Over the past two weeks, there has been painstaking work to reach an agreement between Turkey and Russia on Syria, culminating in a victory by Russian Presidents Vladimir Putin and Turkish Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the Russian city of Sochi. The important question remains, will this convention last for a reasonable period of time? After eight years of bloody conflict in Syria, Moscow and Ankara celebrate their 10-point agreement as the beginning of the end. But the agreement can only be valid if the other parties, participating in the civil war, decide to agree to work according to Putin and Erdogan's plan.
So what has Russia and Turkey agreed to? Through the 10 points that make up the formal agreement, many conclusions can be found.
First, Turkey has agreed to stop its invasion of Syrian territory, and will work to occupy less land than it had planned, 20 miles deep inside Syria, and called it the “safe zone,” which Turkey announced it would establish in the Kurdish-controlled area.
Secondly, Russia, along with President Bashar al-Assad's forces, will expel the YPG from the Syrian-Turkish border area and thus address some of Turkey's security concerns.
Third, Turkey and Russia will conduct joint military patrols within the Syrian border along much of the border area. If implemented as planned, it would strengthen Syrian government control and reduce the authority of the YPG, Turkey's main concern.
It is unclear whether this agreement will continue, and Russia and Turkey may be bound by it, but other warring groups are unlikely to comply. The main aspect of the negotiations between Erdogan and Putin was that "all elements of the YPG and their weapons" must be removed from certain areas, and that "both sides will take the basic measures to prevent the infiltration of terrorist elements into the safe area." The Kurdish people, which make up most of the SDF, have no choice but to comply with the agreement in the short term. US President Donald Trump's decision to withdraw US troops from Syria pulled the rug from under YPG commanders, and so they also withdrew from parts of the border region.
Dismantling of troops
If these forces are dismantled, there must be a party to do so. But even after deploying its troops for the promised "joint patrols", Russia will not have the forces necessary for a sustained campaign against the YPG, and Russia has no interest in weakening the fighting power of the Kurds. President Assad may not have the strength to force the YPG to surrender its weapons, but he is unlikely to be ready. It would be illogical to use his few resources to eradicate Ankara's arch-enemy, at a time when Turkey and Syria have become disputed on many issues.
Therefore, Ankara is wrong to believe that the issue of the Syrian Kurds is over. It is true that joint patrols stemming from the Putin-Erdogan agreement can prevent the YPG from approaching the border, but Turkey is well aware that keeping this area by an organized army is not the way. The only one that enables the Kurdish militias to wage war. Ankara's decades-long conflict with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), from which the YPG was born, was a guerrilla war and terrorist attacks. The PKK has often carried out grenade attacks in Turkey and Ankara has responded with air strikes on PKK hideouts in the mountains of northern Iraq. Even if Turkey, Russia and Syria succeed in suppressing Kurdish units in Syria, Kurdish groups are unlikely to surrender, but will adopt the guerrilla style of the PKK. If Kurdish militias continue to fight, Turkey will return to the threat of force to protect its interests.
Of course, the YPG is not the only party affected by the Putin-Erdogan agreement. President Assad's approval is very important for the continuation of this agreement. Ankara seems optimistic that Russia will force the Syrian government to agree to the terms of the agreement, considering that Assad is Russia's ally. But Moscow says the Syrian government is a difficult partner to work with, and Assad has received Russia's biggest reward - maintaining his regime.
But Damascus does not need Russia's help, as it was at the beginning of the war, given that the opposition is divided and weak, and poses no threat to Assad. Certainly, President Assad has no hope of maintaining control over all of Syria without the Kremlin's support.
contradiction
There is a clear contradiction in an agreement to preserve the territorial integrity of Syria, negotiated by two outside powers, without the participation of the Syrian government. When Ankara says it supports the territorial integrity of Syria, it means that it wants to be a united Syria de jure and de facto, but that Turkey has effective influence along the Syrian border, and the right to ensure that Kurdish fighters do not use this area as a base for their attacks on Turkey. The Erdogan-Putin agreement contained a reference to the 1998 Adana agreement between Turkey and Syria, in which the Syrian government promised not to harbor PKK fighters. Turkey had guaranteed the survival of the 1998 agreement by threatening to invade Syria.
At present, President Assad will welcome the Putin-Erdogan agreement to prevent Ankara from invading northern Syria, but the Syrian government is likely not to give up pushing for the restoration of the Idlib region in northwestern Syria, now ruled by a mix of militias. Turkey views Idlib as part of its sphere of influence and is concerned that any Syrian attack on the region could trigger a wave of refugees fleeing the war to Turkey.
Of course, a combination of skilful Russian diplomacy and the exhaustion of other parties could encourage concessions on all sides. But the past eight years of conflict indicate that the opposite is true. President Assad believes he is the winner, and Turkey believes that its threats have forced other parties to compromise.
Chris Miller is a professor and director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute
- Russia has no interest in weakening the power of the Kurds
Combat, perhaps President Assad does not have the strength to force
YPG on handing over
Their weapons.