Translator introduction
In its first response to the assassination of the Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, Tehran launched a batch of "Fajr" missiles targeting the American "Ain al-Assad" base in Iraq and another US base in Erbil, as part of what it called "Soleimani", a process that came in response On the assassination of "Soleimani" a few days ago, the Iranians have warned their allies, that they will not hesitate to bomb any base that becomes a "platform for the Americans" if they take a response to bombing their bases.
In view of the Iranian response strategy, this may be only the beginning, as experts expected Iran to escalate by removing restrictions on the uranium enrichment file, which has already happened, to finally ease Iran from the embarrassment that has governed its relationship with the rest of the joint comprehensive working agreement parties from the Europeans and their successors. The Russians and the Chinese practically canceled the agreement.
In this context, the article predicts a number of possible reactions to the Iranians, whether medium or long-term, compared to the strained relations that ruled Tehran's relationship with Washington starting from the Afghan war and passing through the Syrian file, and up to the Iraqi file, which is at the top of the list of Iranian-American hostility, Rebekah The nuclear file.
Article text
Qassem Soleimani, commander-in-chief of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, was one of the most influential figures in the Islamic Republic and a special kind of peer to the United States. Where he stood at the head of Iran's efforts to arm and train Shiite militias in Iraq, and later became one of the main sources of Iran's political influence in Mesopotamia, especially through its efforts to fight the Islamic State. And its influence extended to the Syrian territories, under the supervision of Iran's policies in providing arms and support necessary to save Bashar al-Assad, including the deployment of nearly 50,000 Shiite militia fighters in Syria. He was the main character in Iran's relationship with the Lebanese Hezbollah, by helping the party to provide the missiles and missiles that have long spared Israel. He was at the forefront of Iran's strategy to arm the Houthis in Yemen. For these reasons and more, Soleimani was considered a popular hero in Iran and the region. In short, the United States took a massive escalation step by assassinating one of the most prominent and powerful figures in the Middle East.
Just a year ago
The Trump administration says Soleimani is a terrorist, and that his assassination was a proactive defense step that prevented an imminent attack. Whatever the degree of credibility in this claim, the United States would not have taken such a step had it not been for the reckless policy that accompanied the presidency from day one. In May 2018, Trump withdrew from the JCPOA and adopted a policy of "maximum pressure" that translated into economic sanctions on Iran. For more than a year, Iran has been cautious in responding to the United States by efforts to isolate the latter from the diplomatic arena and to obtain economic exemptions from other parties to the agreement.
Iran is likely to avoid an all-out war with the United States. But the few events that have occurred in recent days offer the possibility for Iranian recklessness
However, this cautious approach has not yielded tangible results. By May 2019, Iran had decided to break the agreement and escalate the tension. The first step in this escalation came, in an amalgam attack against a number of international cargo ships in May and June. Then Iran landed an American drone, in connection with an open struggle against the United States of America. In September, Iran launched missiles towards the Abqaiq facility and Khurais emigration, which are the most important infrastructure points for an oil facility in the world. Then the Shiite militias launched missile attacks against American bases in Iraq, killing an American contractor last week. Ultimately, retaliatory military actions by the United States resulted in the assassination of Soleimani.
The most important question now is: How will Iran respond? The behavior of the Islamic Republic over the past months and, given its history, indicates that it may not rush to respond. Instead, it will try to embrace an approach it considers more effective for it, cautiously and patiently, and is likely to avoid an all-out war with the United States. But the few events that have occurred in recent days offer the possibility for Iranian recklessness. Soleimani clearly did not believe that the United States would escalate matters to this extent, otherwise he would not have been present with fragile protection forces, within a stone's throw of American forces in Iraq. Trump has often stressed that he does not want to start a new war in the Middle East, but here we are on the cliff.
Ways to fight back and counter strike .. Is it war?
| The effects of the American raid on Baghdad airport that led to the death of Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis (communication sites) |
The United States of America must, in the worst case, not rule out the possibility of finding itself in conflict with Shiite militias in Iraq that could target American forces, diplomats, and civilians. Iraq has been the scene of American strikes and is therefore the most reasonable place for Iran to respond immediately. Moreover, Shiite militias have started to escalate their activities in advance over the past six months. Especially since it is one of the most cooperative Iranian arms and has a lot of motivation, given that Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis, one of the most senior leaders of these militias, spent his life in the bombing with Soleimani.
