"The Arab world faces greater challenges than just toppling dictators," Izzedine Fashir wrote in his Washington Post article.
The strong images of pro-democracy protests in Beirut, Baghdad and Algiers remind us once again that Arab authoritarianism is no longer welcome, but in many eyes its purpose has not yet been exhausted, as the weakness of Arab states has reached a point where authoritarianism is the only glue. Keep it knit.
The challenge facing Arab Democrats is to move from mere advocacy to democracy to build realistic paths to democratic change.
Fashir, a visiting professor at Dartmouth College in New Hampshire, argues that Arab authoritarianism is not a traditional tyranny, and that it has become a complex strategy to deal with state weakness.
Arab states have not been strong from the start because they have never been able to provide political frameworks that promote economic development and social justice, manage social and political conflicts, or protect their place in the world.
The article explains: Today these countries sit on a mixture of growing poverty, rampant corruption, hollow institutions, brutal security services, severe social polarization, and civil and regional conflicts. The greater these challenges, the weaker the growth of these countries, which exacerbates these challenges, and so on.
Arab regimes have adopted repression in order to suppress social and political disputes that they have not been able to resolve and silence demands that they have not been able to meet. To labor disputes. Gradually, the security of the regime became the main concern of these bodies, eroding respect for the rule of law and the prevalence of human rights violations, and further emptying state institutions, which now hold only a systematic fear.
Arab Authoritarianism
Fashir shows that Arab authoritarianism depends on nepotism and corruption, and that by relying on tribal, family, sectarian, or ethnic divisions, rulers maintained patronage networks, exchanged interests with powerful local allies, and the Arab state became the ultimate donor, where leaders of major social groups manage Gifts from above and loyalty from below. As Lebanon's protests against these particular patterns show, the end result is a weakening of norms, rules and institutional processes.
Given the vital importance of the management of interests and bribes, as the writer says, "the capitalism of those close" took root, where the Arab rulers occupied a dominant position on the economy, and pushed the market forces to different degrees of dependence. Instead of existing rules and regulations that can withstand regime change, Arab markets operate primarily through patronage.
Finally, to compensate for its inability to resolve the century-long conflict between Islamists and secularists, Arab states suppressed both sides, assimilated them, and made themselves the rule between them, and the gateway that protects society - and the world - from the chaos that would come if this gate were exposed. To collapse.
Of course, authoritarian regimes did not invent Islamic extremism in order to intimidate us, but they made sure to become the only barrier between us and its violence. The Syrian regime's use of IS for this purpose is a good example of this dynamic.
Arab Democrats are focusing on resisting repression, with little interest in what may happen next, but events since 2011 have shown that autocratic rulers can be abruptly overthrown.
Here are the questions: How can a post-tyrannical government run hollow institutions that operate primarily through patronage and fear, and run security agencies where a culture of non-respect for human rights is rife? How will you control the economy in the absence of regulatory frameworks that operate outside of patronage? How will severe social polarization, and above all, manage the legitimate demands of tens of millions of poor people?
Good governance
To answer these questions, Fischer argues, this government will have one of two things: to suppress these demands and conflicts in the name of democracy; and then to slide practically into a new form of tyranny. Or allow it to reach the surface in the absence of effective management frameworks; and then slide into instability and possible collapse.
He pointed out that the revolutionaries in Egypt learned this lesson directly; in 2011, when they chanted in Tahrir Square, "The people want to overthrow the regime," they thought they could put a quick framework in place to manage these conflicts. Everyone was happy, compassionate and tolerant, but social and political conflicts proved They are more solid than empathy, and therefore could not maintain the democratic experience.
The idea that authoritarian rulers and their oppressive organs are the main barrier to Arab democracy is a misleading simplification. The ways in which Iraqis, Libyans and Egyptians have walked since the fall of their perennial dictators should put an end to this illusion; authoritarianism plays social, economic, and political roles, so replacing it with democratic rule requires much more than the overthrow of regimes.
He concludes that one million demonstrators will not demand good governance, and that in order to move on to good governance, Arab democratic leaders must begin to build strong partnerships among themselves and reach agreements with authoritarian beneficiaries. They must also find realistic ways to revive state institutions. These are daunting tasks, but they represent the difference between advocating lofty demands and shaping reality.