Biden's limited options in Syria

As a president who ordered the withdrawal of the US army from Afghanistan two decades after the invasion, and has been managing for months a proxy military confrontation with Russia in Ukraine, and at the same time seeks to focus the US effort on competition with China, and is working to reduce the US security link in the Middle East, Joe Biden finds himself facing a dilemma. Another is to determine whether his country should maintain its military presence in Syria.

Since assuming power, Biden decided to focus goals on confronting the threat of the return of the Islamic State (ISIS), although the US military presence in Syria is very limited and does not exceed 900 soldiers, but it constitutes a continuous crack for Washington.

On the one hand, the US relations with the Kurdish "People's Protection Units" are causing increasing tension in the relationship with Turkey, and on the other hand, the US withdrawal from Syria has become a major goal for Turkey, Russia, Iran and Damascus.

In light of the renewed Turkish military pressure on the Kurdish units, and the escalating risks of friction between the American and Russian forces operating within close range in northeastern Syria, President Biden will find it difficult to ignore making a decision about the future of the American military presence in this country.

Moscow is still clearly opposed to a new Turkish incursion into the region, but it gives Ankara a greater margin of military action in order to increase pressure on US forces.

The Biden administration still avoids engaging in a public debate in this regard, and links the American stay in Syria with the constant need to confront the threat of the return of ISIS, but other complex factors related to this issue make it difficult for Washington to ignore the future of survival in Syria, and increase the risks for American forces. .

Turkey has recently threatened to launch a new ground military operation against the Kurdish units, despite American warnings that it would threaten the safety of the American forces deployed in the region.

There have been recent reports that some of the recent Turkish airstrikes have been in direct proximity to American soldiers.

In parallel, the decline in the effectiveness of the line of communication between the US and Russian armies in Syria - after the Russian-Ukrainian war - increased the risks of a clash between the two sides.

Meanwhile, Russia recently allowed Turkey to use Syrian airspace it controls to launch strikes against Kurdish units.

While Moscow still clearly opposes a new Turkish incursion into the region, it is giving Ankara greater latitude for military action in order to increase pressure on US forces.

It is also working on mediation between Ankara and Damascus to end the estrangement between them and joint security cooperation against the Kurdish units.

In contrast to the past years, when the interests of Moscow and Washington met in restricting Ankara's ability to target the Kurdish units, the partnership between Turkey and Russia in Syria, which has grown further after the Russian-Ukrainian war, constitutes an additional pressure factor on Washington.

The US administration still expresses its desire to continue the relationship with the Kurdish units, and strongly opposes a possible Turkish ground operation, but its ability to influence to deter Turkish plans has increasingly weakened.

And given that Ankara has expanded the margin available to it through increased coordination with Russia and openness to Damascus, the American position has become more vulnerable to changes in the Syrian conflict.

However, Ankara still faces two major obstacles: the difficulty of distancing Washington from the Kurdish units, and pushing Moscow to support its plans to expand the borders of the safe zones it established in northern Syria 6 years ago.

It seems clear that these two obstacles are already pressuring Turkey to wait to launch a new operation, but the military pressure on the ground - accompanied by political pressure on Moscow and Washington - is gradually undermining the ability of Russia and the United States to contain the current Turkish impulse.

Despite this, the American influence on Turkish orientations in Syria has become weaker than before, as Ankara previously succeeded in launching a series of ground incursions into northern Syria with limited consequences, in addition to the major shifts it made in its policy in Syria.

The United States could resort to threatening to end or freeze plans to sell Turkey F-16 fighters as a means of pressure to deter it from a potential ground operation, but such pressure carries greater risks.

In addition to the threat of this deal, Turkey may search for another alternative to the American fighter jets from Russia. A new escalation in the crisis with Ankara may encourage it to move forward in obstructing the project to include Finland and Sweden into NATO.

Although the options for US pressure seem limited, Washington's adherence to the relationship with the Kurdish units reflects 4 important issues.

Such pressures may constitute an incentive for Washington to search for a settlement with Turkey to meet its demands in northern Syria, or at least part of it, in exchange for persuading it to abandon plans for a ground operation, but it will not in any way contribute to postponing the discussion regarding the future of the American presence.

The American failure to contain Turkey’s new demands will have major consequences for long-term American interests in Syria and will push Ankara to coordinate its moves more with Moscow and Damascus in order to limit American influence.

This is due to the fact that the main motive for the Turkish military moves against the Kurdish units is the convergence of Ankara's interests with Moscow, Tehran and Damascus to remove the American forces from Syria in the foreseeable future.

Although the United States is still sticking to the survival of these forces to face the threat of the return of ISIS, it loses convincing justifications for remaining due to the main consideration, which is that the ability of this organization to rebuild itself has greatly weakened, and it is no longer able to plan to carry out attacks abroad from Syria.

And if Washington seeks to provide the necessary military capabilities to confront the threat of the resurgence of ISIS activity, then in practice it will not need a limited and risky military survival at the same time.

And the ISIS threat can be contained through an understanding with the actors in this matter on an American withdrawal from Syria in exchange for reaching an understanding that allows Washington to exchange intelligence information with Ankara, Moscow and Damascus, and to secure access to Syrian airspace to launch strikes when the need arises.

The United States is no longer able to bear the cost of staying in Syria for a longer period, in light of the pressures it is facing in terms of its relationship with Turkey, and in terms of the increasing risks to the security of its forces.

The American failure to contain Turkey's new demands will have major consequences for the long-term American interests in Syria, and will push Ankara to coordinate its moves more with Moscow and Damascus in order to curtail American influence.

The conflict of American and Turkish interests in Syria - due to the dilemma of the Kurdish units - played a major role in reshaping Turkish policy in Syria, and in light of this, further disturbances in Washington's relations with Ankara will increasingly deepen the Turkish drift towards strengthening partnership with Russia and accelerating the pace of restoring relations. with Damascus.

And decision-makers in Washington should look at these consequences more seriously, and think of a way to accommodate Turkey's security concerns, rather than show a challenge to Ankara's legitimate ambitions to enhance the security of its borders.

Further delay will only make the situation worse.