In fact, of course, the statement of the Prime Minister of Saxony, Michael Kretschmer, which caused, to put it mildly, a “serious discussion” in the European media (in business circles it is definitely discussed almost more than the Davos Sabbath), about the need to create today all conditions for the repair of the Nord Stream pipeline, so that in the future, after the end of hostilities, to ensure the supply of Russian gas to Germany, only at first glance looks somewhat inappropriate and certainly untimely.
Especially against the backdrop of Davos, Ramstein and the attempts made to push through decisions on the supply of heavy tanks to the war, to which London and Washington strongly persuaded Berlin.
And they did it downright defiantly tough, breaking the remnants of the sovereignty of the German authorities almost through the knee.
Nevertheless, it only looks like it, everything is simple: it is in the fundamental interests of not only the federal state of Saxony, but of the whole of Germany to start such work not even tomorrow, but probably already yesterday.
When the Saxon Prime Minister Kretschmer said that right now, the rise in energy prices was “strangled by companies” (c) all over Germany, he was not joking at all.
Here, in general, everything is quite obvious.
The war in Ukraine will end anyway, sooner or later, and it is known in advance with what approximate result: nuances are possible, but in any case it is clear that the Russian Federation, being, among other things, a nuclear superpower, will not go anywhere from the geographical map.
And if we consider the situation precisely strategically, it is already clear now that with the current configuration of the European economy, there is simply no alternative to energy sources from Russia: and the question here is not even in the physical volumes of either Russian oil or blue fuel.
The question, I'm sorry, is the price.
If you can even buy the necessary physical volumes of the same gas (for next year there are definitely very big doubts) somewhere else, then with the volumes already purchased, which - right now, in fact - are pumped into European UGSFs, there is a rather paradoxical situation: it is now very difficult to sell them, especially to the industrial sector.
Because many industries do not need this gas from UGS facilities at such a horse price: the manufactured products become uncompetitive.
Well, why then the same German industry, excuse me, is that all?
Disputes with the cost and final prices are generally quite meaningless.
If you don't believe me, ask the metallurgists, for example: most blast furnaces in Europe are either idle or just standing still.
About such energy-intensive industries as aluminum and zinc, it is probably better not to mention it in vain.
There are very big problems in the chemical industry, in paper, in glass - yes, it is probably easier to try to find among European industries those who have not been affected by this disaster.
Fortunately, there are very few such left in the real sector.
Here the problem is different.
Kretschmer, in general, did not say any heresy: Europe (and first of all Germany, if someone else is thinking about the future in this country) really needs to take care of securing the Nord Stream structure from further destruction.
Time, as it was rightly noted, goes by, and it costs not only money.
If the damage is not repaired, then the gas pipeline after a certain period will simply become unusable purely technically.
And this issue must, at least, at least begin to be addressed right now.
Right there, everything is clear and everything is right according to the great American writer O'Henry, one of whose heroes somehow philosophically remarked that "sand is a poor substitute for oats."
And even under the most favorable scenario, LNG will not be able to replace relatively cheap pipeline gas in the European industry.
Russian, Algerian, Norwegian, Dutch - yes, even Martian, it doesn't matter.
The main thing is the pipeline.
And real politicians, in general, understand this.
How real business understands this.
The only problem here is that their voices against the general background are not so easy to hear.
And those whose voices are heard are just working to ensure that this real European sector is better, excuse me, finished off.
Moreover, the same European green deindustrialization is almost directly declared as their political task: so is it any wonder, sorry.
There's something else worse.
Even the prime minister of Saxony said that supplies via Nord Stream during the war were hardly possible, but it makes sense to put the question much broader: will Europe need pipeline gas after the war.
Suppliers do not really believe in this, to be honest, they already seem to believe.
And it is no coincidence that the Gulf countries demand guarantees and long contracts.
And Russia, without making particularly loud statements, directly reorients to the markets of Southeast Asia even the resource base that has traditionally been considered “European”: the fields of Western Siberia, such as those in Yamal, among other things.
By the way, it turned out to be quite ironic: at about the same time, approximately when the Prime Minister of Saxony, Michael Kretschmer, shared his thoughts and doubts about the future of Nord Stream with journalists, Russian Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) were discussing the project Soyuz Vostok gas pipeline.
Which is expected to be a continuation of the planned Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline for gas supplies from Western Siberia.
Recall that if the project is implemented in accordance with current plans, the volume of supplies will amount to 50 billion cubic meters.
m of gas per year from Gazprom's existing West Siberian fields to China via Mongolia.
Just a volume close to the volumes of Nord Stream, we recall.
On which you need to think something, and quickly: whether this gas pipeline is subject to repair or not.
Can anyone give guarantees that no one will blow it up again?
And most importantly, excuse me: at whose expense is the banquet?
Ugh, in the sense of repair.
Sorry.
So if the German politicians on the Baltic routes are really going to decide something and offer something to the operator, then they better hurry up.
Because with the implementation of current trends and, most importantly, with a further contraction of European economies and, as a result, energy markets, Russian suppliers can also ask this strange question: why do we need this?
The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editors.