"Just Terror", the Islamic State (IS) titled its digital glossy magazine "Dabiq" in November 2015 after the attacks in Paris, named after the prophetic place of the apocalyptic decisive battle between the armies of Muslims and Christians.

Just Terror - in the cynical sense of the authors, that could be translated in two ways: Just Terror - or, without justification or justification: just terror.

At that time, the "IS" was still at the zenith of its power, dominated his "caliphate" still Mosul, Rakka, large parts of western Iraq and eastern Syria, and the city of Sirt in Libya. But at the same time, it was clear that the US and its allies in the anti-IS coalition would resume their air strikes in the late summer of 2014 and soon begin ground combat to repel the core project of IS, the state to pay off virtual maps.

Long followed the IS terror wave a plan

ISIS, with its attacks on Paris, Brussels, and the plethora of individual attacks aimed at raising the price of the imminent attack on jihadist territory, as well as fueling resentment and turmoil between the majority and Muslims in France, Belgium and elsewhere.

The terror wave followed a plan, because it did not begin until the West mobilized more than verbal expressions against the progressive, murderous expansion of the self-styled state warriors. By 2014, the "IS" had indeed mustered gigantic resources to conquer first large areas of eastern Syria and then invade flash in the West Iraq - but not bombed in the West. Even the Hollywood-staged murder of American hostage James Foley (and subsequently another kidnapper from the US and the UK) happened after the "IS" Foley had been held captive for almost two years and had remained silent about it.

All this needs to be remembered to understand what the alleged wire-drawing role of "IS" means in the assassinations of Easter Sunday in Sri Lanka.

A murderous act of absolute opportunism

That the "IS" in the construction of the explosives, in the logistics of the bomb series on churches and hotels has played an important role, not the two days later published Bekennervideo - but, if applicable, the search of the US station CNN, according to which it Indian intelligence service, which had sent very detailed warnings to Colombo after interrogation of an Indian IS-trailer. The then tragically sanded there.

Jewel SAMAD / AFP

Mourning relatives after the Sri Lanka attacks

It would explain why a hitherto insignificant faction known as "National Thowheed Jamaath," NTJ, who had hitherto only struck with vandalism against Buddhist temples, suddenly became capable of such an inferno. Only that this inferno was not directed against their opponent: For so far was the rabid Buddhist majority and state power. Christians, also a minority, and foreign tourists have not been enemies to anyone.

Likewise, Sri Lanka had previously played a role for the "IS". According to the government, 32 people left the island for the "caliphate", less so than from the Maldives. More than 30 times as many came from Germany alone.

The act appears like a murderous act of absolute opportunism. We bomb because we can. But this is a blatant break with those strategic patterns that helped the "IS" from 2012 to power and size: attention in itself was not the goal, but a dosed as well as disciplined used means.

The early phase of infiltration of Syria's rioting areas until April 2013: run under complete secrecy. The training of a force from the thousands of foreigners who have been pouring into Syria since 2012 has taken place without any mention of the name of the "IS" on the outside. The procurement of more than a thousand tons of explosives and several kilometers of ignition cables, many times from Indian manufacturers via Turkish cover companies: discreetly organized as early as 2012.

Pure terror, no matter where and for its own sake

IS's overriding PR machinery deceived public attention only for specific areas - just as terror abroad was purposefully deployed only after the attacks on the "IS" area began. The actions had one goal: to conquer and rule one's own state.

To look at IS only through the lens of one's own fears, and above all to see him as the author of attacks in the West, obscures the view of the changes. Because the bombs of Easter Sunday no longer have any relation to any agenda: neither that of the perpetrators, nor those of the old IS leadership. Instead, they show the danger but also the strategic lack of planning of the current command level.

Of the ambiguity of autumn 2015, only one variant remains: pure terror, no matter where and for its own sake.