Protecting the American presence in Iraq remains an open question. But the security question, which today is a complex issue, is not the only problem. The assassination represented a major violation of "Iraqi sovereignty", especially since it was carried out unilaterally, without the government's approval, so that it has become an increasing political pressure on Iraqi officials to expel the remaining American forces. Many Iraqis do not care about the United States or Iran, and all they want is to restore their homeland, and the events will not put them in the midst of a confrontation between Iran and the United States. There is a possibility for matters to get worse for Iraqis. But the ill-conceived withdrawal of the United States under fire could lead to real dangers. As confronting ISIS remains a real problem, and if the United States is forced to leave Iraq, all past efforts will go unheeded. ISIS is quietly observing events now, but it might benefit from the chaos of the American withdrawal or a US-Iranian struggle to improve its situation in Iraq.
Even if Trump pretends to show restraint in the coming weeks, the desire for revenge inside Iran, and the political momentum that this desire is gathering, may lead the United States and Iran to a comprehensive conflict.
The complications of the assassination may not be confined to Iraq alone. The Lebanese Hezbollah, which has a close relationship with Iran, is likely to respond to Iranian demands and attack American targets in Lebanon. And if Iran decides to avoid a massive escalation in Lebanon, Hezbollah operatives are spread out across the region and can attack the United States anywhere else. The party could launch attacks against Israeli targets, although this possibility is weak. Hezbollah wants to avoid an all-out war with Israel that extends to the destruction of all of Lebanon, and the Trump administration has won international praise for the killing of Soleimani, which increases the likelihood that reprisals will target the United States directly.
Iran can launch attacks against American targets in Saudi Arabia or the UAE or oil installations in the Gulf. The accuracy of Iranian missile strikes on the Abqaiq oil facility last September surprised the United States and the rest of the world by surprise, though it was carried out with the aim of keeping the attack limited and symbolic. In the current climate, Iran can become more aggressive, especially given that it has demonstrated impressive success in the field of missile strikes, by carrying out effective attacks and avoiding reprisals over the past six months.
But we should expect Iran to accelerate its nuclear program. Since the Trump administration withdrew from the nuclear deal in May 2018, Iran's responses have been very cautious in resorting to the response via the nuclear file. But after a year of staying in the agreement, in May 2018, Iran began to violate the agreement increasingly by taking small steps at a pace not exceeding one response every 60 days. Just one week remained for the next 60-day quorum, and it is hard to imagine a cautious response following Soleimani's death. So, at best, Iran will start enriching uranium to 19.75%, which is a huge step toward making a nuclear weapon.
Iran recently threatened to go beyond withdrawing from the NPT or expelling inspectors. These are dangerous moves, especially since most analysts believed that until this week, Tehran was unlikely to take them. But it will be among the options currently on the table.
Perhaps the most likely act that Iran could launch was to carry out a terrorist attack on American "Homeland" security forces or to attempt to kill a US official of the same prestige as Soleimani. It may be more difficult for Iran to launch an attack on American facilities or personalities abroad, but it may consider it the most appropriate option for it. The last time that Iran tried to launch an attack on the United States was in 2011, when the American intelligence and criminal forces thwarted an attempt to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to Iran, Adel Al-Jubeir, by exploding a restaurant where he was having lunch in Washington. At that time, the attack was thwarted early and easily due to the Iranian port's lack of necessary professionalism. This failure was an indication that Iran is weaker in carrying out external operations than it is in the Middle East, a conclusion supported by thwarting a number of Iranian bombing attempts in Denmark and France this year. So while Iran may try to carry out an attack inside the United States, it will need a lot of luck to succeed.
Because we all know Trump
If the Trump administration is indeed smart, it will do its utmost to strengthen security in American facilities and protect its citizens simultaneously while absorbing some of the inevitable attacks coming. It should also communicate with Iran through US partners who have good relations with this country, such as the Sultanate of Oman, to avoid escalation along with drawing common red lines from under the table to avoid Iranian miscalculation.
Finally, Trump must be satisfied with this victory, and he can boast that he has the upper hand over the Iranians in killing Soleimani, instead of taking escalatory steps. But this kind of caution seems to run counter to Trump's nature. Even if it pretends to show restraint in the coming weeks, the desire for revenge inside Iran, and the political momentum that this desire is gathering, may lead the United States and Iran to a comprehensive conflict.
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Translation: Farah Essam.
This article is translated from Foreign Affairs and does not necessarily represent Meedan.