On September 30, 1989, he established the Taif Agreement, which was approved by parliament on 22 October of the same year to equate the sharing of new power in the country, under the auspices of the Syrian regime and the presence of its forces and security services on the ground. The framework for a solution to the Lebanese crisis, which was regional, was characterized by two tracks: the Syrian-Saudi politician and the Syrian-Iranian security.
In the first track, Taif practically opened the door to different participation in power for the winning forces in the civil war, supported by the Syrian regime, namely the Amal movement led by Nabih Berri, the Progressive Socialist Party led by Walid Jumblatt, and other secondary forces loyal to Damascus. But Saudi Arabia's role in Taif was also a gateway to businessman, Rafik Hariri, to politics, who managed the reconstruction process and established internal and regional balances. The Taif regime thus formed a partnership between a Saudi-backed businessman on the one hand, and Lebanese warlords and other allies of the Syrian regime, less represented.
In the 1990s, the Taif phase was a constitutional monarchy in which the de facto ruler, the Syrian regime, intervened in order to adjust the balance of power whenever he felt threatened, or even the necessity of adjustments suited to his fundamental interests. In contrast, Hezbollah was outside the political equation, with only a symbolic representation under the title of "loyalty to the resistance," while the Amal movement managed the Shiite share in the state until the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon.
Alongside the political track of the sect, with a Syrian-Saudi consensus, there was another understanding of a security nature, Syrian / Iranian, which legitimized Hezbollah under the name of resisting Israeli occupation. Although the focus of the analysis is mostly on Saudi / Syrian understanding, the context of events over the past three decades has always shown that the agreement with Tehran has had a deeper impact on the Lebanese reality and its plight, given its institutionalized military and security presence separate from the state and its decision-making mechanism.
Two regional events reflected negatively on Syrian control, and precipitated its sagging. First, the death of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in 2000, and his son Bashar's rise to power. The lack of experience of the heir to the Syrian presidency opened the way to strategic mistakes in dealing with the Lebanese parties, especially the decision to extend the former Lebanese president, Emile Lahoud, in 2004, which caused a rift in the Lebanese political class and increased the level of opposition to the Syrian role in Lebanon.
Second, US policies in the region changed after the attacks of September 11, 2001, starting with the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and ending with the pressure on the Syrian regime to withdraw from Lebanon after the assassination of Hariri in February 2005.
Hizbullah's entry into the Syrian war, publicly in 2012, carried some changes in the balance of the relationship with the Syrian regime, in particular on the one hand that the organization carried with it its own agenda of intervention
These transformations established a new reality in Lebanon, following the Syrian withdrawal. The Syrian regime is no longer the main player in Lebanon. Rather, Hizbullah managed the political game on its own, according to an agenda linked to its interests and focused on maintaining the "weapon of resistance" first, not the regime. When there was a trade-off between Hezbollah and its rivals in Lebanese politics, the Syrian regime was usually its victim, in return for a comprehensive commitment to the weapons of the "resistance" and recognition of its legitimacy in the ministerial statement. Thus, in a few years, Lebanon witnessed the exclusion of some of the Syrian regime's allies, and the recognition of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to try the assassins of Rafik Hariri, in exchange for an assertion on Hezbollah's right to keep its weapons in the Lebanese structure.
Until Hizbullah's entry into the Syrian war, publicly in 2012, carried some shifts in the balance of the relationship with the Syrian regime, specifically on the one hand that the organization carried with it its own agenda of intervention. Less than a year after the intervention, on May 9, 2013, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah explained the organization's vision of the benefits of the conflict in Syria, particularly turning it into an arena for confronting Israel:
"All those who were previously critical of the Syrian leadership on the Golan issue, we were telling him: There is a difference between Lebanon and the Golan, that in Lebanon there is a margin of resistance because the world considers the central state weak, the state does not pay the price of the work of the resistance, Syria is a strong central state, With the war you imposed on Syria, the threat was turned into an opportunity. Isn't that what the administration is saying: Turning the threat into an opportunity? You imposed a war on Syria to weaken it. This means that the margin that allows for a popular resistance in the Golan has become. In the Golan, this is a great strategic response.
The organization's involvement in the Syrian war increased the pace of local division and sectarian tension, and produced countervailing violence, represented by the phenomenon of Sheikh Ahmad al-Asir in the south, and with relatively weak Sunni involvement in jihadi factions. The high level of tension was largely linked to local bets on regime change in Syria, given the importance of this at the heart of internal balances, particularly the weakening of Hezbollah. However, the course of the war was in the interest of the party with the end of the battle of Qusayr in his favor in 2013, despite the casualties. On the security and military level, this participation raised the morale of the organization, politically and militarily, as it had not previously engaged in conventional battles of this type, and had never sent such a number of fighters outside the country.
Russian worker
Ironically, Russian intervention in Syria coincided with the rise of Gibran Bassil to the leadership of the Free Patriotic Movement, followed by the election of Lebanese President Michel Aoun the following year.
Russian intervention in the Syrian war, in 2015, re-shuffled the cards, not only in Syria but also, and to some extent, Lebanese. The project to create a popular resistance in the Golan, however, has declined not only as a result of continued Israeli strikes, but also because the Russian intervention has set its sights on various goals that are disproportionate to keeping any front open.
The danger of the collapse of the Syrian regime has disappeared, raising many questions about the possibility of returning to the Lebanese arena in a different form, especially in light of reports of rising tensions between Moscow and Tehran over the Iranian presence in Syria. Since the beginning of its Syrian intervention, Russia has started to raise its role in Lebanon, culturally, politically and even militarily and security, which has led to a change in the Lebanese arena and local alliances with abroad. Ironically, Russia's intervention in Syria coincided with the rise of Gibran Bassil to the leadership of the Free Patriotic Movement, followed by the election of Lebanese President Michel Aoun the following year.
From the outset, Bassil worked to strengthen his relationship with the Russian side through a series of visits to Moscow, and through an intermediary (MP Amal Abu Zeid) who later served as the President's Adviser on Russian Affairs. Compared to the rest of the political poles, Basil has been developing his relations with the Russian side closely, culminating in a presidential visit to Moscow this year. According to a Russian official, the Lebanese presidential visit to Moscow at the end of last March (2019), was a milestone in the relationship between the two sides.
| Michel Aoun and Putin (Anatolia) |
The visit was marked by a closed-door meeting between Presidents Aoun and Vladimir Putin, also attended by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Yuri Ushakov, Assistant to the President, Information Secretary Dmitry Peskov, and on the Lebanese side by Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil and Presidential Advisor Mireille Aoun. For the Lebanese side. The visit concluded general lines of understanding between the two sides on the issues of the displaced, oil and gas, diplomatic cooperation, military, security, financial, trade and economic exchange.
A few weeks later, Basil visited Moscow again, in the context of his tireless efforts to strengthen the relationship with the Russian side, given Moscow's influence in the Syrian neighborhood, and the possibility of playing direct and intermediate roles that may provide a cover for his future presidential ambition. The pragmatic relationship with Moscow is more acceptable to the Christian side, than an alliance, for example, with a religiously conservative Iran that has always had a tense relationship with the Gulf states.
In parallel with the regional situation, Bassil continues his rise locally through two tracks: first, incitement against the other, whether a Syrian or Palestinian refugee, and escalation verbally and politically against local political poles such as the Druze leader, Walid Jumblatt, and the Speaker of the House, Nabih Berri. This first track gives Bassil political momentum, and some popularity exclusively in Christian circles, especially since his speech is based on the restoration of Christian rights lost since the Taif Agreement. The second, and more difficult, path is to achieve service and profitable achievements just as other sectarian leaders have done since the end of the civil war; at the core of the task of restoring the rights of Christians is to hold on to government appointments (i.e. recruiting Christian loyalists within government jobs), just like other leaders. Sects. According to this equation, any disagreement between Basil, as a representative of Christians and defenders of their rights, and leaders of other denominations, regarding appointments and the rights of Christians therein is reflected positively.
In this context, the tensions between Bassil on the one hand and President Nabih Berri and the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt on the other are understood. Bassil's insistence on rivaling sectarian leaders raises them to their level and shows him as a Christian player who has been missing since the end of the civil war and the start of the Syrian tutelage. We must read this rise and confidence in the context of giving the leader of the "Free Patriotic Movement" special importance for his relationship with Moscow, as a rising power in the region, and perhaps the guarantor of a key role to play in the future.
Basil is a regional phenomenon
| Lebanese Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil and his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov Russia (Reuters) |
Lebanon's foreign minister, Gebran Bassil, with his special relationship with Russia and his alliance with Hezbollah, is also a regional phenomenon. His rise comes at a favorable political moment in the region: Russia plays a leading role in the Syrian neighborhood and has influence in Syria's security services, including The Military Intelligence, which was assigned to administer the file of Lebanon throughout the era of tutelage and beyond. Indeed, Russia, with its complex relations with the Gulf States, Israel, Iran and Turkey, has a margin of political maneuver, which does not seem to be available to the United States, although it is still a significant force inside Lebanon.
Iran, on the other hand, is on the verge of receding and repositioning as a result of its weak resources, and thus its ability to pay the cost of its proxies, as has been shown in Western reports; we are facing a financial crisis unfolding in succession, which is still in its infancy. Iran's budget has shrunk from $ 104 billion (end of 2017 for 2018) to 43 billion, and halved in months after the beginning of this year. Iranian oil sales are at their lowest level in decades (100,000 barrels according to Reuters).
This unprecedented decline must be reflected in Hezbollah's ability to maneuver politically inside Lebanon, particularly on the adoption of the issue of the Constituent Congress. Indeed, the party's austerity measures are open, and its allies are looking for other options to finance their activities. This anticipated decline in the party's ability is also an opportunity for Basil, as the party will increase its reliance on its allies and may make a major trade-off with the rising Christian leader to ensure the legitimacy of its weapons.
Founding Conference
As a result of the deteriorating financial situation, Hizbullah is showing greater reliance on local allies, especially the Free Patriotic Movement, because of its Christian weight.
