Olaf Scholz's long-winded article in the flagship globalist magazine Foreign Affairs could only be perceived as another attempt to demonstrate his super-loyalty to the United States in the fight against France, Germany's eternal rival for the role of the main ally in Old Europe.

Even chronologically, the release of the article seemed to coincide by chance with the end of Emmanuel Macron's visit to the United States, which can hardly be considered successful.

In any case, Washington, represented by Joseph Biden, did not make any concessions to Europe in the impending trade war, and could not make it in the conditions of the aggravation of the internal situation and the struggle with the Republicans, who gravitate towards protectionism.

The situation is clear: for Scholz, losing to Macron in the struggle for the sympathies of the current American administration (although, as everyone now understands, she has only two years left) will be very sensitive and, probably,

However, in Scholz's article there are several curious theses, or slips, or hints.

To begin with, we note Scholz's statement that Russia has violated the "natural course of things" characteristic of the last 30 years since the end of the Cold War and the advent of the era of "democracy" and "dialogue".

Let's leave aside the debate about what kind of democracy it was with a test tube in the hands of Colin Powell.

But what was this "natural course of things" broken by Russia?

Was this not the most comfortable scenario for the United States and its satellites of the geopolitical marginalization of Russia through the gradual strangulation of economic sanctions, pumping weapons into the Kyiv regime, which was becoming openly Nazi, preparing a “Maidan” within the country, “setting fire” to the post-Soviet space?

Maybe that's why, traditionally starting the enumeration of Moscow's "crimes" against "democracy" and "Europe" from Vladimir Putin's Munich speech in 2007, Scholz immediately jumps to February 2022, forgetting about Russia's many years of attempts to negotiate, including Moscow's December (2021) proposals on strategic stability.

It was on February 24, 2022 that the scenario of a slow preparation of aggression against Russia was broken, under smiles and promises to Moscow to take into account concerns.

And instead of the muddy waters of information and political manipulations, Europe had to directly begin to participate first in a hybrid war, and, starting from August 2022, to become more and more involved in the conflict as direct participants, openly declaring its goals politically, and not hiding behind pressure from side of Washington and trying to squeeze various concessions out of Moscow.

And Scholz's article is valuable in that the German chancellor writes in it what he really thinks about relations with Moscow, dispelling the last illusions about the possibilities of returning to bilateral partnership.

But the breakdown of the “natural course” of things was apparently expressed in the fact that the European elites, probably for the first time since the 1990s, were forced to pay for the decisions made.

First of all, the Americans forced us, but also Russia, with their perseverance and economic stability.

Yes, on the Russophobic hype, it worked out well at first, but the further, the more acute the question becomes not only about the price, but also about where to move on.

And here in the article by Olaf Scholz the most interesting and important begins.

The chancellor suddenly talks about the need for Germany to have some kind of "new strategic culture", meaning the transformation of Germany into a key military force in the region.

As they say, everything new in Germany is just forgotten old.

The logic here is clear too: if Germany is the shield of Europe, then it means that it is the recipient not only of the main volume of American military-political assistance, but also of economic "carrots", which are now more than desirable.

But there is a nuance.

If Germany is ready to become a "European shield", then there must be a "sword" somewhere.

This means that Europe is seriously preparing for the fact that the line of contact between Russia and NATO will be the front line.

And this is where the main fear of modern European politicians — Scholz, Macron, Borrell, and everyone else — opens up: what if the United States, having drawn the EU into the conflict over Ukraine, which has already expanded beyond Ukraine, will do Europe a pen, focusing on the formation of its own super-macro-region in Latin America and AUKUS?

After all, only the lazy cannot compare the US game of "aggravation" in Europe and reconciliation with yesterday's hostile regimes in Latin America.

The European elites – and there is no fundamental difference between Macron and Scholz here – cannot fail to see how, under the talk of Euro-Atlantic unity and readiness to “stand to the end”, Washington is increasingly striving not only to get out of the “Ukrainian black hole”, but to limit the scale of his involvement in it.

In other words, European politicians are fighting to keep Americans in Europe by offering the best conditions.

And here the fundamental difference between the "Europe of Scholz" and the "Europe of Macron" is noticeable.

No, of course, both of these concepts involve building the well-being of Europe on the ruins of Russia and at the expense of not just preferential, but almost gratuitous access to its resources.

But if Macron assumes the preservation of the current format of Atlantic relations (“suzerain-vassal”), but subject to a return to the state of the Cold War and a decrease in the level of military-force risks for European countries, an actual return to the model of slowly strangling Russia and maintaining the status of the main contactee with Moscow, Scholz is aiming for a far more brutal scenario.

He seems ready to turn Germany, if not into a "front-line state", then at least into a rear base for continuing confrontation with Russia.

It is significant that Scholz writes practically nothing about the future of the European economy.

It's like the future doesn't exist.

The only exception is the passage about the rejection of Russian gas, after which Germany became even better, especially in terms of climate.

And in general, Scholz's rhetoric leaves no doubt:

he is really ready for the militarization of Germany, and at first against Russia, and then - as he goes.

Maybe against China it will be possible to play the role of a junior partner of the United States.

It must be said directly that the Nordic model of Scholz looks more convincing.

Considering that Scholz, unlike Macron, not only agrees to pay almost any “energy tribute” to Washington, but is also ready, probably, unlike the leaders of most European countries, to really go for an unprecedented tightening of the screws in domestic politics.

This is evidenced by the exposure of the "conspiracy of the military" and the actual reconstruction of the mechanism of political repression, dismantled in Germany after 1945.

But there is something in common in the concepts of Macron and Scholz: in both cases, Europe will continue to exist exclusively as an appendage of the United States, the only difference is which one is political-economic or military-political.

And this apparent clarity is the main result of the zigzags in European politics over the past couple of weeks.

The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editors.