Washington (AFP)

Lack of engineers, insufficient expertise, outdated procedures, a committee of the world's civil aviation authorities, criticizes the American Air Regulator (FAA) who certified the Boeing 737 MAX.

The US authority has simply been unable to properly assess the reliability of the Boeing 737 MAX MCAS flight control system, which has been implicated in two air disasters, concludes the panel of experts from nine countries, dubbed JATR, in a 71-page report released Friday.

The tragedy of Lion Air on 29 October 2018 followed by that of Ethiopian Airlines on 10 March killed 346 people. These accidents led the authorities around the world to nail down the 737 MAX, a Boeing best-seller, on the ground in mid-March.

Experts from the JATR (Joint Authorities Technical Review) point out "an insufficient number of FAA specialists" to evaluate the design of the 737 MAX, "limited experience and knowledge of the key technical aspects of the 737 MAX program" and insufficient knowledge of the MCAS anti-stall system.

In addition, the MCAS interactions with the pilots were not sufficiently evaluated, which was all the more detrimental as the FAA itself was not fully aware of the MCAS changes that had occurred during the development of the MCAS. aircraft, modernized version of the 737 and competitor of the Airbus A320neo.

The FAA has therefore not been able to properly assess the training needs of pilots.

The US transport regulator, the NTSB, also felt in September that Boeing and the FAA had misjudged the response of pilots to flight alerts in case of malfunction of the MCAS.

When it is activated, the MCAS suddenly puts the aircraft in "dive", that is to say, points the nose towards the ground.

The JATR team also "determined" that the FAA had not used the most up-to-date compliance regulations available at the time of the 737 MAX certification process, "which did not lead to full compliance. security benefit ".

The panel recommends, among other things, that "the FAA collaborate with other civil aviation authorities to revise the approach to certification of products that are subject to change".

The JATR does not call into question the principle of the FAA's transfer to Boeing of the evaluation of certain MAX systems and software.

This procedure, called ODA, was adopted in 2005 under the pressure of the aeronautics lobby against a backdrop of deregulation and declining budget of the US agency.

But she stresses the need for ODA members to work "without undue pressure". Communication lines must be "open with FAA certification engineers without fear of sanctions or violation of procedures".

- Man-machine interaction -

JATR was commissioned by the FAA last April to review the procedure for approving MCAS anti-stall software before both accidents.

"Although man-machine interaction problems are at the heart of all recent aircraft accidents and are involved in both B737 MAX accidents, the FAA has very few human factors experts (...) among its members. certifying staff, "note the experts who have identified" several human factors issues in the certification process "of the MAX.

Thanking the experts for "their impartial and independent review," the new FAA boss Steve Dickson pledged to "review every recommendation and take appropriate action" to strengthen aviation safety around the world.

"Safety is a fundamental value" for Boeing "and the safety of passengers, our customers and the crews on board our aircraft is always our top priority," said a spokesman for the American manufacturer.

Boeing recalls that it is committed to working with the FAA "to review the recommendations and contribute to the continuous improvement of aircraft certification procedures in the coming years".

For the time being, the world's security authorities have not lifted the flight ban on the 737 MAX, which still considers the modifications to the MCAS insufficient.

© 2019 AFP