A new wave of escalation between the occupying state and the Palestinian resistance, specifically the Islamic Jihad movement, ended in the Gaza Strip, with mediation and then an Egyptian initiative and guarantees, according to what was announced.
Not much has changed regarding the positions of the various parties on the event compared to the previous confrontations, but a new phenomenon has begun to take root in this type of event, which is the tendency of some to evaluate the confrontation and crystallize the position on it from the standpoint of the position on Iran only.
As in the previous confrontations between the "Israelis" and the Palestinians, the positions of the vast majority of the parties in the Arab world, especially the popular and elite ones, were clear in condemning the aggression and expressing support for the Palestinians who are exposed to it, despite what some of them may have notes and criticisms of some Palestinian resistance factions. And the differences between them with regard to the export of the position of them.
This familiar scene, which is usually interspersed with timid positions from some Arab and regional countries, was added to this tour by the positions of new segments that did not look at the event from the angle of the Palestinian issue with its clear grievances, nor the “Israeli” aggression with its known history, nor the angles of similarity and difference from the previous confrontations, nor International, regional and local developments that may have contributed to its industry, but exclusively from the standpoint of the position on Iran.
new slides
These new chipsets originally crystallized into two:
The first: a segment of writers and media associates associated with some regional regimes, who claimed that it was Iran that wanted the recent war in Gaza to benefit from it in relation to its own interests, such as the current negotiations on the nuclear agreement that have been stalled for some time.
They seem to forget - deliberately - that it was the occupying state that started this wave of escalation, not the Palestinians.
First, the wave of arrests of activists, then the assassination of the leader of the Islamic Jihad movement, Tayseer al-Jabari, and then the announcement of an operation they called “the truthful dawn” in Gaza, which they said is likely to continue for days, before any statement or reaction from the Palestinian factions.
The second: a segment of some supporters of the Syrian revolution - from Syria and other countries - and some of them expressed solidarity “only with the Palestinian people” in Gaza, excluding the resistance factions, especially the Jihad and Hamas movements, on the basis of their relations with Iran, Hezbollah and perhaps the Syrian regime in the future, and some of them expressed The other - and they are few - is gloating or, at the very least, indifference to the confrontation and its consequences and repercussions, because those who lead the confrontation in it are factions that have relations with Iran and its axis in the region.
As for their motives for taking these positions, those belonging to this second segment announced on social media that they are based on a moral principle linked to the Syrian revolution in particular, according to which Hamas and Islamic Jihad in particular (which are at the fore in the resistance action in Palestine) have relations with Iran and praise it for its support. For them, while the latter has stood and is still on the side of the Assad regime in the face of the revolution and a large part of its people, making it a partner in action and responsibility.
morality balance
So, the starting point of the two slides is their stance - with the big difference between them in motives, goals, and style;
Thus, the evaluation view of each of them is the relationship of the Palestinian resistance factions to Iran.
If the first segment expresses prior convictions, known alignments, and exposed goals;
Therefore, it is not worthy of discussion. The second tranche is based on good intentions, and there is a need for dialogue with it.
In terms of facts, the relationship of the two movements (Jihad and Hamas) with Iran extends over several decades.
Therefore, it is a precedent to the Syrian revolution, and it is limited openly by them only to confronting the “Israeli” occupation, and does not extend to any other areas of Tehran’s foreign policy or its regional project, neither support nor endorsement, let alone involvement.
While some activists and many social media pioneers accuse Hamas of siding with the regime;
The latter is still accusing it of fighting him and supporting the Syrian revolution against him in the media and on the ground, and his statements and media materials issued by him are still negative towards it, including with regard to the recent confrontation.
Even the praise of the former head of the Quds Force in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Qassem Soleimani, who sparked great controversy and harsh criticism of Hamas and still is, came from the angle of his support for the Palestinian resistance and not for the roles he played in both Syria and Iraq.
With regard to the Syrian revolution in particular, neither of the two movements took a position siding with the regime.
