The recent visits of Libyan leaders to Turkey have multiplied and coincided, which opened the door to the question of the possibility of Ankara mediating in the internal Libyan dispute.

Shortly after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan received the Speaker of the Libyan Parliament, Aqila Saleh;

The Prime Minister of the National Unity Government, Abdel Hamid Dabaiba, and the Prime Minister-designate from Parliament, Fathi Bashagha, visited Turkey, and they held individual meetings with Turkish officials.

Turkish engagement

Before the revolution, Turkey linked many interests to Libya.

In the foreground are the companies and investments that were active there, which confused the Turkish position immediately after the revolution, before Ankara aligned itself completely and clearly with the emerging situation after Gaddafi.

For many years, the two countries did not have direct and in-depth relations, but the gas discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean imposed new and different equations on everyone, led by Turkey and Libya.

The most important variable in the Libyan issue was the failure to organize the elections at the end of last year without setting a new date, and the deepening of differences between the Libyan parties, then assigning the House of Representatives Fathi Bashagha to form a new government

According to the new situation, and on the sidelines of the lineups in the region;

Relations between Turkey and Libya represented a strategic interest in two main dimensions: the first with regard to energy security, especially the quantities of natural gas expected in the eastern Mediterranean, and the second in the context of geopolitical competition in the region with parties that it considered its opponents for many years.

With the announcement of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, which tried to marginalize Turkey and ignore its interests and rights at the beginning of 2019, Turkey signed with the Government of National Accord in November of the same year two agreements: one to demarcate the maritime borders between the two countries to serve their rights in the face of the Greek narrative and demands, and the second For security and military cooperation between them.

Based on the second agreement, the Al-Wefaq government, led by Fayez Al-Sarraj, asked Turkey for support in the face of Haftar's attempts to control the capital, Tripoli.

The Turkish intervention had a direct contribution to stopping the path of military solutions and adopting the political path, which led, through the national dialogue, to the election of a new presidential council and the establishment of a transitional period that was supposed to end with general elections in December 2021.

A different approach?

From the moment of its first involvement in the Libyan issue, Ankara has maintained two main goals there: preserving stability and the territorial integrity of Libya (hence the support of the legitimate, recognized government), supporting the idea of ​​dialogue and confirming the course of the elections, so that they represented a common interest for Turkey and Libya together, and in what could be To preserve for Turkey its role and influence in the Libyan issue.

Therefore, Turkish support has shifted from the Government of National Accord to the Government of National Unity led by Abdel Hamid Dabaiba, after which the recognized legitimate government.

The latter was also very keen on maintaining good relations with Ankara, and even developing them and continuing to support the latter in various fields, and the two sides held meetings of the Strategic Cooperation Council between them.

However, the most important variable in the Libyan issue was the failure to organize the elections at the end of last year without setting a new date and deepening the differences between the Libyan parties, then assigning the House of Representatives Fathi Bashagha to form a new government on the grounds that the unity government lost its legitimacy with the date of the elections that were not held, while holding Dabaiba is down his caretaker government until future elections.

These political complications revived the bet on military solutions. More than once, Bashagha tried to forcibly enter Tripoli to seize power there, without being able to do so, and each time the Turkish position rejected these military moves and called for dialogue.

It was remarkable that the statement of the Turkish Foreign Ministry regarding the armed clashes in Tripoli at the end of last month did not include a clear bias or alignment in the crisis, nor did it condemn a specific party by name, even if it included a position supportive of maintaining the status quo;

Hence the Dabaiba government, of course.

The statement called on “the parties to silence the weapons and focus on solving their problems in a peaceful manner,” and stressed the need to “hold fair and free elections as soon as (…) to ensure the country’s stability, prosperity and security,” concluding that Turkey “always stands by its Libyan brothers, as it has done until today.” To establish lasting peace and stability.

While Fathi Pashaga has been seen as the man of Turkey in Libya for many years, Dabaiba has also built more than good relations with her during the previous period while he was at the head of the government.

Ankara's close relations with the two men and its stances that always call for dialogue and reliance on elections, not clash to solve outstanding problems, reinforce the idea of ​​Turkish mediation between the two men and the two parties.

What helps the idea of ​​mediation, in addition to the good relations with both, is Turkey's recent openness to political leaders in the east and the latter's openness to it, and the paths of calm and dialogue in the region with countries active in Libyan affairs, such as Egypt and the UAE.

But the internal Libyan scene seemed complicated and rejected the idea of ​​dialogue and mediation until the moment, a challenge that Ankara is certainly aware of and is working to overcome.

Although Dabaiba and Pashaga met separately with Turkish leaders - led by Erdogan - and although Ankara's political and media celebration of Pashaga was much less than its celebration of Dabaiba;

This means that the former did not approve of his political and field path, so the simultaneous visit clearly carries the meaning of seeking to mediate between them.

This was confirmed by Turkey's ambassador to Libya, Kenan Yilmaz, last month, when he said that his country "communicates with all parties, and is ready to mediate to resolve the crisis and spare the country from destabilization and access to elections."

The mediation that Ankara can undertake is difficult to transcend the foundations of its position in Libya, ie supporting the legitimate government, consolidating stability and emphasizing the idea of ​​dialogue and elections. Therefore, it is not expected that Ankara will support Pasha’s efforts to head the government.

It is possible (and difficult) for Ankara to call for the continuation of the Dabaiba government, with a reasonable and close date for the elections, or - this is more likely - the formation of a new government headed by a third person whose mission is to bring the country to the general elections after political consensus and legal framing.

It can be seen recently that Turkey has developed its position in Libya towards openness to all parties, including the "Libyan East" figures, as it received the Speaker of Parliament, Aqila Saleh, as well as the sons of Khalifa Haftar, according to Bashagha himself.

This, although not a radical change in the Turkish position, is an important and significant change.

Although Ankara’s rejection of military solutions certainly means its continued support for the national unity government, the statements of its officials do not suggest a clear and official alignment with him against Bashagha, who still cherishes the “very solid friendship relations” that brings him together with Turkey, which “was built in difficult times and will never change.” As he says.

Accordingly, what is new in the Turkish position - while maintaining its main determinants - is not to put all Turkish eggs in one basket, and to maintain on the one hand a space of relative neutrality that allows the possibility of mediation and contributes to its success (similar to its mediation between Russia and Ukraine). The second party has multiple options in the future that preserve Turkish interests in Libya and do not put them in the wind in the hands of any internal change, in a manner that preserves Ankara’s role and influence in the Libyan issue in the future.

This explains - in our opinion - Turkey's repeated positions on the sidelines of the internal clashes between Dabaiba and Bashagha, which calls for dialogue and elections, and avoids mentioning names and parties in support and condemnation, and confirms the continuation of "Turkey's support for the Libyan brothers", although it has certainly not changed its position in support of the Government of National Unity.