In early August, the United States formally withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Weapons Convention, a landmark non-proliferation agreement with Russia. Just two weeks later, on a small island off the coast of California, the Pentagon tested a ground missile banned under the agreement.

The collapse of the treaty was long anticipated. No agreement can succeed if only one party abides by it, and Moscow, the only party to the treaty, has been violating its rules for years. During his presidency, former US President Barack Obama considered withdrawing from the agreement, which is the same reason that helped US President Donald Trump make the decision. For many observers, the decision to abandon the treaty remains misleading and dangerous, arguing that the Trump administration is dismantling the handrail set up to prevent tensions from escalating into a destabilizing arms race. While many elements of the global arms control structure are fading, these recent implications could make matters worse.

But this line of criticism misses the point. If US unilateral adherence to the treaty is useless in the face of repeated Russian violations, it has become dangerous in the face of more powerful adversaries (China). During the 32-year history of the INF, China developed the world's first conventional missile power, with many of the same weapons that the treaty prevented the United States from developing: land-based and ballistic missiles with ranges ranging from 500 to 5,500 kilometers.

Today, China is using this missile arsenal to threaten the United States, its allies and partners throughout East Asia. Leaving the NPT is not a panacea, but it opens up much-needed possibilities for Washington to rebuild its military balance with Beijing. Washington should take this opportunity to develop and deploy its own missiles to counter the Chinese threat; or risk being crushed in a future confrontation.

Great benefit

With its narrow focus on the United States and Russia, the MTR has always served as a direct backdrop to US strategy in Asia. In theory, Washington could have pressed China to join the treaty; China would not. Beijing has benefited greatly from its large ground missile power and has made it clear that it will not accede to any major arms control agreements in the foreseeable future. At an emergency session of the UN Security Council on August 22, for example, China's Permanent Representative, Zhang Jun, asked Washington to "exercise restraint and maintain the current weapons control system," while insisting that Chinese missiles pose "no threat to any country".

Over the past three decades, China has made tremendous military progress through techniques that set aside adversaries. Ballistic missiles, which are traveling at higher speeds and thus difficult to intercept, were the cornerstone of this effort. China can develop and deploy these weapons more effectively than the United States can stand against, making any future conflict with China a very expensive and risky process.

Overall, “Beijing controls the largest and most diverse missile in the world by inventing more than 2,000 long-range ballistic missiles,” according to testimony of Pacific Command Commander Admiral Harry Harris in 2017. According to Harris, about 95 percent of these are The missiles were banned under the INF Treaty, if China were a signatory.

Beijing benefited from other forms of American myopia. Arms control discussions tend to focus on nuclear weapons, of which China has much less than Russia or the United States. But China's stockpile of conventional missiles is at least one in seven. Earlier this summer, Beijing fired six anti-ship ballistic missiles into the disputed waters of the South China Sea, referring to firmness against its neighbors, Washington and the world at large. It now has dozens of "lethal carrier" missiles, named after its potential for destroying warships or aircraft carriers, off the Chinese coast.

Additional problem

The vast majority of China's missiles are on the ground, rather than deployed on planes, ships or submarines. This means an additional problem for the United States. Large missiles of the type covered by the MTR, are much easier and cheaper to develop and operate on the ground. It is also difficult to find and neutralize before launch. This was true of the Scud missiles launched by former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein during the first Gulf War, which the US military found very difficult to identify even in the open desert; less sophisticated than China's ballistic arsenal, which is hidden in diverse terrain and extensive facilities under Earth, which has become more camouflaged thanks to mobile launchers and a network of secure fiber optic cables designed to ensure communication with launchers.

In a crisis, this destructive arsenal could encourage Beijing to fulfill the "core interests" it always claims, including its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan, by trying to impose a fait accompli and force Washington and its regional allies to bow before the fighting begins. US air bases and aircraft carriers are technically sophisticated compared to their Chinese counterparts, but are at risk from Chinese missiles. As a result, Washington should capitalize on post-Cold War experiments and build a deterrent based on ground missiles. Fortunately, the end of the NPT offers an ideal opportunity to do so.

Catch up

With the restrictions removed and out of the treaty, what can the United States do to rebalance? To begin with, they can develop and test medium-range rockets fired from the ground.

As new missiles become available, the United States should deploy them in the Asia-Pacific region. Currently, the most realistic location is Guam. Areas in the Pacific, Australia, Japan, the Philippines and South Korea are also potential locations. Certainly, small islands like Guam have limited hidden terrain, while governments in the region may face public opposition to hosting US missiles. But public opinion may change quickly, especially if China's military capabilities and regional ambitions continue to expand. While peacetime policies prevent permanent deployment in these countries, Washington can still pursue agreements that allow it to deploy missiles quickly for a limited period in times of crisis.

US withdrawal from the treaty does not close the door to future arms control initiatives. On the contrary, it puts new potential on the table. For now, at least, Chinese leaders remain openly opposed to any development of APRM missiles by the United States, but are unwilling to make any concessions when it comes to their larger conventional stocks. If the Chinese eventually come to the arms control negotiating table, it is because Washington has sought new capabilities, not because it has remained unilateral.

Andrew Erickson is a visiting scholar at the Harvard Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies and professor of strategy at the Naval College.

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