The plight of the Islamists was renewed once again, with its two levels of darkness and stalemate, after everyone believed that the plight of the Islamists had ended with the start of the Arab revolutions, from which they were in one way or another the most beneficiaries, and many of them were liberated from prison with the beginning of the Arab Spring.
This major transformation in the region - which Tunisia inaugurated with the escape of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali on January 14, 2011 - moved the Islamists from one situation to another, and from one location to another.
Islamists fought in the elections that were organized in countries that overthrew their regimes or witnessed significant change, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and Libya, and achieved remarkable results that enabled them to lead the government or participate in it in a significant way.
No sooner had months passed in some of these countries, and in the extreme, a few years, until the wheel of the situation turned backwards, and the state seemed to utter strange bodies, indigestible, and could not be integrated, so with these Islamic currents, it finds itself in an unenviable situation.
The Islamists feel today that - after decades of scrambling and working to enable their project, and contributing to the movement of change and transformation in the region in the last ten years after the Arab Spring - they have returned to where they left off before that moment in which the spark of the Arab uprisings was launched.
The beginning was with Egypt, in which the elected President Mohamed Morsi was overthrown only a year after he ascended the presidency, then events followed from Libya, Morocco and Algeria, ending with the setback of Tunisia.
The political scene in most Arab countries regressed to before the Arab revolutions, and some of them rolled back to worse than that.
It targeted all political forces, without exception, with their forces calculated on change, and those that supported counter-revolutions, turning repression into the most just thing to be divided among all.
Everyone blamed, and they exchanged accusations as to who bears the responsibility for this setback that the region is experiencing again, a few years after the start of the revolutions.
Although the assessments varied, the share of blame, criticism and blame on the Islamists was the largest.
Blaming the Islamists ranged from talking about neglecting the revolution and allying with the deep state and the army, and between emphasizing that the Islamists entered the experience and immersion of government without a vision in management or wisdom in management, ignoring the internal, regional and international balances of power that are generally conservative in dealing with them.
Today, Islamists feel that - after decades of scrambling and working to empower their project, and to contribute to the movement of change and transformation in the region in the last ten years after the Arab Spring - they have returned to where they left off before that moment in which the spark of the Arab uprisings was launched.
But this time, in addition to their feeling of returning to the so-called ordeal phase, they also found themselves facing a real dilemma, which is that the presence of Islamists as a political and partisan force represents an obstacle to democratic transformation, and creates a division in society that the anti-change forces exploit and play as a card to undermine any reform efforts. or demand democracy.
The plight of the Islamists turned on their predicament, to intensify within them and around them crucial questions, and a wide debate: It revolves in its entirety about where the problem is and what to do?
The answer: the withdrawal of Islamists from the struggle for power.
The Islamists’ withdrawal from the struggle for power, as a proposal for a solution, was not only advocated and pushed by the Islamists’ opponents, not even just the Islamists’ friends, but it turned into an idea circulating within the Islamists themselves.
It was expressed by the Secretary-General of the Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt, Gamal Heshmat, and the Acting General Guide of the Brotherhood, Ibrahim Mounir, as explicitly called by the Secretary-General of the abandoned International Union of Muslim Scholars, Dr. Defenders of the thesis of Islamists' withdrawal from the struggle for power, Kuwaiti writer and thinker, Dr. Abdullah Al-Nafisi, in the first episode of the new program "Mawazine" on Al-Jazeera.
The idea recalls a new old controversy, and new exciting old theses, which go beyond politics to thought, and revolve around the position of religion in the state, and the relationship of religion to politics.
It is a debate that revolves in its entirety around the foundations of political society, and the basic elements that form the national identity, culture and politics.
But this controversy is not what our article is about, but rather delving into the solidity of the Islamists’ choice of abandoning the struggle for power, and the extent of its contribution to liberating the Arab political community from what is seen as a main obstacle in the face of change and democratic transformation.
In this regard, the following conclusions can be drawn:
First: The "Political Islam" movement succeeded in pioneering the political scene and social movement:
The political Islam stream succeeded in one way or another in leading the political scene and the social and cultural movement over the past three decades, and it turned into the first political trend in the region, to the extent that whenever it ran in legislative, municipal or professional elections, it swept them or issued their results.
However, the more "Islam" consolidates its positions as a political force, the more it indicates the signs of a political crisis, and a state of division, tension, and resentment within the country in which it wins.
Everyone - the old regime, forces of the left and right, nationalists, some influential elites - often declare their refusal for Islamists to lead the government, or run power.
With the announcement of the election results, “democratic” political forces turn completely, if they bring Islamists, including those celebrating pluralism and the peaceful transfer of power, to them conservative and rejecting, but allied with those that are not “democratic” for one goal: to undermine and prevent Islamists from ruling, now and here.
In fact, this position is deviating from an international position that still shows rejection, and at best reservations about the presence of Islamists in power.
