Does religion play a role in Ethiopia's current conflicts?

Translator introduction

Since Abi Ahmed took power in April 2018, Ethiopia has been experiencing a difficult struggle seeking peaceful democratization that would enable it to achieve revival and stability without descending into chaos. We have translated in " Maidan " a number of articles that follow the course of these developments, especially the article "The Dangers of Disintegration and Collapse of Society ... Will Ethiopia Become Another Yugoslavia?" Perhaps the most important thing in that article is the warning from "that the liberalization of the political system in a society suffers from Ethnic polarization is risky, because the freedoms of expression guaranteed by openness can easily be turned into selective arenas and tribunals for specific ethnic groups with the intent to target and expose pent-up grievances.

Last week, Ethiopia witnessed unfortunate incidents of violence when extremists burned four mosques in the town of Mouta, in the area of ​​Gujam in Amhara Region, after which mass demonstrations erupted across the country, denouncing the attack on mosques and Muslim-owned shops. "And is this the case, so are we in the emergence of a situation in which religion represents the contentious factor? Do we expect a rise in the rate of religious violence? Is this religious violence considered a new matter in the country?" In order to understand the dimensions of these events, we are pleased at the Meydan website to translate an article on the role of religion in the conflicts in Ethiopia, written by the Norwegian Professor "Terje Østebø", a specialist in Islam studies in Ethiopia.

The text of the report

Ethiopia has long been a place of celebration as a unique case of a country with peaceful relations between religions, but this image has recently been disturbed by the appearance of what appears to be a wave of religious violence in the country. Reports - confirmed and unconfirmed - spoke of victims of violence based on religious grounds, on attacks against Christians and Muslims, on burning churches and demolishing mosques, and on people seeking asylum in churches. According to those reports, more than 100 Orthodox Christians have been killed since July of this year, and more than 30 Orthodox churches have been burned, most of them in the eastern part [1] of the country and in the "Sidama" region [2] located in the southern part of The region of "Nations, Nationalities and Southern Peoples", which led to the outbreak of large demonstrations [3] in the northern part of the country in September with the organization of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. And are we, then, are we emerging a situation in which religion is the contentious factor? Do we expect a rise in the rate of religious violence? Is this religious violence considered a new matter in the country?

It is clear from the way in which religion has emerged in the above-mentioned events that it has become a new development that will contribute to the exacerbation of current tension, and will - above all - create new hostile conflicts and perceptions. In addition, considering religion as the engine of violence and the claim that these events are religiously motivated will double the severity of the religious dimension in these conflicts. What is particularly interesting here is the observation by the government of stressing the role of religion and considering it part of the problem, and this trend was demonstrated - for example - in the statement of the Prime Minister, which included an explicit reference to the religious affiliation of victims of the recent violence.

On the other side, we find that the developments of the current events are closely linked to the ongoing ethnic conflicts in the country, and therefore these events cannot be fully understood without realizing the interrelationship that exists between religion and race in Ethiopia. Likewise, an understanding of these events requires us to study the importance of the religious and ethnic dimensions, a careful study according to their implications in local contexts.

At the same time, the current events express a broader trend related to the increasing inter-religious tensions in Ethiopia in the past decade, and the majority of these events have taken on a local character, most of which have been linked to the conflict over building mosques, desecration of religious books or religious monuments, and the dispute over the celebration of religious rites. Of course, there are several factors behind the fragility of the relationship between religious sects, but they are all factors closely related to the great transformations that took place in the Ethiopian religious scene in recent decades, where it has become more dynamic and more flexible than before. In the end, relations and boundaries between religions are violated, redrawn, negotiated, and then again contested. Thus, the developments taking place in Ethiopia can only be fully understood by studying these interrelated dynamics between religion and ethnicity.

In this study, I will try to analyze the current situation more fully, to see whether the current violence is related to the complex developments that took place in the country during the past decades or whether it is a result of it. In the first part, I discuss the interrelationship between religion and ethnicity and its implications for the current conflict. Also, in the second part, I will address the issue of reshaping the religious scene in Ethiopia during the past decades, to shed light on four major trends that have had a mutual impact on the various religious communities in Ethiopia. My analysis in presenting these visions is based on the outcome of two decades of research in the study of religion in Ethiopia, and on the conclusions of a recent book project that examines the interrelationship between religion and race in Ethiopia.

