The issue of international aid has been one of the most controversial issues in the Syrian conflict, especially with the military gains made by the regime of President Bashar al-Assad in recent years. There are reports of complex roles that the PA is playing in organizing it, attempts to use the aid paper politically in order to serve the regime and its objectives in the conflict. His loyalties.

In this regard, in his study entitled “Initial Assistance in Syria: A Framework for International Agencies”, published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), Hayed is exposed to the mechanisms and policies used by the Syrian regime to control the scope and distribution of aid within Syria. And then frame the work of humanitarian organizations operating within the state. He also provides a framework and specific practices that these organizations can use to deliver assistance without undermining the principles of humanitarian assistance. At the same time, it eases the restrictions imposed on it by the Syrian regime.

The study draws on a number of key sources of primary data collected through 35 interviews with staff of UN agencies, international NGOs, and local humanitarian organizations operating or having worked in Syria. As well as with donor representatives, diplomats, and experts. The study also used more than 10 confidential internal documents of international NGOs, as well as official contacts with some government officials.

Intervention policies of the system

He points out that the Syrian regime is using international aid as a tool to assert its authority and legitimacy. The Syrian regime bases its interventionist policies on UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182, which gives conflict-affected states a key role in the management of humanitarian assistance within their territory. This decision was the introduction through which the regime produced different types of practices and policies to influence the work of international humanitarian organizations. These policies can be crystallized as follows:

First: Restrict the working environment

By preventing international humanitarian organizations from conducting a direct needs assessment, they have had to rely to a large extent on data provided by the Syrian regime.

In this context, many humanitarian organizations believe that the data provided by the regime is inaccurate, allowing the Syrian government to influence its priorities, programs and the nature of its budgets.

The Syrian government has also used complex administrative procedures to control the distribution of humanitarian aid, systematically refusing to grant permission to international humanitarian organizations to conduct operations across the front lines to deliver aid to areas controlled by the armed opposition. The government justified this by saying that humanitarian operations on the front lines were dangerous, but in fact it sought to restrict the movement of humanitarian organizations in areas outside the regime's control.

Second: the imposition of local partners

The Syrian regime has imposed a number of local actors and partners on international organizations, allowing it to control its work. The Syrian Red Crescent and the Syrian Secretariat for Development, headed by the wife of Syrian President Asma al-Assad, have become the mandatory focal points for most foreign humanitarian organizations operating. Inside Syrian territory.

In other words, international humanitarian organizations must deal with local partners, because not reaching an agreement with them means, in one way or another, not allowing them to operate in areas controlled by the Syrian regime.

The relationship between the Syrian regime and local partners who are accredited to deal with international organizations is a controversial issue that casts a shadow over the impartiality and impartiality of humanitarian assistance programs. For example, the study points out that one of the most controversial local organizations is the Al Bustan charity founded by Rami Makhlouf, the cousin of President Bashar al-Assad, who received before 2016 about $ 268,000 from UNICEF to spend on Sanitation, hygiene and education programs, despite Makhlouf's condemnations of supporting pro-regime armed militias accused of war crimes in the Syrian conflict.

Third, undermining independence and obstructing monitoring

The government sometimes interferes directly with the selection of staff of international humanitarian organizations, as all staff in these organizations require visas from the Syrian Foreign Ministry.

In the same vein, the study shows that the Syrian government is interfering with the process of reviewing and drafting the annual UN Humanitarian Response Plan to influence humanitarian operations and expenditure programs, and to make them more consistent with the interests of the Syrian regime.

Restrictions imposed by the Syrian regime, according to the study, extend to restricting the ability of humanitarian organizations to monitor and evaluate the impact of their projects, through regulations and procedures that provide that they can not make any visits to monitor and verify the distribution of aid, and access to target groups without the consent of government authorities . Such measures strengthen the Syrian regime's ability to influence aid programs, especially as they are implemented through local partners with regime support.

Fourth: Influencing procurement procedures

Hayd assumes that the Syrian government is using its influence to influence procurement procedures for aid programs, and to pressure international humanitarian organizations, to award contracts to companies linked to the Assad regime, and even to individuals subject to international sanctions.

