Is the Turkish ground operation in Syria inevitable?

Speaking to reporters upon his return from Qatar - where he participated in the opening of the World Cup there - Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that the air operation carried out by the Turkish Air Force in both Iraq and Syria is not the only response to the Istanbul terrorist bombing, which killed 6 civilians. And it (that is, the air operation) is just the beginning, and it will be followed by a ground operation.

Speaking at a partisan event a few days later, Erdogan said that the intended ground operation will target areas such as Tal Rifaat, Manbij and Ain al-Arab (Kobani), from which threats and targets usually come to the Turkish interior, the latest of which was the missile strikes that targeted the cities of southern Turkey after the air operation.

In the strategic framework, Ankara still believes that the operations it carried out in Syria did not fully fulfill their purpose, and still need to be completed in order to be able to prevent the establishment of a political entity linked to the PKK on its southern borders.

What's up?

These statements brought to mind Turkey's threats of a new operation in northern Syria last May, which comes at the heart of the "preemptive war" strategy to combat terrorism that Ankara has been pursuing for years, and serves the goal of establishing a safe area for the return of Syrians in northern Syria.

However, the process was postponed for reasons foremost of which were the positions of the countries involved in the Syrian issue, especially Russia and the United States of America, because the opposition of either or both of these countries to the process might mean additional complications to it that would increase its duration, challenges, and economic and human cost.

What has changed now to give the Turkish threats more seriousness and a better chance of practical implementation?

According to the current data, the ground operation that Turkey is waving today seems almost inevitable.

In the strategic framework, Ankara still believes that the operations it carried out in Syria did not completely lead to their purpose, and still need to be completed, so that it can prevent the establishment of a political entity linked to the PKK on its southern borders, and remove the militants of the separatist groups from its borders to a depth of 30 kilometers. Thus, the ability to establish a safe area in northern Syria that would be attractive to the return of Syrian residents to Turkish territory.

Within the context, the Istanbul bombing and the subsequent developments necessitated the ground operation as a necessary option.

This is because Ankara launched the "claw-sword" air operation in response to the attack in Taksim Square, with the aim of holding those involved accountable, and as a deterrent message to prevent additional attacks.

However, the bombing of the Turkish border cities continued after the air operation, causing casualties, and a number of Turkish soldiers fell in the operations in Iraq, which once again pushes for the idea of ​​response and deterrence.

And because the aerial bombardment again is neither guaranteed nor decisive in this context, the ground operation would be a logical option here.

On the other hand, it is not logical for Turkey to leave the "final word" in this debate to the PKK and its affiliated organizations in Syria, and the internal support for the ground operation, popular and partisan, is large and overwhelming, sometimes reaching the point of demanding it and not just supporting it if it took place.

And with the approaching presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for next June;

These accounts become more important and sensitive.

In terms of the positions of the countries involved in the Syrian issue, whose positions were among the reasons for postponing the operation previously, it seems that today they are more understanding of Turkey's motives, or let's say that the Turkish position today towards it is stronger than before.

This is because the roles that Turkey played on the sidelines of the Russian-Ukrainian war, including mediation, the grain export agreement, the prisoner exchange agreement, its role in the file of Sweden and Finland joining NATO, and in the emerging security threats to the European continent after the war;

All of them are among the factors that make Ankara's hand today stronger than before, especially if the Istanbul bombing and the subsequent targeting of Turkish civilians are added to all of this, which necessitated unprecedented solidarity with Ankara and support for its narrative and position.

Therefore, several statements were issued by both Moscow and Washington supporting Turkey's right to defend itself and combat terrorism.

In all;

The ground operation in Syria seems almost inevitable in terms of motives, so is it so in the context of practical application?

options

However, the Russian and American statements supporting Turkey's right to defend itself did not express the same support for a Turkish ground operation in Syria. On the contrary, both capitals warned Ankara of practical repercussions of this kind.

Which means that the latter has not yet arrived - it seems - to convince them of the eligibility of the operation.

And because the position of the two countries is important for the success of the operation and that it does not face major challenges from the political, military and logistical aspects, Ankara today, in light of all of the above, faces a number of options regarding the ground operation:

In the first place, it does not seem that postponing the ground operation for a long time in the hope that Russia and the United States can be convinced of it would be a logical option, in addition to canceling the idea of ​​​​the operation entirely.

The aforementioned motives and contexts - especially the local factor - are all pressure factors towards the inevitability of the process, and even the failure to delay it.

On the other hand, there remains a possible possibility for Ankara to postpone the ground operation in the event that its objectives are achieved before the date of its launch, and the intention is to remove Russia (and the United States) the militants of the Syrian Democratic Forces from areas such as Manbij and Tal Rifaat, and to remove them to a depth of 30 kilometers from the Turkish border.

Some news reports stated that Russia sought to convince the Protection Units/Syrian Democratic Forces of this matter, without the latter responding.

The third option is for Moscow and Washington, and to a lesser extent Tehran, to be convinced of the motives of the ground operation and Ankara's right to it, which means not seeking to impede it, which is becoming possible more than ever according to the variables detailed above.

However, what was issued by the two capitals does not suggest a current or expected conviction soon, which may prompt Turkey to choose to launch the operation despite Russian and American reservations.

Turkey had previously done so in Operation Peace Spring in 2019, when it launched it despite the opposition of Moscow and Washington, before stopping it later following understandings with each of them that stipulated that the two parties undertake to remove the YPG militants from the Turkish border to a depth of 30 kilometers, which Ankara says is Not implemented until today.

This option (Operation Peace Spring model) also seems possible and likely in the event that Turkey undertakes a limited operation confined, for example, to each of Tal Rifaat and Manbij, as a first stage at the very least, as it is unlikely that an operation with this ceiling would provoke a practical reaction on the ground from Russia or United State.

A process of this kind would also bring the Russian and American pledges back up for discussion and negotiation between Ankara on the one hand and Moscow and Washington on the other.

As for an expanded operation against the entire presence of the Protection Units / Syrian Democratic Forces in northern Syria, especially in the east of the Euphrates region, it is not likely according to the current data, and it will remain postponed at the present time, pending the maturity of other conditions that make it or part of it possible or likely.

In conclusion, it can be said that Turkey has completed the logistical and military preparations, and it is not expected that it will face real challenges from the separatist organizations. However, what it is currently working on is more related to the political safety net of the operation, in a manner that guarantees its implementation with a minimum of time, cost and challenges, which is what It will contribute to determining the zero hour and the limits and objectives of the operation to a large extent.