A situation that has left many countries in a sustainable political stalemate, in which governance institutions are paralyzed, and the country turns into an ungovernable state.
Many advocates of the idea of Islamists withdrawing from the struggle for power have not proven that they advocate in principle for political reform and democratic change, but rather their motivation in this call is to exclude ideological opponents only.
Second: Political Islamophobia
Some believe and others are convinced that one of the causes of the crisis facing the democratic transition and the existence of authoritarian and repressive regimes is the constant fear and morbid phobia of “political Islam”: to dominate the government, imposing a “reactionary” societal pattern - according to their estimation - and threatening freedoms, just as Islam It pushes the international community to refrain from dealing, cooperating, and assisting countries in which Islamists ascend to power, even if that is through the ballot boxes.
Thus, if the Islamists raise the slogan "Islam is the solution", their opponents at home and abroad consider "political Islam" to be the problem.
It is noteworthy that these conclusions have expanded the parties that adopt them to reach sectors of Islamists, intellectual elites and political leaders, and the position of some Islamic leaders that we referred to at the beginning of this article is only clear evidence of that.
Some of the Islamists themselves have become convinced that “political Islam” is part of the problem, not the solution. Therefore, turning to public advocacy groups, under the title of “discharging the project” or declaring withdrawal from the competition for power, is the solution to contribute to dismantling the crisis of Arab political society.
An assessment of many experiences in the region, some of which date back to three decades, represented by the Algerian experience, then the experiences of the Arab Spring countries from the experiences of the rise of Islamists to power, such as Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco;
Many "Islamic" elites have concluded that "political Islam" has become an obstacle to change and reform, but rather an obstacle to the goals of its supporters and forces.
Third: The motives behind the call for the necessity of the Islamists’ withdrawal
There is a serious fear that the idea of the withdrawal of "political Islam" emanating from non-solid motives, cannot be constructive.
Many of the advocates of this idea have not proven that they advocate - in principle - for political reform and democratic change, but rather their motivation in this call is motivated by the exclusion of ideological opponents only.
In addition, it may be more likely that the Islamists who advocate this idea come from the position of the helpless victim, who wants to stop a case of targeting and eradication, and there is no solution to it except by proposing the idea of abandoning the political struggle for power.
In this context, this idea may turn into a call to abandon change and reform, under the cover of abandoning the struggle for power.
Fourth: Is withdrawal the solution?
The Islamists' call to withdraw from the struggle for power and the competition for it does not stand, when observing the experiences in which Islamists were completely excluded from the political scene, or were absent from the political scene.
We do not find that in these experiences, democracy flourished, significant political reform was achieved, or political division eased, but their political systems in governance are almost more authoritarian, less transparent, and more authoritarian.
Hence, the idea of withdrawing from the struggle for power, within the framework of dismantling a structural political crisis, or facilitating the path of political reform, does not seem to be an idea that will withstand the complexities of the political scene in the Arab region.
Fifthly, focus on the Islamists
Focusing on Islamists or “political Islam” and portraying it as an obstacle to the democratic transition in the Arab world, and to the stability and harmony of the Arab political community, seems to ignore and skip a historical political experience in the region, when the left prevailed and is the main force in the region, it was photographed and viewed Just as political Islam is seen today, the same applies to the nationalist trend.
Whenever a political trend prevailed and spread in a certain historical era, it was presented by the forces rejecting it and fearing targeting its interests as a threat to stability and national security and a threat to societal harmony.
Sixth: Serious reviews
There is no doubt that “political Islam” and the Islamic trend in general as intellectual visions, as a political project, and as a political experiment that has been in existence for decades, needs serious revisions, courageous scrutiny, and scientific scrutiny of its vision and behavior.
It is an entitlement that must be open, calm and bold, reconsidering everything, and asking all questions without caveats or inhibitions.
Perhaps it is a great historical responsibility, for the Islamists today to realize that their project itself involves a suspicion of confusion and confusion between religious and partisan, a confusion that must be completely dispelled, and clarified about it, so that societal forces do not get involved in the struggle over Islam, which is the conscience of the whole society, and a component of the components of national identity. Therefore, it is not subject to conflict or conflict, neither political nor electoral.
In doing so, Islamists need to be familiar with all the conscious and unconscious components of their political identity.
Awareness of the apparent and hidden internal and external factors and the equations and balances that control the Arab political society, in which they are engaged in political battles, without realizing its historical and cultural complexities, and its internal and external determinants.
a summary
There is no doubt that reviews and evaluations have become inevitable, fateful and decisive, from the Islamists, and from all the political forces and the active intellectual elites in the region, in order to resume the process of reform and change.
But there is also no doubt that all these political and social actors should not be under the illusion that a withdrawal here or a settlement there may be the magic key to rebuilding the Arab political society, in which the elements of influence still go beyond the inside to the outside, and the regional system to the international system, whose balances are still It is stable and its equations are solid, despite the cracks that occur in it.