A fact from the category of “you can’t come up with it on purpose” or “the best in black humor.”

Romania officially asked Ukraine to recognize that "the Moldovan language does not exist."

Kyiv Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmitry Kuleba arrived in Bucharest for a meeting of NATO foreign ministers and on this occasion met with his local counterpart Bogdan Aurescu.

The two diplomatic chiefs talked about life, once again condemned Russia, and so on and so forth.

And among this “other” something really interesting flashed for the sake of diversity.

I quote from a press release from the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “Last but not least.

Minister Aurescu recalled the repeated requests from the Romanian side to the Ukrainian side to recognize the absence of the so-called Moldovan language.”

In the official report of Dmitry Kuleba's office about his meeting with Bogdan Aurescu, not a word was said about the “last but no less important” thesis of the Romanian side.

And this is understandable: the high-ranking functionaries of the Zelensky administration definitely have more important topics to think about now than the Moldovan-Romanian linguistic differences.

With a strong desire, a certain logic can be seen in the perseverance of official Bucharest.

Own language is a very important attribute of statehood.

If, as they say in Romania, “the Moldovan language does not exist”, then what is the point of existence of such a country as the Republic of Moldova?

And if there is no such meaning, then why has Moldova not yet become part of Romania?

It’s a mess, we need to urgently (or at least not urgently - as it turns out) start fixing it!

That's how cunning (okay, I got excited,

But I would not like to talk about this at all.

There is such a well-known rule since the 17th century: “In the house of a hanged man, they don’t talk about a rope.”

And is it so important that the brilliant Miguel Cervantes put this wise thought into the mouth of such a simpleton as Sancho Panza?

That doesn't stop the idea from being wise.

From a purely technical point of view, Bogdan Aurescu did not violate this rule: he spoke with the Ukrainian minister about the rope not in his house, but in his own, on the territory of Romania.

But is it worth clinging to such technical details as the place where two diplomatic bosses talked?

What is important is the fact that this conversation took place and that none of its participants noticed the gloomy symbolism of the topic raised.

An excerpt from a 1992 report prepared by the staff of the US government Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on the referendum on Ukrainian independence at the very end of the previous year: “All regions in Ukraine, including Crimea, voted for independence.

Support ranged from over 95% in western Ukraine and Kyiv to 54% in Crimea, where ethnic Russians make up a large majority of the population.

It is noteworthy that in the industrialized and at the same time Russified eastern regions, such as Donetsk, Kharkov, Luhansk, Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye, as well as in the southern Black Sea regions - Odessa, Nikolaev and Kherson - the vote for independence exceeded 80% in each region.

Question: why did the Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine vote in December 1991 for the independence of this republic?

Not because, of course, they wanted their transformation into a "second Galicia."

The prophetic-sounding correct answer is contained in the following paragraph of the same report of the American government commission: “Leonid Kravchuk easily won the presidency, receiving 61.59% of the vote.

The results showed that Kravchuk convinced the electorate of his ability, and not necessarily sincerely, to transform.”

What far-sighted people still worked in this American commission more than three decades ago!

“Not necessarily sincere” in relation to the behavior of the Ukrainian political class since the moment that preceded the collapse of the Soviet Union - this phrase describes, if not everything, then almost everything.

In 1991, the Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine were deceived in the most banal way.

People who are accustomed to believing promises from high rostrums were sworn to the free development of the Russian language, close economic and political ties with Russia.

They promised, and then they acted in the spirit of a well-known cynical joke: "I am the master of my word: I gave it myself - I took it back myself."

They tried to turn the Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine into a “second Galicia”.

And this led to well-known consequences.

And now the country, which actually destroyed itself thanks to the policy of "linguistic (and not only linguistic) terrorism" of its own authorities, is asked to apply these abilities in relation to the neighboring state.

If that's not black humor, then I don't know what black humor is.

But the most curious thing is that, apparently, the Romanian Minister Bogdan Aurescu himself does not know this either.

The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editors.