At the beginning of Hizballah's controversial intervention in Syria, demands for research into the organization's weapons rose, and then, for the first time, in June 2012, Hizballah provoked a “National Constituent Conference: State Building.” As stated by Nasrallah, the conference is elected on the basis of "the composition of the national segments and not on a sectarian or regional basis." This conference is a pillar of any discussion of the defense strategy to link arms to the state and its representative apparatus. Nasrallah's words did not come out of context; the party, in the context of its defense of weapons, speaks of its legitimacy according to sect. It also links the organization in its political discourse between the half, despite the fact that it is numerically unfair to the Shiites and Sunnis, on the one hand, and the recognition of the legitimacy of the weapons of the "resistance" on the other hand, as if the weapons here as a compensation for the lack of Shiite share in the balance of power, compared to their numerical size, according to election schedules And informal statistics.
Today, as a result of the deteriorating financial situation, Hezbollah is showing greater reliance on local allies, especially the Free Patriotic Movement, for its Christian weight, to maintain its internal position and stave off risks. Therefore, a very cautious behavior of the organization in dealing with the current, as shown in the punishment of MP, Nawaf al-Moussawi, when he touched, albeit accidentally, red lines were not clear a year or two ago, because the member of the "Hezbollah", in the context of its attack on The leader of the Lebanese Phalange Party, MP Sami Gemayel, said that the current Lebanese President, Michel Aoun, came with a gun of resistance, not Israeli support, as in the case of the late President, Bashir Gemayel. Such criticism is no longer acceptable to the party. This is a policy that applies to other issues where the allies seem to have the upper hand in making decisions, while the party is working to address its internal crises and the growing challenges in Syria and the region.
One of the signs of this reality is that the party has retreated from previous internal demands, such as activating regulators and even pursuing allies in corruption files. Last month (July 2019), International Information Organization published a new census of sects in Lebanon, according to which Christians of all denominations are ranked third after Shiites and Sunnis, respectively. According to the census, 5.5 million Lebanese (including 1.3 million non-residents) are distributed among 1,686,000 Christians (only 30%), one million and 743,000 Shiites, and one million and 721,000 Sunnis. According to this census, even the triangle between Sunnis, Shiites and Christians is numerically unfair, let alone the current half.
Despite the result of this census and its representation of a favorable opportunity, Hezbollah did not leave any statement about the Constituent Congress and the need to reconsider the Lebanese composition through the redistribution of positions; Lebanese. It is noteworthy that Hezbollah is not only silent about its previous demands, but also shows support for Bassil's progress towards his opponents, such as in appointments or in security incidents, including the recent confrontation between the latter and the Druze leader, Walid Jumblatt, on Wallpaper of the Caperchamon Accident. Hizbullah announced its secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, a group of electoral promises from anti-corruption to fair employment, but today it appears to be in complete retreat from its promises, and is focused on securing the home front across allies to ensure that its weapons are not exposed, even If verbally.
Hizbullah, as the most powerful player in Lebanon, will not accept, in a different regional context, a Russian entry on the Lebanese policy line from the gate of Basil and the allies of the Syrian regime. However, the party, for example, abandoned support for the Lebanese-Russian military cooperation agreement in the middle of last year (2018), after mobilizing its members in Qalamoun against a Russian military police force against the background of disputes over the positioning and deployment in the region. The incident angered the party, as it signaled the start of a different relationship with the Russians after two years of fighting and cooperation on more than one front inside Syria. Among the controversial points: Israeli coordination with Russia on the bombing of Iranian targets, and Russian-American talks on the Iranian presence. Russian officials, according to diplomatic sources, always emphasize that the relationship with Iran in Syria is tactical and not strategic. This sensitivity to the Russian role is reflected on Lebanon as well, and described by the Secretary-General of Hezbollah in a television interview, specifically when he said: "Our coordination in Syria is with the Syrian authority and was never with Russia."
With Hezbollah's internal repositioning, and the rise of Basil on the Lebanese scene, talk of a “founding conference” and reconsideration of Taif has fallen.
Conclusion
The Iranian financial crisis has an impact on the Lebanese reality. Hezbollah is pushing to approach the Lebanese political files from a defensive position, with the aim of removing its weapons from the political debate at home, and to take care of major challenges ahead, some of which are organizational as a result of declining funding, and some are regional in light of the US-Iranian clash. In the Gulf. The second factor influencing the reformulation of the Lebanese reality is the rising Russian role, and the attempt of the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, Gebran Bassil, to use it in his favor in the next presidential battle in 2022 at the latest.
It is clear that Hizbullah has abandoned its reform agenda that it adopted prior to last year's parliamentary elections (2018), because it will reflect negatively on it and its relationship with key allies that need their support in the ongoing confrontation with the United States and Israel. At the forefront of the Allies' list is Gebran Bassil, who, by virtue of understanding with Hezbollah and Prime Minister Saad Hariri, is able to manage sensitive service files. It remains that Hezbollah's current position may not last in the event of a decline in the level of Iranian-American tension and the recovery of Iranian finances. The papers inside Lebanon may be re-mixed in a different direction, perhaps by reviving the “Constituent Conference” demand.
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This article is from Al Jazeera Center for Studies.