The positive statements issued by Ankara and Damascus following the tripartite meeting of the defense ministers and intelligence chiefs of the two countries and their Russian counterparts in Moscow last month not only contradicted the bumpy road that the Turkish-Syrian dialogue is taking, but also revealed that diplomacy, even if it is the best option to deal with a crisis of this magnitude, It will take a long time to work before you start harvesting.

Although the bet on achieving a rapid transformation in the Turkish-Syrian relations is fraught with risks, if not unrealistic in the first place, it cannot be certain that the dialogue will not last long or that it is going to a dead end.

Realism requires, first of all, lowering the ceiling of bets on all sides, especially Turkey, which is overly optimistic about a rapid development of the level of meetings with Damascus, as well as the regime, which raises the ceiling of its aspirations for dialogue, and also the Russian mediator, who does not seem to have enough influence on Damascus to persuade it to offer Realistic demands can be met.

At the beginning of any negotiations, its parties resort to raising conditions and counter conditions.

However, Ankara's haste, after the Moscow meeting, to talk about a possible tripartite meeting of foreign ministers this month, and then to set a new date - still uncertain - at the beginning of next February, indicates the difficulties facing the process of restoring a ground of confidence to build on.

Although Turkey is willing to complete reconciliation with Assad due to considerations related to the internal electoral factor and the need to cooperate with Damascus against the Kurdish units and to help return Syrian refugees, it is not ready to make substantial concessions immediately or in the foreseeable future.

Although Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu attributed the reasons for not holding the tripartite meeting this month to the fact that the date does not suit Ankara, the postponement of plans to hold the meeting in January and the lack of certainty about the possible new date for it do not indicate logistical obstacles that prevent it from taking place. Insofar as they reveal the great complexities facing the possibility of developing the Turkish-Syrian dialogue to high political levels.

They also point out that the many factors impeding convergence are still more influential than the few factors stimulating it.

This was evident when Damascus stipulated, on the words of Al-Assad and then his Foreign Minister, Faisal Al-Miqdad, Turkey’s withdrawal from Syria and its abandonment of the Syrian opposition, before a normal return to relations.

Although these conditions do not seem surprising in general, their raising in light of the Turkish talk about the possibility of meeting the foreign ministers and after the positive atmosphere that prevailed in the first tripartite meeting in Moscow, constitutes a decline in the Syrian momentum towards continuing the negotiations.

This also increases pressure on Russia, which plays a key role in sponsoring the dialogue.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is aware of the difficulties he faces as a mediator in this process, and last week he sent his envoy for Syria, Alexander Lavrentiev, to Damascus in an attempt to persuade Assad to ease his terms with Turkey.

Nevertheless, it seemed that al-Assad did not hesitate to show his implicit dissatisfaction with the way Moscow is conducting the negotiations, when he stressed to Lavrentiev the need for coordination and prior planning between Damascus and Moscow in order to reach the tangible goals that Syria wants in the dialogue with Turkey.

The regime previously always concealed its displeasure with the understandings reached by Russia and Turkey in the years that followed the two countries' entry into a partnership in Syria, but it is now showing greater resistance to Russian pressure.

The reason for this is that Al-Assad believes that Putin is seeking to achieve reconciliation between Ankara and Damascus at any cost, as a result of the growing partnership between Turkey and Russia in many areas after the Russian-Ukrainian war, and that this price will force the regime to accept coexistence with the continued Turkish military presence in Syria until it is completed. Reaching a final settlement to the conflict.

Al-Assad may not be able to resist the Russian pressure to the end, but his demand that the price of reconciliation with Ankara be its acceptance of his impossible terms, confuses the Russian calculations and works to reduce Erdogan’s appetite to search for exits that meet some of the Syrian demands on the one hand, and does not lead to a significant impact on the distant Turkish strategy. Range in Syria on the other hand.

Ankara has presented a realistic roadmap for dialogue with Damascus, but in order for it to be viable, it needs concessions from both sides to make the normalization path effective.