Religion and study of Ethiopia

Despite the great importance of religion among Ethiopian society, we note however that it is an issue that has been neglected by foreign and local researchers alike, which led - in the end - to our weak knowledge of contemporary religious discourse in Ethiopia. It is true that the issue of religion was addressed as one of the topics of history science in Ethiopia - especially in the prominent book "Tadis Tamrat" and the tag "Church and State" [4] - as a secondary issue of politics. This perspective, which focuses on the study of the relationship between the Church and the State, has not only led to the conversion of the Orthodox Church into a state-like institution, but has also masked our understanding of Christianity as an active religion practiced in the country. In addition, this approach has tended to make other religions in Ethiopia, such as Islam, appear to be invisible and insignificant.

Although the neglect of the study of religion can be partly attributed to the secular orientations of foreign scholars, the situation was worse for Ethiopian academics who were influenced by the political developments that took place in the seventies, where they looked at the history of Ethiopia from the perspective of class struggle. The study of religion continued to be ignored even when the concept of race was replaced by the idea of ​​class in the early 1990s, in the wake of the activity of resistance movements based on ethnic bases and the inauguration of the "Popular Front for the Liberation of Reading" of ideological rhetoric throughout Ethiopia, based on which a federal system was based on ethnic bases. This trend has sparked intense public discussions about the concept of race and the boundaries of each ethnic group in the country, and in particular the bulk of the discussion has gone into the accusations of some ethnic entities related to the exercise of domination and domination in the past and the prospects for ethnic diversity in the country. In conclusion, these discussions produced new literature devoted to the study of the past and present of ethnicities in Ethiopia. In his commentary on a lecture I gave on “Islam in Ethiopia” a former Marxist fighter from the Popular Front for the Reading, summarized this general disregard for the role of religion in Ethiopia by saying: “I didn’t [understand] the matter. We thought that religion would disappear but it kept reappearing Repeatedly".

Fortunately, the revival of the religious phenomenon in recent decades has aroused a growing interest in questions related to religion, and the literature on Islam, the Orthodox Church and the Protestant community in Ethiopia has proliferated. Consequently, scholars and journalists have become concerned with the role of religion in people's lives as a component of the social fabric, and as a fundamental component of the country's sectarian identities. Nevertheless, many uninformed areas still lack detailed knowledge about it, especially with regard to the role of religion in the socio-political field, the role of religion in power relations and the making of others or others, and its contribution to forming distinct identities. Moreover, religious conflicts continue to capture the attention of society.

Ethnicity and religion in Ethiopia

The Oromo proverb that says “You and I are like the Muslim and the Amhara”, and the proverb that corresponds to it in the Amharic language, is a clear and powerful example that expresses the deep feelings of mistrust prevailing in Ethiopia among races. Although the ideal refers to religious difference, it does not necessarily express religion only, but also refers to race in its broadest sense. What is striking about this example is that religion is used as a metaphor for expressing seemingly intractable differences, confirming the importance of religious difference in Ethiopia. Another interesting thing in this example is the use of a term with religious connotations such as the term "Muslim" (Islaama) along with the term "Amhara" which is usually understood as an ethnic term, as it indicates at the same time the complications involved in the concepts of religion, race and relationship The document between them.

For example, until the early 1980s the term "Muslim" (Islaama) remained the most common among the group "Arsi Ormoo" when identifying themselves, while the term "Oromo" was not common in circulation, but there were those who opposed its use And link it to pagan or "Awama". This does not mean, of course, that the term "Muslim" (Islaama) of the group "Orsi Oromo" refers exclusively to being a Muslim, but also includes a reference to their race and their religious belief. Thus, being a member of the "Orsi Oromo" group means being a "Muslim" (Islaama), and being a Muslim requires that you belong to the "Orci Oromo" group. This is more evident than the way in which they define their language as "Avan Oromo or Avan Islam". The same thing with the Amhara, they call "the language of Muslims" the Oromo language.

The term "Amhara" is also a term of a flexible nature, and its significance has gradually changed over the past years from the term inclusive of the Ethiopian identity to a term that has explicit ethnic connotations. Although people in the main regions of the Amhara identify themselves according to the areas from which they hail such as "Kondar", "Gujam" or "Lulu", the term Amhara - as a collective term expressing collective identity - has always been associated with Christianity and includes a clear religious dimension based on the representation of Christians. The same applies to Orthodox Christianity, as it was not only an essential part of people's daily life, but was also the dominant factor in shaping a national identity that was based on shared faith in the Sulaymani myth, in the king the Lord chose and believing in themselves as a blessed nation.

