Once again, tension is back over the relations between Turkey and Greece.

The first accused the second of harassing its fighters during a NATO mission, then sharp statements from both sides followed, then Greek boats returned to target a merchant ship in international waters, according to Ankara.

Erdogan warned Athens that his country "may come suddenly one night", in a symbolic gesture that is not devoid of significance, to start talks about the possibility of a military clash and war.

In such an atmosphere, especially on the sidelines of the Russian-Ukrainian war, attention is drawn to the position of the Alliance - and specifically the United States - regarding the existing tension.

traditional position

In addition to the historical legacy between the two countries, Greece and Turkey differ on several files, foremost of which is the Cyprus issue, Greece's arming of some islands in the Aegean and the demarcation of the maritime borders between the two countries, which is reflected in the competition for wealth, especially natural gas.

Therefore, specifically in recent decades, calm has become a state of exception between the two countries, while tension and escalation hardly subside until they return to the fore.

The Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 was indirectly directed against Greece, the state that supports the Greek Cypriots, and in 1996, the two countries almost reached a direct military confrontation following a dispute over one of the Aegean islands.

In 2020, frictions occurred between the ships of the two countries in the Mediterranean, as a result of gas exploration activities in the disputed areas, and it seems that the current wave of tension is a new link in the chain of tensions on the ground of contentious issues that have not been resolved until today.

In all of these contentious issues, the United States used to declare its neutrality between the two sides, and sometimes even seeks to mediate between them, on the grounds that they are members of NATO and that it has alliance and partnership relations with both of them.

In Cyprus, Washington maintained its position of supporting efforts to unite the island with a tendency for a federal solution, and took a decision to stop selling arms to Cypriots in order to maintain calm and curb the arms race tracks between the two sides.

It also - alone or through NATO mechanisms - played the role of mediator between the two arch-rivals in the latest escalation between them in the summer of 2020, after which the two sides resumed reconnaissance rounds of dialogue.

Relative bias?

However, recent years seem to have brought about a change in Washington's attitude toward the relative bias of Greece and Greek Cyprus.

At the height of tension between the two sides in 2020, Pompeo visited Greek Cyprus, and from there urged Turkey to "stop activities that raise tension in the eastern Mediterranean," and then announced his country's lifting of the arms embargo on Cyprus. A month later, he visited Greece to "support it in confronting Turkey" in their border dispute, according to a statement by the US State Department at the time.

Recent years have seen the United States strengthen its military presence in Greece, in parallel with its strained relations with Turkey.

In October 2021, the two sides signed an agreement to update their joint defense cooperation agreement, allowing increased space for US activity in Greece, and allowing US forces to train and operate at additional bases outside their previous bases in the country.

Washington's construction of new bases in Greece and the island of Crete in particular, alarmed Ankara, especially as it coincided with joint military exercises with Greece near the Turkish border and during periods of tension between Ankara and Athens.

Therefore, the Turkish president downplayed the credibility of the American narrative that the high level of cooperation with Greece is intended to confront Russia, suggesting that it is targeting his country as well. His foreign minister considered the new American positions “a violation of the balance policy that it was following between Turkey and Greece and between the Turkish Republic of Cyprus and the administration of southern Cyprus.” .

It is no secret that the administration of Joe Biden is not completely satisfied with the Turkish president and his positions on a number of issues, the latest of which is the Russian-Ukrainian war, although it certainly praised Turkish efforts in the Ukrainian grain export deal, but Erdogan's participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Samarkand may increase the level of The American dissatisfaction expressed by the American president during his election campaign.

Where does Washington stand?

Today, with a new round of tension between the two countries, retired generals on both sides say that a war between them is inevitable, if not today, then tomorrow. Where exactly does the United States stand?

In principle, it is not in Washington's interest for a direct military clash - as well as an expanded war - to erupt between two countries within NATO, and the alliance - headed by the United States - is not fighting a proxy war with Russia in Ukraine, and wants to give its full focus on it and remain united and without battles. side through it.

The Russian-Ukrainian war prompted NATO and the European Union to re-evaluate the security threats surrounding Europe after the war, including the supposed and expected Turkish role regarding these threats.

Therefore, the writer of these lines does not see that the visit of the Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis to Turkey months ago, and his meeting with Turkish President Erdogan and his talk about giving priority to talking about cooperation files rather than controversial ones;

A subjective Greek orientation, but the visit was implicit in the name of the Western bloc, the European Union and NATO, led by the United States.

But looking in depth at the developments in Washington's relations with Ankara and Athens in the last few years says that they are not the same.

On the Greek side, there is talk of close cooperation, a willingness to sell it modernized F-16 fighters and possibly F-35 (Greece requested this), and an increase in the number of military bases and joint exercises.

On the Ankara side, there are repeated tensions, sanctions, exclusion from the F-35 fighter jet project, stalling in the F-35 deal to modernize Turkish fighters and purchase new ones, and talk in Congress about the possibility of selling on terms that Turkey rejects.

If Turkey sees the Greek-American cooperation from some angle as a threat to it and an order targeting it, the F-16 fighter file has become vital for it, as it is directly linked to the balance of the air force in the context of any possible confrontation with Greece, and the possibility of the latter’s air fleet turning into an advanced position over Therefore, Erdogan recently talked about Turkey not limiting its options to the "F-16" if the American procrastination continues, and that his country has "alternative options", including Russian fighters.

It is also no secret that the Joe Biden administration is not completely satisfied with the Turkish president and his positions on a number of issues, the latest of which is the Russian-Ukrainian war, although it certainly praised the Turkish efforts in the Ukrainian grain export deal.

Perhaps Erdogan's participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Samarkand may increase the level of American dissatisfaction, which the US president expressed during his election campaign.

For all of the above, it can be said that the United States is closer in the situation to Athens than to Ankara, and it may find the tension between the two sides an opportunity to put more pressure on Erdogan and Turkey.

The tension between the two countries with the possibility of a direct clash between them - although the possibilities are slim at the moment - is beneficial to Washington, as it increases the need for both of them for its position, support and role, which keeps it a reference to the two capitals and gives it more influence over them politically, and may give it additional contracts on better terms with them. On the arms issue, as happened with the previous tension in 2020, when Washington returned to selling arms to Nicosia.

All this does not mean that Washington wants a war between the two countries, especially in light of the confrontation with Moscow. Rather, it is expected to seek mediation between them in the event that events unfold, directly or through the NATO gate.

The statements of officials and the statements of the US State Department also show a degree of expected neutrality based on “urging the two sides” to calm down, return to dialogue and avoid conflict, including deleting an account belonging to NATO on Twitter, a tweet congratulating Turkey on the “victory day” at the end of last month, which refers to a battle between the Turks and the Greeks, after the protest of Athens, so as not to be counted as a biased position to one of them amid the tension.

Perhaps what reduces the level of US involvement in the current tension is the assessment that it is temporary and will not lead to a field clash between the two countries.

However, there are fears that the atmosphere of the elections that will prevail in the two countries in the coming months will lead to an increase in the level of tension and raise the risks of conflict, which is supposed to raise the alarm on both sides, Ankara and Athens, and between them Washington.