The fact that the course of the Turkish-Syrian dialogue is surrounded by a group of direct and indirect factors affecting it, makes it more complicated.

The high ceiling set by Assad for any reconciliation is not only due to the large gap between Ankara and Damascus and the divergence of goals and motives between Damascus and Moscow, but also reveals the influential Iranian influence on Assad.

Although Tehran has expressed its "happiness" with the Turkish-Syrian dialogue, it has many reasons to obstruct this path, or at least to ensure that its success does not affect its interests in Syria.

Although Tehran has been involved for years with Moscow and Ankara in the Astana platform designed to manage the interests of the three countries in Syria, it did not have a direct role in sponsoring the course of the Turkish-Syrian dialogue, as Russia did.

It also fears that the growing partnership between Russia and Turkey will marginalize its role in Syria.

Moreover, Iran aspires to fill the void left by Russia's preoccupation with its war with Ukraine in the Syrian arena.

Although it sees itself as qualified to compensate for the Russian retreat in Syria, Moscow's desire to preserve the Turkish-Iranian influence static reduces Tehran's chances of occupying a greater role.

While Russia publicly avoids raising the demand for a Turkish withdrawal from Syria, Iran did not hesitate to raise it.

It will also view any reconciliation between Ankara and Damascus without achieving a Turkish withdrawal from Syria as consolidating the Turkish presence rather than diminishing it.

Ankara has been explicit that its withdrawal from Syria depends on achieving an end settlement to the Syrian conflict on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 2254, and it seems that its approach to this issue is partly understood by Moscow, which attaches importance to wooing Turkey and pushing it to engage more in its efforts to settle the conflict according to its standards, and put pressure on The United States to withdraw its forces from Syria, and to demonstrate its ability to act effectively against American interests in Syria and the Middle East by attracting Washington's allies to cooperate with it, such as Turkey and the UAE.

Although Turkey is willing to complete reconciliation with Assad due to considerations related to the internal electoral factor and the need to cooperate with Damascus against the Kurdish units and to help return the Syrian refugees, it is not ready to make substantial concessions immediately or in the foreseeable future, and its interest in visiting its foreign minister is born. Cavusoglu to Washington next week is another reason for delaying plans for the tripartite meeting of foreign ministers.

In view of the importance of this visit, which will discuss other core issues other than the Syrian issue, such as the issue of Turkey selling F-16 fighter jets, Ankara wants to give it a positive atmosphere and not exacerbate tensions due to its dialogue with Damascus.

It will also work to use its dialogue with Damascus as a bargaining chip with Washington to extract concessions from it on some issues, including the issue of American support for the Kurdish units.

The Turkish opening to Damascus may prompt Washington to put a real offer on the table that would meet some of Turkey's main demands, such as the withdrawal of Kurdish units from the border areas.

The holding of the tripartite meeting of the foreign ministers of Turkey, Russia and Syria in the coming period may also depend on the results of Cavusoglu's visit to Washington.

It is unlikely that Turkey will abandon its attempt at rapprochement with Assad, but its negotiating power with Damascus and Moscow will be determined by what it can get from Washington.

Given the bargaining that Turkey is playing with Moscow, Damascus and Washington at this stage, it will work to balance its interests with the three parties.

In an effort to get out as much gain as possible.

In light of the fact that Russia's mediation between Ankara and Damascus helps it to maintain its active role as a pacing officer between Ankara, Damascus and Tehran in the Syrian situation, in isolation from its preoccupation with its conflict with the West, it will have to put more pressure on Assad to dissuade him from the impossible conditions he sets before Turkey, as well. It will have to convince Tehran and Damascus of the need to cooperate with Turkey in order to remove US forces from Syria, as it is in the common interest of all four parties.

Finally, without taking into account Iran's interests in Syria and perhaps its involvement in the tripartite mechanism, the Iranian role will turn into a player that spoils the rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus.