The statements made by Russian President Vladimir Putin about his intention to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus next July raised the temperature of Western political, military and media positions alike, despite US President Joe Biden's downplaying of these statements, stressing that Putin cannot enter into a nuclear war, an underestimation that some considered part of the psychological war waged by the West against President Putin. How serious is President Putin about this move? Does this mean that the situation is approaching the third scenario, the scenario of nuclear war, and that the countdown to the date of the outbreak of this war has begun?

Will conventional warfare be derailed because of the failure of its parties to achieve their goals, and move to unconventional warfare in which weapons of mass destruction are used, which may usher in the explosion of the situation and out of control and the outbreak of a third world war that eats green and dry?

In the previous two articles, we dealt with two possible possibilities for the course of the United States war in Ukraine in its second year, namely the possibility of stopping the war, and the possibility of its continuation, as indicators showed that the first possibility is very unlikely unless President Putin leaves the political scene for any reason, and that the second possibility - the possibility of continuing the war - is the most likely possibility for a few years to come.

We conclude our conversation in this article by addressing the third possibility, which is the possibility of a conventional war derailed due to the failure of its parties to achieve its goals, and a transition to unconventional warfare in which weapons of mass destruction are used, which may usher in the explosion of the situation and out of control and the outbreak of a third world war that eats green and dry.

Why did Putin resort to the option of tactical nuclear weapons?

Months after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in which more than 200,<> troops participated, Russian officials began to make statements about the possibility of resorting to the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and President Putin's decision to deploy tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in Belarus a few months later, confirmed to the United States and its partners that these statements were serious and not for media consumption. The strange thing about this was President Putin's keenness to confirm that his decision does not violate the agreements banning the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as if his invasion of Ukraine, the destruction of its cities and villages and the displacement of its people did not violate international laws!

The decision came at a time of doubling of Western military support for Ukraine, which recently included Patriot missiles, fighter jets, advanced equipment and medium-range missiles capable of taking the battle to Russian territory. It also came at a time of heightened political pressure on President Putin, most recently the issuance of an arrest warrant for President Putin by the International Criminal Court. This decision refers to several implications, the most important of which are:

  • Russian forces have been unable to achieve a military victory so far using conventional weapons.
  • The inability of Russian forces to secure the preservation of the eastern Ukrainian provinces annexed by Russia. President Putin thus failed to achieve his strategic goals of invading Ukraine.
  • President Putin's desire to worsen the Western political situation, and to send an urgent message to Western countries about what things could turn out if they continue with their current policy, and that he is ready to go to war as far as you can imagine.
  • President Putin's conviction that Russia is not fighting Ukraine, but fighting the United States and Western countries, and that his country is fighting this war alone, which means that it must rely on itself and not wait for support from anyone, and that he must find the means that enable him to win over the West in this war, which he considers existential for Russia.
  • President Putin was keen to shorten the war, because of its heavy political, military and economic effects on Russia, its army and its people.
  • President Putin's desire to avoid the scenario of a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, where his defeat continues, and his withdrawal while dragging the tails of disappointment, rings ears.

This decision was further strengthened by the start of exercises by Russian strategic forces on Wednesday involving the Yaris intercontinental ballistic missile systems with the participation of more than 3,300 troops and about <> warships.

It is unlikely that the United States and its allies will provide Ukraine with tactical nuclear weapons in response to Russia, because this will inevitably lead to the expansion of the circle of tactical nuclear war, an option that America and Western countries will not go to because they know very well the consequences of this.

Consequences of Putin's Use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Tactical nuclear weapons are missiles or bombs launched by special launchers from land, sea, or air, and are specifically designed for battlefield use, with friendly forces in close proximity to the target, such as destroying a column of tanks, military positions, fortified ammunition stores, aircraft carriers, or battleships. Their destructive capacity ranges from 10 to 100 kilotons of dynamite, and we can imagine the destructive capacity of these weapons if we know that the destructive power of the bombs dropped by US forces on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War II ranges from 15 to 21 kilotons. The centers believe that Russia has about 2000,10 tactical warheads, more than <> times what the United States has, which are far more destructive than conventional weapons, and leave deadly radiation repercussions, contaminating air, soil, water and food supplies.

However, the destructive capability of tactical nuclear weapons is low compared to strategic nuclear weapons (SNW) that target the depth of the enemy away from the war front, against military bases, cities, towns, arms industries and other hard weapons. It has a destructive capacity of 100 kilotons to more than one megatonne, and may carry larger warheads that far exceed its destructive capacity. Russia has the most powerful strategic nuclear warhead, with a destructive capacity of 500 to 800 kilotons, designed to destroy entire cities.

President Putin is primarily responsible for the decision to use both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, and the indications we reviewed above indicate the seriousness of the Russian position in the use of these weapons, and the following are the most prominent expected scenarios for that:

  • First of all, Putin should not make this decision easy, although he urgently needs to improve his military position in Ukraine to strengthen his negotiating position. The difficulty of making the decision comes from the ambiguity of Western responses to this, and what might happen next. This means that conventional warfare will continue until at least the end of the second year of the war, and will remain stagnant without decisive victories for either side.
  • Before the end of the second year of the war, Putin is expected to launch one or more tactical reconnaissance nuclear strikes with the aim of knowing Western responses and dragging them to the negotiating table, especially if this results in an increase in the scale of destruction of Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, and an increase in the volume of casualties among Ukrainian forces and civilians, which will lead to a limited retreat of Ukrainian forces in the targeted areas, and a limited advance of Russian forces towards strengthening control over the eastern provinces.
  • These strikes are expected to trigger a new Western diplomatic movement in search of political initiatives to resolve the crisis, which will certainly favor Russia.
  • It is unlikely that the United States and its allies will provide Ukraine with tactical nuclear weapons in response to Russia, as this will inevitably lead to an expansion of the circle of tactical nuclear warfare, an option that the United States and Western countries will not go to because they know very well the consequences.
  • Thus, a tactical nuclear war is unlikely to expand or transition to a strategic nuclear war between Russia, the United States and NATO countries.

    • The question that has been searching for an answer since the beginning of the war remains: Is the United States seeking nuclear war? If yes, the big bang is coming, and if not, Putin's use of tactical nuclear weapons will enable him to eventually win politically, unless he is eliminated.