At times, the Syrian government, through its various institutions, provides some of its associated companies with basic information on procurement tenders, in a privileged position compared to others. In addition, the government uses other tools such as intimidating or pressuring competitors through permits and permits granted to humanitarian organizations to operate within the state.

In practice, a number of businessmen affiliated with the Syrian regime have benefited from the spending programs of international organizations, such as the Syriatel mobile phone company owned by Rami Makhlouf, which received until 2016 about $ 700 thousand from the United Nations. UNRWA has also awarded a contract to provide generators worth approximately $ 88,000 to the Alton Group, owned by Syrian businessman Salim Elton, who has been under sanctions by the European Union since 2012 for its links to the Syrian regime.

A framework for humanitarian action

The study proposes a framework for the work of international humanitarian organizations in Syria, with the aim of creating a unified alliance among them capable of negotiating with the Syrian regime, to reduce the area of ​​intervention and pressure imposed on it on its part, thus enhancing the efficiency of its work and its ability to implement its programs on the other.

In general, the proposed framework is based on a number of key themes:

First: Reducing administrative approvals and bureaucratic interference of power

For example, international humanitarian organizations may require the authority to obtain general or area-based permits for repeated access and entry, rather than existing individual approvals and permits, which are granted separately for each entry or movement of cargo.

Second: Facing the authority's restrictions in refusing to issue statements

International humanitarian organizations can invoke Article III of the Geneva Convention, which does not allow States to refuse to grant approvals and permits for arbitrary reasons. Thus, they could establish a common system for collecting information on all permit requests rejected by the Authority, and requesting a formal written explanation of the reasons for the refusal. Since the Authority often justifies its refusal for security reasons, humanitarian organizations must be allowed to conduct independent assessments of the security situation in the areas in which they operate.

Third: Strengthening the operational independence of the organizations

This requirement can be achieved by expanding the capacity of organizations to conduct regular, comprehensive and impartial needs assessments, through direct access to work areas. This may require organizations to expand field offices to increase their presence on the ground. In this context, humanitarian organizations can add a requirement to any memorandum of understanding with the Syrian government by allowing field offices to be opened by notifying the government rather than applying for additional approvals.

Fourth: Facing the Authority's attempts to interfere in the recruitment processes

This in turn leads to the exclusion of humanitarian organizations from any candidate imposed on them by the Authority. Such cases can be formally communicated to the Authority, as a mechanism for documenting and demonstrating attempts by them.

In addition, international humanitarian organizations must adhere to the criteria for competence in the selection of local staff, and refrain from hiring them as a tactic to satisfy power. They should also take the necessary care to ensure that people working for them are not involved in human rights violations and promote hate speech.

Fifth, the development of humanitarian organizations more transparent procurement mechanisms

This requirement requires that the procurement files be discontinued with the government, or any other entity, to avoid giving members of the Syrian regime unfair advantage in bidding. In addition to formulating a comprehensive examination process, to study all aspects and legal gaps related to tenders. This process also includes excluding persons involved in human rights violations and preventing them from obtaining any contracts.

Source:

Haid Haid, «Principled Aid in Syria: A Framework for International Agencies», Chatham House, 4 July 2019.

Aid is a conflict issue

The issue of humanitarian aid will continue to be one of the main issues in the Syrian conflict amid the conflict between the regime of President Bashar al-Assad and international humanitarian organizations over the areas of movement and influence, as the regime treats aid as a mechanism to prove its legitimacy and gain more gains in the military conflict.

On the other hand, humanitarian organizations see the regime's practices as pressures that negatively affect their work, and this may lead them in the future to develop new mechanisms to deal with it, and alleviate the pressures imposed on them, especially recognizing that the system needs them at least to ease the discontent caused by Lack of services and commodities.

The Syrian regime is using international aid as a tool to assert its authority and legitimacy, and its interventionist policies are based on UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182, which gives conflict-affected states a key role in the management of humanitarian aid within their territory.

The Syrian government has used complex administrative procedures to control the distribution of humanitarian aid.