftar in Moscow, just 7 days earlier, had rejected the "peace plan" agreed by Russia and Turkey. Despite his presence at various summits, his goal was, is and will be to enter Tripoli and Misrata. In other words, close the circle and conquer all of Libya. With the help of the Emirates who continue to supply him with weapons, he may be able to do so. Why accept the "onusian" plan and come to terms with Fayez al-Serraj?
Let's talk now about Haftar's blockage of oil taps. A real blackmail that of the general of Cyrenaica. Who is it aimed at and what objectives does it want to achieve?
Haftar wants to show that he has control of the country and oil wells represent the Libyan economy. It follows that controlling the wells means controlling the country. It is a test of strength and at the same time a weapon of blackmail towards the international community. It is as if the general was saying to the international actors: "either support me or the Libyan economy will remain on its knees and the problems will also be reflected on you". In fact, since Libya has been deprived of more than 800,000 barrels per day, oil prices have risen: in just over a week, the Brent price (the world reference for the crude oil market which determines 60% of prices on the market) earned nearly one dollar, reaching 66 dollars a barrel. Furthermore, with this move Haftar would like to weaken the Noc (the state-owned oil company based in Tripoli) to obtain an oil authority also in the east, an area from which the largest amount of crude is extracted. The general has repeatedly tried to circumvent the NOC - which sends the proceeds of oil and gas to the Central Bank of Tripoli, which works mainly with the Serra government - to obtain greater control over the distribution of proceeds.
The Libyan war, in some ways, can become even more dangerous than the Syrian war. Is this so?
At this moment there are all the elements to predict a serious escalation of violence that could claim further victims among the population. Turkey continues to send mercenaries to Libya to support the western militias, on the other front, in spite of any reassurance of respect for the embargo, "arms are raining" from the Emirates and continue to fight Russian mercenaries. In the last few hours, Haftar's army is advancing towards Misurata, probably to break the military axis Tripoli-Misurata, attacking the latter to make the capital lose its maximum ally. The general is acting fast before Turkish strategists take control of Tripoli operations. The scenarios are not easily predictable. Either Misrata will fall and Haftar will have the chance to get to Tripoli or we will have an energetic Turkish response with a huge bloodbath. In this case, the war that is played (also) by proxy would increasingly take on the appearance of the Syrian conflict, with Turkey on one side, Russia on the other and with the dirty game of some Gulf countries. There is another similarity with Syria: Russia and Turkey, thanks to their common economic interests (such as TurkStream) could continue to attempt an agreement. However, as has already happened, the interests of Haftar and its Gulf allies could prevail. Furthermore, the chaos produced could favor the presence of jihadists who are known to move in search of unstable theaters in which to find space to create further destabilization, functional to their expansion. Many fighters would have come to Libya from Syria and many were already present in the Libyan south where they had sheltered after the defeat suffered in Sirte in 2016. The presence of jihadists on the ground also brings us back, in some way, albeit with the necessary differentiations, at the Syrian theater. As for the "danger" factor, every war is a story in itself and is a danger tout court but, for Italy, having a conflict of this magnitude on the doorstep is certainly not reassuring.
We are talking about two absolutely fundamental actors in the Libyan scenario: Qatar and Saudi Arabia. They obviously have no oil problems. What are they looking for in Libya?
In the meantime, let's start with evidence. Qatar supports Serraj, together with Turkey, while the Saudis and, above all, the anointed Arab Emirates arm Haftar. There is a rift in the Gulf countries and it is dictated by various interests which, of course, have little to do with oil since they are producer countries. In the first place, interests are geopolitical: for the Emirates and Saudi Arabia it is vital to curb the advance of the Muslim Brothers who are in the west. For the Saudis, in particular, it is essential to expand the Madkhalite current in Libya (an ultra-conservative Salafist current founded by the Saudi sheikh Rabi al-Madkhali, in the pay of the Saudi royal house) in opposition to the Muslim brotherhood. This is also why Riad supports the general. Furthermore, for the Emirates, the European idea that the Libyan conflict must be resolved on a diplomatic and non-military level is not acceptable. Hence Abu Dhabi's clear commitment not to let Haftar miss weapons. On the other side is Qatar which has been a major supporter of the anti-Gaddafi revolts. The reasons why Doha is close to the Tripoli-Ankara axis, are of an internal nature to the Gulf Cooperation Council where there has been more than a "break" between Qatar and the other components, especially since leading the country there is Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, who forced his father to abdicate, showing a much more unprejudiced attitude than his predecessor. Hence the support for the Muslim Brotherhood but also for some groups in the extremist galaxy to counterbalance the influence of the former Gulf allies, the Emirates and the Saudis in the first place.
