By Christophe BoisbouvierPosted on 02-12-2019Modified the 02-12-2019 at 11:27

A national tribute is given this Monday afternoon in France to the thirteen soldiers killed in Mali in the collision of two helicopters during a combat operation against jihadists. A ceremony at the Invalides, in Paris, in the presence of Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. This tribute will be given as French President Emmanuel Macron has announced that he is ready to review "the methods of intervention" of France in the Sahel. What changes are possible and / or desirable? Jean-Hervé Jezequel, director of the Sahel project at the International Crisis Group is our guest.

Rfi: Jean Hervé Jézéquel, after the death of these thirteen French soldiers in Mali, what can change in the war in the Sahel?

Jean-Hervé Jézéquel: President Macron himself said that he considered that options were on the table, that we needed to reopen discussions on strategic ambitions in the Sahel. But I do not think that in the short term the question of withdrawal is one of the possibilities. One of the possible options is, indeed, to strengthen the military means by bringing in other contingents. There is a call of the foot which is made towards other European neighbors. Also a call to the African subregion. On the side of ECOWAS, there are ongoing discussions about the possibility, also, to reinforce the investment of West African countries in the fight in the Sahel.

I think one of the dangers would be to lock up the question of revising the strategy only in a military option. Basically, we must look beyond. If we want to lead an effective fight against insurrections in the Sahel, what is also needed are tools that make it possible to clearly distinguish the terrorist actors who are moved by a more global agenda, which are finally rather few in number, and the mass of local insurgents, who are motivated by local motivations. And basically, the military tool makes it difficult to distinguish these two categories of actors. More political tools would probably be more useful.

The thirteen French soldiers died during a pursuit of a column of the EIGS of Abu Walid al-Sahraoui. You, who, in a recent report, advocated dialogue with some jihadists, such as Katiba Macina in central Mali, is it possible, in your view, to dialogue with the EIGS of Abu Walid al-Sahraoui?

When you look at the composition of the EIGS, you find a whole group of young Fulani lieutenants who, ten years ago, were members of local militias who were mainly in demand for protection, in search of safety and security. dialogue with their own state to try to get positions in the army, in the National Guard. Ten years later, these same people have become dangerous international terrorists with whom we can no longer discuss. I think that's the division that needs to be questioned. It would be good to expand the group of people we can talk to. This is not to say that the entire group to which the Nigerian, Malian and international forces are confronted in this region, are willing to dialogue. But within these groups, there are people who are driven by essentially local agendas. The longer we wait, the more we radicalize positions, the less this type of political dialogue will be possible.

This Monday afternoon, President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta will be alongside his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron, during the ceremony at Invalides. How do you interpret this gesture?

It's a gesture, I think, a bit of a normal tribute from the Malian president. After, indeed, in Mali, some consider that there is as double standards, that the president may not be enough visible enough, too, for losses internally. There have been debates, for example, on the desirability of creating monuments, to have also ceremonies in honor of Malian soldiers, sons of the Malian homeland who fell during the fighting.

And after the death of these thirteen French soldiers, does the anti-French feeling that seems to rise in Bamako, can continue to strengthen, or on the contrary can diminish?

I think we are on a rather long trend of reinforcing this anti-French feeling. When we followed a little social networks after this announcement, there was a lot of conspiracy theories that circulated already in the hours that followed. I think we are indeed in a period (of denigration) of the motivations of the French intervention. There is a reason for that. And it is true that, for example, there are undoubtedly a number of manipulations of social networks, partly by local actors who disapprove of this presence, or by local actors who also want to hide their own responsibilities, or why not, by third-states that might have an interest.

But I believe that, to see in this rise of anti-French feeling that manipulations of social networks, would be a mistake. It reflects something else. It is because there is really, in the end, the feeling that France has been one of the leaders of the answers to the Sahelian insurrections and that this answer does not work. The violence continues to spread, it is even worse, and it is now even undergoing local community-based tension. There is a lot of frustration that goes back a little logically to those who are considered as those who have defined the options of the struggle.

► See also : Tribute to 13 soldiers killed in Mali in the presence of Ibrahim Boubakar Keïta

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