Military rule is the negation of democratic rule, whether by definition or experience, and the experiences of democratic transition in various parts of the world did not succeed until after agreeing on the military's exit from politics in any form, whether through negotiation, concession or coercion. In the Arab countries, the opposite is true: the military – and other authoritarian elites – do not negotiate, do not compromise, and if they are forced to leave power, their slogan becomes "either me or chaos." We have seen and experienced this in Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Libya and Somalia, and we are currently living it in Sudan.

This was also confirmed by the experience of the "Arab Spring", which revealed the vital role played by armies in the issue of revolutions and uprisings, and then the democratic transition, and that no country can succeed in establishing a democratic system without the military leaving politics, or at least their commitment to the rules of the political game that frame their role in the fields of national security and the defense of homelands and their borders, away from the political and civil fields.

If the Arab armies played a key role in the policies of modernization and development after the independence phase from colonialism in the middle of the last century, or so it was portrayed, they penetrated and dominated the civilian sphere, froze political life and destroyed the chances of success of any democratic experiment, and staying in power became a primary goal for the military elites who seized them after the exit of the colonizer.

Therefore, the question arises: Can we imagine the existence of Arab armies that adhere to the rules of democracy? Are there successful global experiences in this regard? What are the requirements for this success?

These and other questions are discussed in the book "The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas," by the American scholar Zoltan Barani, which was translated and published by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies several years ago. Barani is a professor at the University of Texas who specializes in the issue of armies and the role of the military in political life, and is the author of a famous book released on the eve of the Arab Spring on how militaries respond to revolutions, translated by the Arab Network for Research and Publishing.

The chances of building democratic armies are subject to a complex process of negotiations and bargaining that may succeed or fail depending on the circumstances of each country. This raises the question of whether the situation can be repeated in the Arab case, and can we witness democratic armies and military elites that do not practice politics and do not seek power?

In his book The Soldier and the Changing State, Barani argues that there are 3 conditions for democratic armies in a country:

  • First, there can be no solid democracies without military elites committed to democratic governance.
  • Second, there must be what Barani calls a "formative moment" or "critical juncture" with which new institutions can be established in the state, including the military.
  • Third, the nature of the contexts in which the democratic transition takes place. Here, Barani points to 3 different contexts that may contribute to building democratic armies:
  • First: The context of the war, whether it is a major war in which the state is crushed and then rebuilt, especially the building of the military institution on professional foundations that do not interfere in politics and adhere to the rules of the democratic game. This often happens with the participation of foreign actors, as happened in Germany and Japan after World War II, or after a devastating civil war that pushes the warring forces to sign peace agreements, calm and agreement on rules of the political game in which there is no control of arms, as happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador and Lebanon.
  • The second context is the fall and failure of military rule, and then the search for a new system that is more efficient and capable of managing the affairs of the state, similar to what happened with the third wave of democracy, such as in Spain, Portugal and Greece in the seventies, and in Latin America in the mid-eighties.
  • The third context is the transformation of the postcolonial state and the presence of political elites aware of the importance of establishing a democratic system, as has happened in some African countries such as Ghana, Tanzania and Botswana.

By investigating these conditions and previous contexts, Barani comes to the important conclusion that the chances of building democratic armies are subject to a complex process of negotiations and bargaining that may or may fail depending on the circumstances of each country. Perhaps this raises the question of whether the situation can be repeated in the Arab case, and whether we can witness democratic armies and military elites that do not practice politics and do not seek power?

I believe that it is difficult, if not impossible, and it requires, in addition to the previous three conditions, two other conditions:

  • A large segment of the civilian elites are convinced of the need for the military to get out of politics, and that they are able to resolve their differences without rushing to the military to intervene if there is a dispute between them. This is an important and necessary condition in the Arab context, which has witnessed the alliance between civilians and the military repeatedly in more than one Arab case, such as Sudan, Iraq, Syria, and others. Most Arab coups occurred not only as a result of the military's quest to seize power, but also because of the failure of civilian elites to solve their problems away from summoning the military, and sometimes inciting each other against others.
  • In many cases, America and Europe, as well as regional powers, have supported the military takeover of power in more than one Arab country, most recently in Sudan in 2021, and before them in Mauritania. The United States, in particular, has a dark record and a long history of supporting military coups, whether in Iran, Latin America, or Africa. While it has remained silent and colluded with the military elites who carried out the recent coups in the Arab world. A country like Israel is also in the interest of the military to seize power and remain in power, convinced that any democracy in the Arab world could represent an existential threat to it, so it fought the Arab Spring and instigated it by its regional and international allies, and strives to keep the status quo as it is.

    • Therefore, the battle for democratic change in the Arab world will not be easy, and it needs to understand the nature of the adversaries it faces, whether local, regional or international, and above all the commitment of political elites to democratic values, which requires time and great effort.