The deadline for the formation of the Government of National Unity in South Sudan, part of a four-year-old peace agreement, has been postponed by an additional 100 days. Under the newly revived agreement to resolve the conflict in southern Sudan, which was mediated by neighboring countries, a unity government was supposed to be established by November 12, formed by the current government led by President Salva Kiir and the armed opposition movement led by the vice president Rick Machar, as well as many other armed groups. But after the Ugandan president hosted the meeting, which included Salva Kiir and Machar, all parties agreed to postpone, despite US and international pressure to meet the deadline.

But the logic of this agreement seems to be fundamentally crooked, and the support provided by the United States and others to the parties involved in meeting the November 12 deadline was destabilizing. Despite the brief delay, pressure on Machar to return to Juba without progress on the three unresolved issues, such as the integration of security forces, security arrangements in Juba, and the politically sensitive process of delineating state borders, could risk a return Violence erupts between forces loyal to Salva Kiir and those loyal to Machar in Juba, the capital of South Sudan.

Agreement was questioned

The revitalized agreement, signed in September 2018, was the result of another series of negotiations and much international attention, but was met with skepticism by the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway, known to South Sudan and others as the Troika countries, as these countries support all issues of concern to Sudan and South Africa. Sudan. However, this agreement was the basis for a significant reduction in the conflict and increased civil security and agricultural production, after a civil war that claimed about 400 thousand people. The troika is now trying to maintain the agreement as the only way forward, despite its many gaps.

The forthcoming unity government will be the third attempt by Machar and Salva Kiir to participate in the Government of Southern Sudan. When South Sudan seceded from Sudan, Kiir became head of state, since he was the head of the self-government in southern Sudan. But Machar, who defected from Salva Kiir's armed forces in the 1990s and returned in 2002, was vice president until mid-2013, when Salva Kiir sacked his government. Tensions mounted as senior officers challenged Salva Kiir's leadership, and by December 2013 Juba was a powder keg. A conflict erupted between soldiers loyal to Salva Kiir and others loyal to Machar, leading to an ethnic war between the two ethnic groups of Machar and Salva Kiir. The conflict spread immediately beyond Juba, and then turned into civil war, where Machar led the rebels, dividing the state into two.

In August 2005, after several rounds of negotiations, the original agreement was reached to resolve the conflict in South Sudan, and Machar was allowed to return to Juba and serve as vice president. In July 2016, Kuta and Salva Kiir and Machar clashed again in the city. Sudan.

Machar has long been considered a political adventurer, using violence to achieve his political goals, but his fear for his personal security in Juba is reasonable, not exaggerated. International calls for Machar to return to southern Sudan, before the emergence of new security conditions, did not help to resolve the situation.

The United States ambassador to the United Nations, Kelly Knight Craft, said last month that the Security Council was "disappointed" when Machar signaled he would not return by November 12 and warned of renewed violence. But he stressed that his return without agreeing on adequate security arrangements could trigger another civil war in Juba. The United States has said it is committed to forming a unity government, but has done little to achieve it.

The United States and its partners in the peace process in South Sudan, whether in the Western world or in the region itself, engaged in feverish diplomatic activity when the negotiations neared the conclusion or the deadline, but did little to oversee the implementation of the agreement to ensure its survival. The right direction.

This was the case following the 2015 agreement, as well as the 2018 agreement. Although the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the East African regional bloc, played the main role of mediator in South Sudan, it has been virtually absent since the beginning of pressure for The 2018 agreement, apparently failed to appoint a chairman of the committee that oversees the agreement.

Criticizing external support for the formation of a unity government on November 12, although no agreement has been reached, a coalition of civil society organizations in Southern Sudan warned that it was “deeply concerned that instead of pressuring all parties to carry out the tasks comprehensively agreed in the peace agreement, Regional and international encourage the parties to the conflict in South Sudan to implement selective articles in the agreement ».

Indeed, with more than one peace agreement, there has been some will among signatories. In both 2015 and 2018, significant international pressure was exerted on both parties to the conflict to sign an agreement. But the basic rule of peacemaking is that outsiders cannot want peace more than the belligerents, and for many years it has been clear that Kiir and Machar were not interested in reaching a settlement.

table

Because the two sides were not interested in implementing the timetable leading to a peace agreement, the United States increased pressure on them through sanctions because it believed that this could change the leaders' views. Sanctions can play a role when they are linked to a broader strategy, but they will not make a lasting and just peace that belligerents admire. Salva Kiir and Machar are struggling for their political and personal survival, doing their best to avoid being prosecuted for the violence that occurred during their time in power.

If the United States is serious about imposing peace in South Sudan, it can begin by publicly acknowledging that Salva Kiir is not a legitimate president, as he has not been elected as president of an independent South Sudan, and the mandate to elect him as leader of an autonomous government in 2010 ends in 2015, killing Hundreds of thousands of South Sudanese have their eyes as a result of violence, hunger, and other factors caused by the civil war.

The United States has always favored Salva Kiir over Machar, although Salva Kiir holds most of the responsibility for not implementing the agreement. The same could continue again, as Washington's letter calls for pressure on Machar to return to Juba prematurely to hold him accountable if the unity government is not formed. Indeed, Salva Kiir is in a comfortable position as prime minister now. But publicly acknowledging that his position is not based on the will of the people of South Sudan would help pave the way for what should be the larger goal of the departure of Salva Kiir and Mashir of South Sudan's political life so that the state can move forward.

Re-engage

The United States must do more than threats and rhetoric.It must re-engage in the region and make sustained and appropriate efforts to resolve the thorny issues of integrating security forces and settling internal borders so that Machar can return to Juba. The United States and its partners will then need to devise an exit strategy for Salva Kiir and Machar, opening the way for the next generation of South Sudanese leaders.

This includes encouraging dialogue not on how to start a unity government, but also on how to end it, and how elections planned for 2020 can be free and fair and facilitate the transition away from the current generation of leaders, who have done so much harm to the state. This will require strong diplomatic support from Washington as the United States seems preoccupied with its internal political divisions, and even if it cares about this part of Africa it will focus on the rapid development of neighboring Sudan. But by their lack of enthusiasm for implementing another peace agreement, Salva Kiir and Machar continue to prove their inefficiency to lead in southern Sudan.

John Timin: Director of Africa Programs at Freedom House

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