Ukraine demands the opening of a "second front" against Russia.

And he demands this from his, it would seem, brother in the color revolutions - Georgia.

Moreover, by the “second front” here we mean not so much direct military operations against the Russian Federation and the invasion of Georgian troops into South Ossetia and Abkhazia (although Kyiv, of course, would very much like this), but Georgia’s accession to the sanctions regime.

And, perhaps, the deployment of Western military bases on its territory, which would create additional tension in the Caucasus and force Russia (which is transferring all possible troops to the NVO) to strengthen its contingents in the Caucasus.

However, in Tbilisi, these ideas are rather cool.

Firstly, because they don’t want to sacrifice their security, economy (Georgia has a double-digit economic growth in percentage terms) and the state itself on the altar of the Ukrainian struggle — after all, it’s clear what Russia’s response will be for such a “second front”.

Secondly, because the Ukrainians, in the words of Don Corleone, ask without respect.

Or rather, banal blackmail.

“On the one hand, they say that you must open a “second front,” and on the other, they threaten sanctions, threaten Bidzina Ivanishvili and government officials,” Irakli Kobakhidze, chairman of the ruling Georgian Dream party, is indignant.

This is how he described the decision of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine to include the founder of the ruling Georgian Dream party in the sanctions list,

billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, members of his family and close circle - so that then the West would take sanctions against these people.

“Today Ivanishvili has turned into a Georgian Yanukovych.

He and his people are pursuing a policy in Ukraine that is not supported by the Georgian people.

They want to quarrel Georgians and Ukrainians for a decade ahead, ”David Arakhamia, head of the parliamentary faction of the ruling Servant of the People party in Ukraine, explained the need for sanctions.

However, the pressure does not stop.

In addition to open Ukrainian pressure and the same open pressure from the Georgian opposition (the “United National Movement”, which criticizes the government for being too “soft”), there is also pressure from the West.

Not as obvious, but much more powerful.

At the same time, the West needs a “second front” not only to create additional tension in the south for Russia.

The tasks facing the US and the EU are of a much more strategic nature - they basically want to bring down the current structure of Russian-Georgian relations, since they see it as a serious threat to their entire policy in the Russian direction.

The uniqueness and danger of relations between Moscow and Tbilisi is that they provide pragmatic coexistence and even more or less good neighborly relations between Russia and the pro-European post-Soviet country.

Yes, there are conflicts and scandals (the case of deputy Gavrilov, periodic skirmishes between nationalist Georgians and Russian tourists), but in general, interstate relations are at a quite high level.

Despite the recent war, Russia's recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and the absence of diplomatic relations, bilateral trade is on the rise.

Moreover, "hostile" Georgia has become (especially against the backdrop of Western sanctions) one of the favorite places for Russian tourists.

People who would hardly have gone to rest in Georgian resorts,

And all why?

Because both sides put the principle “we are different, but we are not enemies” at the basis of their relations.

Tbilisi does not follow the example of Ukraine and does not provide its territory as a springboard for the enemies of Russia, and Moscow respects this position of Georgia, therefore it does not show hostility towards it.

Such a Georgian recipe for coexistence with Moscow is dangerous for the West in that it destroys the myth of Russia's aggressiveness and intolerance.

Well, and that all post-Soviet countries urgently need to flee to NATO.

Therefore, according to Washington, such a format should be destroyed, which is constantly signaled in Tbilisi.

Apparently, the degree of pressure has grown so much that the Georgian authorities have put the final argument on the table - they offered to appeal to the people.

“Georgia will not enter into the Russian-Ukrainian conflict under any circumstances.

If anyone has even the slightest doubt that the majority of Georgian citizens do not want a “second front” and do not see a Georgian perspective in it, then we will hold a plebiscite,” says Mamuka Mdinaradze, executive secretary of the ruling Georgian Dream party.

“People must decide whether they agree with high-ranking officials of the Ukrainian government or whether they agree with our position regarding the non-opening of a “second front,” Irakli Kobakhidze said.

Later, however, Mr. Kobakhidze said that he was joking.

“There was sarcasm and irony in this statement.

We know, and this has been proven by research,

that the population of Georgia is against the war,” the politician explained.

Probably because the results of the all-Georgian public opinion poll on the future of relations with Russia could turn out to be very pro-Russian.

Of course, in theory, Tbilisi's approach may change.

Georgia can change its mind and open a "second front", but only under one single condition.

If Russia does not just weaken, but begins to "crumble".

Then, of course, the Georgian authorities will take the side of the winners and try to take what they consider their own.

The problem, however, is that Russia isn't "rolling in".

Despite a number of publications that have appeared in the West that the collapse of the country is about to begin right now, Tbilisi clearly sees the real picture: Russian society supports the government (although some people are dissatisfied with the “softness” of the operation), the economy is coping with sanctions pressure, and the regions not only do not show any separatist tendencies, but are increasingly involved in the process of liberation of the former Ukrainian territories.

This means that they are unlikely to participate in the war on the side of the losers.

The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editors.