Four questions about post-capitalism against the backdrop of Davos

The forum in Davos, which was held on the anti-Russian wave, opened the door to the world of post-economics - this statement has become almost a banality.

We tend to associate such a seemingly "anti-economic" agenda of the meeting of the "globalization tycoons" only with Russia.

Yes, of course, Davos regulars, in full accordance with the recommendations attributed to Zbigniew Brzezinski, are trying to build a new world order on the ruins of Russia, at the expense of Russia and against Russia.

But let's not forget the more important thought of Brzezinski from the book "The Choice: World Domination or Global Leadership": sooner or later the United States will have to choose between leadership and hegemony in the world - there will not be enough resources and opportunities for everything.

The United States has obviously chosen hegemony - direct control of its allies, even at the cost of losing its "soft power" potential and breaking many important chains of interdependence.

A united West—it can hardly be called a collective one—one way or another would begin to build a post-economy in the space that would be under its control.

And Russia will have to coexist with this inherently parasitic system, and possibly interact where it will be beneficial.

In order to correlate Russia's interests as a first approximation with the post-economy constructed by the United States on the ruins of financial and investment capitalism, which is essentially usurious capitalism exclusively in its own interests, we will ask four questions.

The first.

Can sovereignty in the actual world be only spatial and what is the criterion of sovereignty in over-spatial systems, primarily in global finance and the global information society?

Under most scenarios of the development of the global situation, these systems will remain integrating systems of the world economy and politics.

But we, I hope, understand that the preservation of American hegemony in supraspace systems, primarily in the global information society, which ensures the stability of all channels of digital communications, means the actual preservation of American monopolarity, albeit in a reduced format?

So for any state that claims to participate in determining the "rules of the game" of the world after American-centric globalization, it becomes critical to create not only political and legal,

but also operational and technological mechanisms of supra-spatial sovereignty.

It seems that it is in this direction that Russia will face the most decisive struggle.

But how far it is possible to sovereignize extradimensional systems without destroying them, with serious consequences for everyone, remains an open question - it seems, with a negative answer.

Second.

Is there an alternative as the basis of the economic model to financial and investment capitalism, which is in a deep and, most likely, fatal crisis?

The model of commercial capitalism, defeated by usury only at the end of the 18th century, looks the most natural.

In any case, there is already a serious economic basis for a return to merchant capitalism — world and transregional trade.

Let's not forget that this version of capitalism was based on the so-called triangular system of world trade, the most important element of which was the slave trade.

The largest investment-worthy fortunes of the Western, and even conditionally Eastern, world have grown out of the slave trade, its “service” support or the fight against it.

And this is not a question of morality, although from Klaus Schwab's battery people to the concept of a consumer-slave is not even half a step - less.

And is commercial capitalism really so historically progressive for Russia and its Eurasian partners, especially given the dominance of the United States and its satellites at sea,

and China on land?

But is there a more favorable model of post-capitalism for Russia, which allows counting on a new geo-economic status?

Undoubtedly, but it is based on the new industrialization of Eurasia, which opposes Russia not only to the West, but partly to the East as well, making it an objective ally of the South (Africa) and the Southeast.

But such a model will require the deepest comprehensive study and a new internal state of our country.

And this is also not only the economy, but the ideology and principles of social development.

The third.

Is the state the only basis for constructing geoeconomically self-sufficient macro-regions?

Especially considering Borrell's brilliant cynicism about the "garden and the jungle", behind which looms the readiness of the united West to go to the chaos of large spaces that were previously considered economically valuable.

Yes, for Russia the state is not only natural, but probably the only form of survival.

But in other societies, they may sincerely believe that it is easier to delegate sovereignty than to take on the burden of responsibility for their own state.

By the way, the Americans are now successfully playing on this in relations with the post-Soviet countries and not only.

Sovereignty is an applied thing, but if there is nothing to apply it to, then why is it?

The problem, however, is deeper: economic diversity (and this, I think, is one of the axioms of the future world) will inevitably be expressed in political diversity.

And Russia should be able to take into account and use this multi-format approach, preventing civilizational degradation and the emergence of geo-economic chimeras on the basis of chaotic spaces, reinforced by aggressive ideologies.

No more, but no less.

But this is also not quite the economy - even with the prefix "geo".

Fourth.

What should underlie the system of macroeconomic development indicators in relation to the new world?

It is obvious that the existing criteria for economic development - from indicators of GDP growth to all kinds of ratings - mainly evaluate emptiness, at most - an indicative vector of development of large systems (states or largest corporations).

And this is the case if they do not become an object of manipulation, as we are seeing now.

The importance of the issue is that the restructuring of the system of global economic development indicators means the formation of a framework for a new global institutionality, the very framework “rules of the game” on which the new system will be built, opposing the American-centric post-economy.

By answering these questions, which lead to the simple idea that the post-economy period is actually objective, we will probably better understand how ready we are to step beyond the threshold of globalization.

And most importantly, we will be able to better formulate an economic model for Russia itself as part of the emerging post-monopolar world.

The name of the economic system can be chosen later: the point is not in terms, but in economic specifics and new development institutions that correspond to new tasks.

That's just classical capitalism of the second half of the 20th century, and even more so the first 20 years of the 21st, this model will definitely not be.

The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editors.