It is not just a visit of the Chinese president to Riyadh to inaugurate a multi-field Saudi-Chinese civil partnership, even if some try to give it this simplistic character. It transcends the formalities of the signed agreements. It is a long and complicated march carried by feet laden with a jogging for a long time towards the "setting of the sun" in which they reached the mutual benefits. But the darkness of the scene imposed a complete turn towards the rising of the sun to welcome a new day that you are experiencing from its early stages, and Riyadh has prepared for it well. Over the course of 3 years, she reads the challenges, reviews the opportunities, and considers the alternatives, to draw her roadmap with China.
The severity of the situation raises questions:
Will the Chinese space be compatible with the requirements of Riyadh, in which it will not give up building an integrated national identity?
Will economic interests and political positions be separated, or will they be a model of binding alignment partnerships? The “China Partners” site from the new “Saudi-Chinese” circle, “Iran as a model”?
Who will catch up with Riyadh in the east, and this depends on ability and readiness?
The "American and Russian" parties understand each other well, and if they meet at a table, the hidden hand of both will not be devoid of a "pistol" aimed at the other.
Riyadh with this turn, even if it came in a purely national context: However, it is "somehow" in response to two things:
Anticipation of the interruption of "American bribery" before reaching the water, and its signs are practically visible.
Take advantage of ample inventory to adjust the direction that may drain a lot.
This symbolism is initially a "necessity";
To prepare the mind "absorbed in the West" for frank expression, reading the scene of the "Chinese-Saudi partnership" is not complete without dismantling the American angle.
The United States of America has been a strategic partner for the countries of the region, along with Saudi Arabia, for decades, in mutual comprehensive interests.
Yes, we have gained a lot, but it is not enough to quench the thirst. The United States of America takes more than it gives, and what it gave “whatever” was not a “free gift” but rather paid for with a double value, and that is okay, because each stage has its requirements and consequences, and the current stage is not consistent with the American orientations Utilitarian unilateralism.
The United States “unilaterally” took its practical decision to reposition itself in the region, “from the point of view of the American national interest,” and thus hastily abandoned its commitments in all files, the most severe of which is the “security file,” and the worst is that it enabled the opponents of the Arab region, “Iran and Israel,” to manage these issues. The files are to take care of what remains of its interests “within the framework of the” American / Iranian-Israeli binaries “at the expense of Arab interests, and ignore its security concerns that were related to that partnership.
The United States of America today is not what it was yesterday, in terms of the strength of its deep institutions, which did not withstand the crises within the United States: (partisan interests prevailed over the national interest - the lobbies were able to give priority to the interests of Israel and Iran over American national interests).
The most dangerous here is the economic challenge, as the US public debt “exceeded 31 trillion dollars” and the annual deficit exceeded 700 billion dollars, and every day the reliability of the US dollar decreases as a currency of trade exchange for countries, in addition to US sanctions and “intercontinental” legislation far from international decisions. Which left a state of restlessness "even from the closest allies" due to the consequent disruption and slowdown of trade movement, and thus commercial breathing away from the dollar.
The question here is: Will Riyadh turn the page on the “United States of America?”:
Certainly not. Rather, the partnership will remain in place for quite some time, considering its paths and details, and it is noticeable that the decrease in it comes from the American side, while Riyadh seriously maintains the purity of the corner from its side, but Saudi Arabia, in return, is committed “nationally” to satisfying its needs in a timely manner. appropriate, without delay.
Why is China and not Russia the new strategic choice for Saudi Arabia?
Very briefly;
Partnership with Russia is possible and possible, and even achieved at a good rate "after the two mutual visits": (King Salman's visit to Moscow / in October 2017, and President Putin's visit to Riyadh in October 2019, and the signing of multi-field agreements and memorandums of cooperation. However, it is "practically and politically" much more complex than the partnership with China, and it will not be read "economically" at all. Russia is an "existential/philosophical" strategic opponent for America, its framework is civilizational confrontation, and its tool is military confrontation, even if it is not direct at the current stage, "the Ukraine crisis" A model for the applications of confrontation between them militarily.
The "American and Russian" parties understand each other well, and if they meet at a table, the hidden hand of both will not be devoid of a "pistol" aimed at the other. The confrontation between them will remain to the most coarse degrees, unlike the confrontation with China, with which other tools may succeed, at least in terms of the "exchange" factor. "The huge trade" that exceeded 220 billion dollars annually, in products necessary for both parties, unlike Russia, which does not have real commercial interests with America, but rather they have competition in the field of energy, and even in space in which America lost the elements of its existence after Moscow canceled the cooperation agreements in space. In response to US sanctions.
In this context, and in order for the "Saudi strategic equation" to appear clearer:
The "American administration" believes that what is happening is a natural result of its behavior in the region, "which it likes to call it/tactics," and it is continuing to implement it at different rates and different paths.
The realization of the "American administration" that the new Saudi approach is a national need that does not contradict direct American interests, in the sense that it does not threaten American national security in our region.
The US administration's realization of Saudi Arabia's commitment to the requirements of the "Saudi-American" strategic partnership, and that any new "Saudi" approach will be parallel and not an alternative.
Features of "Saudi" challenges that may seem invisible
There is a problem of elite awareness integrated with the Western/American model in particular, as its awareness circle and methodology of thinking are consistent with models imbibed with the length of immersion in "learning, communication, and media feeding" that form its positions and opinions, even if they contradict "unconsciously" with the national interest.
There is the problem of national competencies, in terms of abundance and ability to work directly with the Chinese arena. The nature of partnership requires effective and capable "national" tools with practical awareness of the Chinese interior and its methodology of thinking.
Finally, to achieve strategies "as planned" it is necessary:
Neutralizing obstructing influences.
Realism in operational plans and procedural steps.
Seriousness in implementation mechanisms.
Strict follow-up and evaluation.
The strategy should have “interim results” in a tangible and effective manner.