This religious dimension - mentioned above - played a pivotal role in shaping relations between the religious sects in Ethiopia, which made people, in "Belle" and in other southern regions of Ethiopia, usually associate the word "Amhara" with the image of an outsider and a stranger (neftegna), especially Christian. Therefore, the campaigns of "Menelik" and the forced assimilation of the South were not only considered as subjugation to the hegemony of an intruder regime, but also as subjugation to a Christian kingdom. On the other hand, the invading northern powers [represented in the Amhara] were also showing in their behavior a clear contemptive attitude towards "non-Christian" non-Christians, and they are called upon to be backward, primitive and pagan. As a result of this, the relationship between Muslims in southeastern Ethiopia, on the one hand, and the state and local skilled settlers, on the other, has remained tense throughout the twentieth century. In this case, religion represented a strong aspect of this enmity, and the negative treatment that is supposed to have taken place on Muslims has been interpreted as a treatment that took place because of their religious belief. Even today, the term “foals” means Christian. For example, the group “Arsi Oromo” calls flesh slaughtered in the Christian way “foon Amhara”.

In this sense, religion, as a factor in the production of inequality and discrimination in Ethiopia, is a historical fact even if it is ignored in contemporary studies. If there was general agreement that Ethiopia's past was marked by widespread ethnic and racial discrimination and inequalities, then it can be said that the manifestations of discrimination and inequality due to religion in Ethiopia were more severe. If one’s mastery of the Amharic language and its use of an Amharic name and “Amharic culture” have historically been considered crucial factors in the process of integration into the Ethiopian society, communication with the elite, and recognition of one's affiliation with the Ethiopian nation, converting to Christianity remains - however - the fundamental criterion that qualifies for political positions It allows one to integrate and accept as an Ethiopian. Thus, the process of converting to Christianity was more than just a change of faith, it is - according to "Messay Kebede" - a process of "naturalization and recognition of citizenship" [5].

No wonder that most of the group who hesitated to convert to Christianity were Muslims, because adopting them for them meant losing the religious and social identity, but submitting to a "foreign" power. Since Christianity was the main component of Ethiopian nationalism, the refusal to convert to Christianity placed Muslims in the category of "followers of the" opposite "religion, that is, in a position contrary to everything that is Ethiopian. Despite this, the continued existence of Muslims in the country as "another" is fraught with a number of dangers, which in turn necessitate the affirmation of the Christian character of Ethiopia. This character - Christianity of Ethiopia - is supposed to have a clear impact on how we understand the relations between Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia, especially since this relationship is celebrated in a simplified way to the extent that it is described as peaceful and harmonious relations.

The recent revival of religious phenomena has increased religious enthusiasm and the formation of more exclusive religious identities, but there is not enough evidence to assure us that widespread militancy is associated with the politicization of religion.

Reuters

There is no doubt that the interfaith interaction in Ethiopia was popular at the grassroots level, and that the relations between the two sects were generally friendly, but it is important to remember that a peaceful relationship does not mean religious equivalence. The issue that must be emphasized here is that the sites and centers of the two sects have been clearly demarcated, and this in turn has produced a specific form of asymmetric relationship between the two sects. As I mentioned elsewhere [6], this peaceful coexistence would not have occurred without the existence of this unequal character in the relations between Christians and Muslims. In other words, it is not possible to understand the recent developments in Ethiopia, including the recent emergence of religion in conflicts, without understanding the close relationship that exists between religion and race. The question that arises here is: Why have these conflicts occurred now?

There are a number of reasons behind this conflict, perhaps the most obvious one, of course, is the decline of authoritarian state control. Other causes include the cracking of social structures, related to the increasing number of youth, unemployment, urban expansion, and the dissolution of intergenerational bonds. Moreover, it is worth knowing the change in the religious scene in Ethiopia during the past decades.

Religious landscape changes

It is common to say that the escalation of inter-religious tension is caused by the expansion of religious extremism, especially among Muslims in Ethiopia. However, I would argue that this interpretation is not only viewed as breaching simplification, but rather as completely inaccurate. It is true that the recent revival of the religious phenomenon has increased religious enthusiasm and the formation of more exclusive religious identities, but there is not enough evidence to assure us that the widespread militancy is associated with the politicization of religion. That is why I do not think that the escalation of the current violence can be explained from the perspective of religious extremism, but rather it cannot be understood by relying on developments that occur within a single religious sect. Instead, understanding these events necessitates a deeper examination of the religious landscape.

The religious scene in Ethiopia is a truly unique scene, as it is made up of three denominations that include Muslims, Orthodox and Protestants. Although each of them is considered a completely separate sect from the other, it nevertheless remains related to each other, especially in terms of its influence on the developments taking place within each one. This interdependence is evident because it often involves competition, violation of religious boundaries, and acquisition of a place in the public sphere, which in the end leads to tension and sometimes to conflict.

These developments and changes related to the religious scene are increasing as a result of the emergence of reform movements within the three sects. Since these movements, especially those that have revitalized among Muslims, have been informal, it is correct to speak of them as reformist currents. It was common for these currents to call for a revival of heritage in order to purify religious practices from deviations, prepare religious individuals and expand the scope of proselytizing.

Based on the foregoing, the transformations taking place in the religious scene can be understood by understanding four main, interrelated and mutually supportive paths that prevail within the religious sects. The first track relates to the expansion of religious space boundaries, in both symbolic and material terms. The most obvious form of this expansion is embodied in the activities of evangelization, especially evangelization by the Protestant community. This activity led to an influx of Orthodox congregations into the Protestant Church, while some schools of the Church themselves began adopting a strategy that sought to reach Muslims. On the other hand, the expansion of the religious scene space draws attention to how religions have become more present in the public sphere. This appears, for example, in changing the rules of religious dress and increasing the performance of religious rituals in public places. In this context, it is particularly noteworthy that the number of places of worship is increasing, whether this is reflected in the multiplication of mosques or the rise in the number of Protestant churches - in particular - throughout the country.

Another aspect of this expansion is linked to the efforts of some Muslims who try to carve out a place in the public sphere. These efforts come from the idea that Islam is a comprehensive religion that covers all aspects of life, and therefore Muslims must be more interactive in all sectors of social and political life. The owners of this approach believe that the embodiment of Islamic values ​​through such interaction would lead to a progressive and ethical society.

The second track can be described as the "protection of religious space" path, which is especially activated to respond to proselytizing efforts, because the expansion of the space of any group is interpreted as a violation by others. As expected, we notice that the feeling of a violation of religious space is more prevalent among the followers of the Orthodox community and also among Muslims in the Beghi (Wollega) area, in 2006 and in 2010, where Protestant churches were burned against accusations alleging that their development activities are nothing but Just an excuse to preach. At the same time, Ethiopian Muslims have tended to protect their religious space, due to the historical marginalization they were subjected to, forcing them to adopt a strategy of self-isolation.

Although the Muslims - as I will explain later - have gained more confidence in themselves and have become more open, but despite this there is a "withdrawal policy" [7] that still prevails among many Ethiopian Salafis. The irony is that this same group - i.e. the Salafis - is accused by the regime and foreign observers of being an active Islamic group, while the Ethiopian Salafi movement devotes its efforts to maintaining the purification of Islamic rituals and beliefs, and is therefore a movement with little interest in broader political and social issues.

The third track relates to the sectarian dispute over religious space, through which Protestants and Muslims in particular seek to challenge the cultural hegemony of the Orthodox. While Protestants confronted this hegemony in a gradual and non-confrontational manner, Muslims protested more openly against what they considered the dominance of Christianity over the state in Ethiopia, and indicated that despite the ruling coalition policy related to freedom of religion under a secular system, there was still a bias for Christianity in Ethiopia It undermines the foundations of true equality between religions.

Among the concrete examples cited are the continued prohibition of building mosques [8] in Aksum and Lalibela, places where Christians consider the Orthodox to be holy. Therefore, the endeavors of Muslims to gain recognition as Ethiopians and to view Islam as an integral part of Ethiopia's history is an attempt to make demands that correct their historical status. However, these demands, especially their criticism of religious bias, are considered by many Christians as critiques of the foundational pillars of Ethiopian identity. Any attack against religious heritage and the status quo in the country is immediately interpreted as an attack against Christians and against Ethiopians. Thus, the presence of Muslims became more prominent and gained more confidence in themselves, which they confronted to correct the balance of balance between the established religions in the country. However, this matter has become a source of resentment and discomfort among others who, in turn, find it difficult to understand the changing religious scene, and they tend to believe that Islam is expanding and taking on extremism.

The fourth track, which can be described as the path of "restoring religious space", refers specifically to the situation of the "Ethiopian Orthodox Unification Church" and how it was forced to maneuver to align the heritage of the ancient past with the variables of the religious scene imposed by the new political realities in Ethiopia. Although the new federal and secular reality has forced the Orthodox Church to reduce its political and religious roles, it nevertheless considers religious heritage an essential pillar of the Ethiopian nation. Moreover, there is a sense of loss among the Orthodox and a feeling that they are being attacked by rivals of other religions, which prompted them to make efforts to restore their "lost space".

The Assembly of the Saints, which appeared in the late 1980s, was the most important actor working on the project to restore the lost space, reinforce the Orthodox identity and confront external challenges of the Marxist ideology of the “gendarmerie system” and activities of the Protestant church. The Assembly also affirmed the position of the Orthodox Church in relation to society and national identity, by expressing the importance of the historical Orthodox Church and calling for the restoration of this legal status. This invitation became evident during Orthodox festivities - especially in 2009 - when young people were displaying T-shirts with the slogan "Ethiopia Christian Island", "Ethiopia, Christianity, Baptism", and "One Baptism and One Religion" And one country. "

Religion and the cause of ethnic unity

Although religion and race are working to strengthen collective identities - as previously mentioned - religion also tends to amputate ethnic ties and create a new discourse that divides within one ethnicity in Ethiopia. This kind of discord was evident in Erisha's celebrations this year, when some Muslim scholars invited the Oromo Muslims not to participate in the celebrations under the pretext that "Erisha celebrations" were pagan rituals. Moreover, religion also plays a role in the rise in the nationalism of the Amhara, who sees Christianity as an integral part of the Amara identity. The establishment of the National Amma Movement (NaMA) seems to have contributed to the sharpening of the ethnicity of the Christian Amra [9], which sparked the reaction of the most prestigious Muslims, especially in the "Lulu" region, who felt excluded due to the predominant Christian tone of the movement. However, the current discourse of nationalist movements tends to ignore the role of religion in stirring discord within a single ethnicity, but I still think it is something that should not be underestimated.

Those who try to understand the current events in Ethiopia must realize the role of religion in producing national discourse and the negotiations conducted by various religious identities.

Reuters

Of course, this type of conflict is linked to Ethiopia's ethnic history, where the thorny relations between the "Showa Oromo" Christians and the Oromo Muslims in the southeast of the country are a good example of it. The "Showa Oromo" groups, or "Salale" as they are commonly referred to, started to migrate to southern Ethiopia from the late 1940's onwards. The locals still considered them different and strangers, and religion had a role behind this paranoid view. The Christians of "Showa Oromo" were called the Amra by others and also considered themselves Amara and also called "Muslims" the local Oromo. This difference between the two groups in the Peel region developed into an open conflict between "Arsi Oromo" and "Showa Oromo" during the Bell uprising in the 1960s. Given the control of the Muslims of the "Orsi Oromo" to lead the uprising, it was classified by the "Showa Oromo" Islamic movement.

When the last group sided with the state in the uprising, the uprising revolutionaries targeted it, which led to a cycle of bitter violence in the region. In addition, another similar violence erupted upon the arrival of the SALF movement, which was controlled by the Arce Oromo group in the 1970s, where it was also classified as an Islamic movement [by opposing parties]. The same thing happened in the 1990s when the local residents of Showa Oromo classified the Oromo Liberation Front in Bell as a Muslim movement. As a result, the "Showa Oromo" group placed its full weight behind the Oromo People 's Democratic Organization (OPDO), now known as the Oromo Democratic Party (ODP). In conclusion, they have controlled the joints of government structures in Bell for more than a decade. Although the factors of religious division between the two Oromian groups have declined over the years, their roots remain.

In sum, those who try to understand the current events in Ethiopia must realize the role of religion in producing national discourse, negotiations conducted by various religious identities, and the critical importance that issues of religious difference continue to have. Rather than understanding religion as a secondary matter of racial boundaries or as an aid to economic, social and political developments, I say that religion was - and still is - most important in producing political narratives and in creating distinct groups with experiences of belonging and perceptions of "self" and "the other" ". Moreover, religion remains a key and decisive factor in [fueling] hostile relationships that have become more and more evident in open conflicts.

-------------------------------------------------- -----------------

This article is translated from Addis Standard and does not necessarily reflect Meedan site.