A month after the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, I wrote an article for Al Jazeera Net in which I said that this war represents an opportunity for Turkey and the West to reshape their relations and overcome years of turmoil, and that this will help Ankara achieve a balance in its relationship with Moscow.

It has been nearly 7 months since the conflict erupted, but the result so far is that it is doing the opposite and pushing Ankara and Moscow to deepen their relationship further.

On August 5, Presidents Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin agreed in Sochi to strengthen the partnership between their countries on many levels, including the economy and trade.

As Russia suffers from Western isolation and is looking for ways to ease the pressure of sanctions and win more friends in the world, Putin considers it very important to strengthen the relationship with Turkey because of its geographical proximity, its pivotal role in global trade and its great economic potential, as well as its being a rising regional power. It owns the keys to the Black Sea, and most importantly, it is a member of NATO, but it meets with Russia in challenging Western policies.

The main impetus for the working relationship established by Erdogan and Putin was not limited to the wide range of overlapping interests between them;

Turkey's growing frustration with the West has played a strong role in shaping this relationship, even though it contradicts Turkey's transatlantic identity.

Despite the great leap in Turkish-Russian relations, especially after the first half of the last decade, the trade exchange between the two countries remained very far from the goal set by Erdogan and Putin.

It is $100 billion.

Today, the transformations brought about by the war give strong impetus to this goal, and the level of trade exchange between the two countries is expected to rise by the end of the year to about 10 billion US dollars, which will make Ankara the fourth largest supplier of goods to the Russian market, and the departure of European and American companies from Russia has unique advantages for Turkish companies.

Expanding the volume of trade exchange will strengthen both Russia, which finds in Turkey one of the main alternatives to Europe and the United States in many trade issues, and Turkey, whose economy sees new opportunities.

The additional benefits that the two countries will derive from strengthening the relationship will not be limited only to the economic fields, but will push them to align their foreign policies more on many issues of common interest.

While the partnership that Erdogan and Putin have established since they came to power has been mostly functional, it has seen its gradual expansion to include cooperation in strategic areas;

Such as coordination on geopolitical issues and cooperation in nuclear energy and defense industries.

In 2016, the two countries launched the Turkish gas pipeline construction project, then agreed to supply Russian S-400 air defense missile systems to Turkey the following year.

In the same year, Ankara entered the Syrian Astana platform alongside Russia and Iran, and Erdogan and Putin were able to develop the process of aligning interests in Syria into broader coordination on other regional issues.

In 2020, the two countries oversaw the end of the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in Karabakh, and also agreed to sponsor a ceasefire between their allies in Libya.

These developments were linked on the one hand to the flexible Russian interaction with Turkey, and on the other hand, the new geopolitical identity that Ankara embraced and is based on the idea of ​​balance between East and West instead of limiting foreign partnership with one of them.

The main motive for the working relationship established by Erdogan and Putin was not limited to the expansion of the overlapping interests between them;

Turkey's growing frustration with the West played a strong role in shaping this relationship, even though it contradicts Turkey's transatlantic identity.

Russia is a major strategic competitor to Turkey in the Black Sea in the north, in the Caucasus in the east, in Syria in the south, and in Africa as well.

However, Erdogan and Putin were able to find common ground to manage this rivalry and turn it into broad cooperation in their foreign policies.

This is what could not have been done between Turkey and the West in recent years, which witnessed a sharp decline in relations.

Moreover, the Eurasian tendencies of Turkey under Erdogan have widened the gap with the West and in turn helped narrow the gap with Russia and China.

These shifts in Turkey's foreign policies explain how Ankara seeks strategic autonomy in its foreign and security policy.

Due to the intense geopolitical competition and the contradiction in political identities, it was difficult to imagine the possibility of developing Turkish-Russian relations to the level of a strategic alliance.

Although this is still not possible and unrealistic, the two countries are seeking to develop the relationship to a level higher than a normal partnership and less than an alliance.

For example, the Black Sea and the former Soviet space have been the cause of deep mutual suspicion between Turkey and Russia for decades, led to the Russian war on Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014;

to an imbalance of power in the Black Sea.

However, this rivalry has recently begun to turn into effective cooperation.

Turkey's determination to keep the Black Sea isolated from the Russian-Western conflict and obstructed by NATO's ambition to play a role in it, along with Russia's approval of a grain deal with Ukraine under Turkish auspices;

All are indications that Ankara and Moscow attach importance to strategic cooperation in the Black Sea.

Given that the balanced Turkish approach to the Russian-Western conflict stems mainly from Erdogan’s broad vision of a new world order in which the West loses absolute hegemony and moves towards multipolarity, maintaining a good working relationship with Moscow is an essential element of this approach regardless of the nature of the relationship with the West .

The Turkish balancing approach to the Ukraine war was relatively understood in Western capitals, considering that this was the most that Ankara could offer in the process of careful balancing between its Atlantic identity on the one hand, and the requirements of its interests with Russia.

With Erdogan inclined to take more advantage of the relationship with Russia, Turkey's balancing act is becoming a source of concern for the West and carries some risks, and may lead to a Western reaction.

The Sochi summit laid out a road map for developing the Turkish-Russian partnership to a strategic level, and if the two countries succeed, this will constitute a strong blow to Western efforts to isolate Russia on the one hand and co-opt Turkey on the other.

Erdogan will become tougher in managing the relationship with the West.

This result emerged in the issue of NATO expansion before a settlement was reached, although it remains uncertain and may collapse.

Erdogan does not look at Russia from a Western perspective, but from his own perspective, which works to balance Turkish interests on a rational basis rather than an ideological one.