Let's look at Macron. Libya is proving, perhaps not so paradoxically, a very tough sovereignist. What is Macron's real goal? Libya has been the ultimate expression of Macron's hypernationalist policy in the foreign scenario. The French President openly supports General Haftar to pursue his interests in terms of energy and hegemony, often in total opposition to the European and UN line. Twice he has summoned conferences on Libya completely unilaterally, inviting Haftar and Serraj and only warning the members of the European Union, Italy in the first place. A few days ago, France refused to vote for a European resolution, also supported by the United States, which condemned Haftar's blocking of oil production. No further examples are needed to say that Macron, despite his presence in Berlin, only supports and exclusively Haftar and has no intention of coming to terms with the other members of the European Union for a more inclusive line. I will say more: the French president at the moment, as far as Libya is concerned, is the disruptive element of the EU.
Erdogan and Putin, the new Caliph and the new czar, are playing a parallel game. Indeed, to use an "ancient" term, they are realizing a parallel convergence. For both, the game is to extend the sphere of influence to the detriment of the EU and the US. BUT are we sure that this link is stainless?
There are no stainless ties in a world in which each state pursues its own national interest only. At most there are "variable geometry alliances" based on individual common interests. It is the case of Russia and Turkey that in Libya (as in Syria) have tried to find an agreement not for the good of the Libyans but because they have interests that go far beyond the former Jamahiriya. At stake is not only the billionaire deal of Russia's sale of S-400 missile systems to Turkey but also energy issues such as the aforementioned TurkStream project, the gas pipeline that will allow Russian supplies to arrive directly in Turkey through the Black Sea. Russia is Ankara's second economic partner, which in 2018 saw its exports to Moscow increase by 50% compared to previous years. No other words are needed to explain how many interests are involved and to what extent. Although the agreement for a ceasefire in Libya, drawn up by Ankara and Moscow, was short-lived, I do not think that the functional alliance between the two could be affected. In the same way, as Berlin has shown us, these players have managed to marginalize an EU incapable of speaking with one voice and the United States disinterested in the Libyan dossier. The only risk that Russia could run in the Libyan quadrant is that of being marginalized by the Emirates, Haftar's true supporters in this advance.
We are talking about two actors looking for an author. EU and Italy. for them, after Berlin, is the glass half full or half empty?
Again I have to say that the glass is broken. Berlin was the litmus test of the inconsistency of Italian politics in Libya and the EU. Our diplomatic efforts, although late, have not been rewarded by the Union which has relegated us to the second row (in all senses). However, Europe itself has proved totally incapable of mediating a solution for Libya, even if it had the main players involved here (Russia, Turkey, Emirates etc.). The truth is that if Italy wants to have a voice in Europe it must first have it in Libya but for now it is silent. However, we still have good trust capital with some Libyan groups, beyond Haftar and Serraj. A trust developed over the years but that is inexorably fading. Only by reopening a dialogue with local actors who do we know better than anyone else can we hope to carve out a place for ourselves again in Libya and, perhaps, reflexively, also in Europe.
And Trump's US didn't say anything?
The US doesn't care much about Libya and they act accordingly. They sent Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to Berlin more by protocol than by real conviction. The American embassy in Libya has issued a condemnation statement for the closure of the oil structures by Haftar (moreover on twitter) more out of duty than out of real conviction. However, it is clear that, albeit from a distance, the US is rooting for Haftar because its Gulf sponsors are the main American commercial partners, especially for the sale of weapons.
What do you think is the way to stabilize the Libyan powder keg?
Unfortunately, there is no diplomatic solution in a state at war. There are various military options which, however, should be implemented under European aegis or, better, by the United Nations, but these would find the ostracism of many states, including for example France which wants a victory tout court in Haftar. So even the military option appears far away. I believe that, unfortunately, the fate of Libya, at least for now, is marked: a "controlled instability" with moments of more or less intense tension between the local actors and their international sponsors. For now, this is the only win-win solution for the great regional powers, but unfortunately not for the Libyan people.