The leadership of the Jihad movement was distributed among several countries without announcing officially leaving Syria, which led to a state of estrangement and coldness in its relations with the regime, which partially changed after many years.
On the other hand, Hamas chose to leave Damascus openly, to avoid supporting the regime or adopting its narrative, and not violating its principle of non-interference in the affairs of states and staying neutral in cases of polarization and internal problems in them.
As for the “ethical” level of the situation, if the reports that talked about the possibility of resuming the relationship between the Syrian regime and Hamas, which the latter has not officially commented on until this moment, are true, they do not mean siding with the regime or adopting its narrative or standing with it against its people.
It is noteworthy that this approach is not used in confronting the Palestinian factions regarding their relations with other regimes. It is not only in a confrontation with a part of its people, such as the Syrian regime, but it has a position hostile to the Palestinian factions themselves, and it is an additional presumption that weaving relations does not necessarily mean adopting the position as well as engaging in The project.
More than that, paradoxically;
While some activists and many social media pioneers accuse Hamas of siding with the regime;
The latter is still accusing it of fighting him and supporting the Syrian revolution against him in the media and even on the ground, and his statements and media materials are still negative towards it, including with regard to the recent confrontation.
Finally, how can any party or person who claims morality in his political assessment stand on the sidelines in a confrontation between the Palestinian resistance, no matter how much he disagrees with it or blames it, and the occupying state, which all Arab peoples still consider a common enemy as its project transcends Palestinian geography and demography to target the entire region?
4 notes
Four main observations can be made regarding this letter:
The first is that it strays from objectivity when it considers the mere desire to weave a relationship with the regime (regardless of opinion) as an alliance with it in what the Interior Ministry faced or the trade in Syrian blood and the like of exaggerated emotional statements that do not stand on a logical ground of facts, information or methodology. intact.
The second: It is almost exclusive in the case of the Palestinian factions and is not expedited to include other parties, who are not only in the process of starting relations with the regime, but rather declare that they are actually in a relationship with it, and may even offer support and cooperation, but it seems that the cost of attacking the Palestinian factions is much less than criticizing any Another party, and therefore it is an act without a price.
The third, and perhaps the most important, is that this segment is affected to one degree or another by the discourse of some Islamic organizations and currents - Syrian and others - which have directed sharp criticism of Hamas, reaching the limits of distortion and treason. Some of them even issued statements to justify their mere meeting with the latter's leadership.
Fourth: The phenomenon of attack, distortion, and treason with the violator is very harmful to those who adopt it and follow it, and not only with others, and perhaps it was among the reasons for the failure of the Syrian revolution, which spread among its affiliates sharp disagreement and harsh accusations, from which almost no one was spared.
In conclusion, the article does not discuss the supposed decision of Hamas to restore the relationship with the Syrian regime from the point of view of its reasons and objectives, nor does it issue an assessment of the matter that lies outside its space and requires an independent and extensive discussion.
Moreover, the writer of these lines does not forfeit the right to criticize, and even to disagree with the Palestinian factions, especially with regard to some of their media failures and sometimes exaggerated rhetoric, and considers this a minimal right and sometimes an obligation.
But he warns against the danger of exaggerating criticism and overriding treason and distortion in a way that does not serve the interests of either the Palestinian or the Syrian cause, and which poses a minimum danger in terms of squashing hearts, stirring up sensitivities, winning hostilities instead of friendships and opening side battles.
In addition to the above, which is the most important, the article sheds light on the incoherence of the moral claim in the discourse of those who stand on the sidelines between the Palestinian factions and the occupation in a confrontation like the latter.
There is no justification here for those who claim solidarity with the Palestinian people, while their resistance factions betray;
The Palestinian cause is not a glossy meaning nor an abstract idea, but rather it is the struggle of a people led by the resistance factions, especially since over the years of the Syrian revolution it has not issued any statement or position that is biased against the demands of the people or their revolution, let alone a field position in this context, despite Much of what is rumored is wrong in this direction, while preserving the expected space for disagreement, disagreement and criticism.