In Burkina Faso, "jihadists attack the army to refuel with arms and ammunition"

On Monday, August 19, a "major attack" by terrorist armed groups against the military detachment of the Koutougou department in the Soum province of northern Burkina Faso killed 24 people in the ranks of the army. This is the deadliest attack ever suffered by the Burkinabe army.

Until then, the most serious jihadist attack against the military had killed 12 people in Nassoumbou, in the same province of Soum, in December 2016. The Burkinabe army had also suffered an unprecedented setback in March 2018, when a jihadist attack had devastated his General Staff, right in the center of the capital Ouagadougou, killing eight people.

Mixed with interethnic conflicts, the terrorist threat has also spread in the east of the country, a forest region whose populations have been abandoned by the central state. In a cross-interview, André Bourgeot, research director emeritus at the CNRS, specialist in the Sahel, and Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni, director of the Institute for Security Studies in Dakar, Senegal, analyze the security situation in Burkina Faso and the springs of terrorism in the country.

France 24 : In northern Burkina Faso, attacks mostly targeted villages. Why do terrorist groups also attack the military ?

André Bourgeot : It's not at all a coincidence, it's a choice. The army symbolizes the authority of the state. And it is not new that the jihadist groups attack the representatives of the order. What is interesting here is that northern Burkina Faso is also border with Mali and Niger. And it is precisely these three frontiers that are the focus of G5 Sahel force intervention. These are therefore frontal attacks on the regional body set up to fight terrorism in the Sahel.

Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni : The attacks against the military targets in Burkina Faso as elsewhere in the Sahel aim on the one hand to show their firepower, but it is also a way to refuel in weapons and in terms of time. This type of attack sometimes intervenes as a prelude to wider attacks. This allows the groups to become stronger in terms of equipment and then be able to conduct larger operations.

The attacks in northern Burkina Faso are attributed to a dozen local terrorist groups. Who are they affiliated with ?

A. B. There are armed groups who claim to be part of the Islamic State movement in the Great Sahara (EIGS). And those who call themselves the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM) led by Tuareg Malian Iyad Ag Ghali. There are also national armed groups. These three movements can intervene whenever they want. What I think is important to emphasize is that all these groups have extremely important autonomies. They can intervene without referring to a higher authority. They intervene in small groups that are very mobile and flexible.

L-AT-B. : There is indeed the presence of the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM) and also the Islamic State in the Great Sahara (EIGS) whose area of ​​activity seems to be rather western Niger and part of eastern Burkina Faso. But in the Sahel region, there is more talk of the presence of Ansarul Islam. But everything depends on how we see the positioning of this last group. Some see it as a group that will sometimes act with the GSIM or with the Islamic State according to its interests.

The most deadly attacks occurred in the province of Soum. Why is this border region with Mali a terrarium of terrorism ?

L-AT-B. : There was this kind of contagion of the Malian conflict. But there are also local jurisdictions on which the Ansarul Islam group has capitalized to be able to recruit and carry out attacks. And these local springs are frustations of all kinds of communities. Frustrations linked to a desire to bring the social and religious order back to the surface. The movement was able to grow by recruiting, it is true, among the Fulani, but in the group Ansarul Islam, there are also Mossis and people from different ethnic groups.

In addition to terrorist attacks, there are also intercommunal conflicts. Is the authority of the state of Burkina Faso at risk of being undermined ?

L-AT-B. : This is already the case. If you look at the movement of the threat to the Eastern region, this was accompanied by targeted attacks against state representations, against the symbols of the state. There has been a clear willingness on the part of the groups to ensure that the presence of the state is undermined. This is clearly a strategy to ensure that the state is discredited in the areas where they want to locate.

How to explain the helplessness of the Burkinabe army ?

AB : The Burkinabe army does not have a reputation as a strong army. It's the same thing in Mali. In general, the armies of the five countries of the Sahel (without Chad) shine by their weakness. They have not been particularly trained in this type of conflict. But it's not just a weakness on the side of African national armies. Since the French military power incarnated by the Barkhane force is facing the same type of problem.

L-AT-B. : All armies are powerless. Faced with an asymmetric threat, armies around the world face real challenges in addressing the threat. I do not think that we should seek to qualify the Burkinabe army weaker than the others. But beyond the security problem, we are facing a problem of governance. Jihadist groups settle where the state is absent or disputed. This is a problem related to the types of basic services that states are able to provide to citizens who are in remote areas. And it is by capitalizing on these issues that jihadist groups manage to recruit, to establish and expand their scope. The answer must not be military.