Now, perhaps, it is difficult to believe it, but only eight years ago Russia was a full member of the then "Group of Eight".

Since then there have been dramatic changes.

Shortly before the meeting of the leaders of the "group of seven", which took place last week in the Bavarian castle of Elmau, their counterparts from the five BRICS countries held an online summit under the chairmanship of China.

And if at the first of these meetings Russia was discussed as a threat, then at the second it was a key participant.

Long gone are the days when Moscow could stand with one foot in the West and the other in the non-West.

After the Ukrainian crisis of 2014, the G8 returned to its previous format, the G7.

And in the light of the Russian military operation in Ukraine that began in February this year, the confrontation between Russia and the West has slid into a full-scale hybrid war with real clashes, albeit indirect ones so far.

After the end of the Cold War, Russia tried to become part of the new West, but failed and now focuses on developing relations with Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.

The task is both difficult and necessary for a number of reasons.

First, the powerful inertia conditioned by history.

At least since the time of Peter the Great, Russian elites have looked to the West, adopted Western fashion and behavior (despite their wardrobe and etiquette, while maintaining a distinct Russianness), introduced Western institutions (albeit often only superficially), borrowed Western philosophies (creatively rethinking them , as was the case with Marxism), sought to enter the great European powers;

then, during the Soviet era, to become a global superpower, and in a later period, a key component of a larger Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok.

This is a rut that is hard to get out of.

But now, for the first time in history, Russia is facing a united West, from North America, the European Union and Britain to Japan and Australia.

Moreover, there are no allies in the West that Moscow could turn to.

Even theoretically neutral states such as Finland, Sweden, Austria and Switzerland have all abandoned their neutrality.

Thus, there has been a complete political break between Russia and the West, and any new norm of relations between them can only emerge as the result of a hybrid war that will be waged for years, if not decades.

Secondly, Moscow built its economic relations mainly with the West.

Traditionally, Russia supplied the resources of Western European industry, was the breadbasket of the continent and a major importer of industrial products and technologies.

Until recently, the European Union alone accounted for more than half of Russian foreign trade, and Germany was the leading exporter of technology and equipment to Russia.

Since the first half of the 1970s, oil and gas pipelines from Russia to Western Europe have been the backbone of economic relations and ensured overall stability on the continent, even during the dangerous decades of the Cold War and the turbulent times of the collapse of the USSR.

However, that too is a thing of the past.

The tough sanctions imposed on Russia by the United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom will not be lifted even when the fighting in Ukraine ends, and the painful experience of seizing assets abroad will leave a deep mark and affect Russia's approach to any building of economic relations with West in the future.

Third, culturally, Russians traditionally identify themselves with the rest of Europe.

Christianity, the legacy of antiquity, the ideas of the French Enlightenment and German philosophy, European literature, fine arts, music and dance - all this contributed to the formation of Russia's own culture, giving it a powerful incentive for self-development.

Despite the recent political break and geo-economic shift, the foundations of Russian culture remain distinctly European.

However, a number of elements of today's cultural scene in the West, in particular the dominant cult of individual self-expression, rampant liberalism that is becoming increasingly repressive, the erosion of family values ​​and the multiplication of genders, conflict with the more traditional cultural code of most Russians.

With all this, Russia now clearly needs to consider directions beyond the West, which means that it will probably be able to overcome historical inertia, the legacy of previous geo-economic priorities and cultural closeness.

The West is shunning Russia, trying to isolate and sometimes cancel it, leaving Moscow with no choice but to shed old habits and turn to the wider world beyond Western Europe and North America.

In fact, this is what Russian leaders have repeatedly promised to do, even when relations with the West were by no means so hostile, but the European-oriented worldview, the apparent ease of exchanging resources for Western goods and technologies, and the desire to be accepted among Western elites prevented the implementation of intention to life.

But, as they say, people start doing the right thing only when there is no other choice.

Definitely, capitulating to the West is not an option for Russia now.

Everything has gone too far.

But apart from the need to revise Russia's international relations, there are also real prospects.

At the end of the Cold War, there was an impressive rise in the leading countries of Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America in all aspects, from political and economic to military and technological.

Even before the start of the hybrid war, China took the place of Germany not only as Russia's main trading partner, but also as its leading supplier of machinery and equipment.

India, a traditional importer of Soviet and Russian weapons, is now becoming a major technology partner for Moscow.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are Russia's main partners in regulating oil production in the OPEC+ format.

Turkey and Iran are major independent players in a region of key strategic importance.

And the fact that the vast majority of non-Western countries have refused to condemn Russia for its actions in Ukraine (many of them despite strong pressure from the United States) is very encouraging for Moscow.

In the sense that those who are not against us can be considered for us.

There are many dynamic and ambitious countries - from Indonesia to Brazil, from Argentina to South Africa - with which Moscow is eager to cooperate.

For this, Russian foreign policy must offer a suitable strategy.

Above all, prioritize ties with non-Western countries over de facto frozen relations with the West.

Being an ambassador to Indonesia should be more prestigious than heading an embassy in Rome, and a post in Tashkent should be considered more important than an appointment in Vienna.

It is necessary to assess the potential economic and other opportunities for Russia in the BRICS countries and draw up a plan to work on them.

In addition to the economy, it is necessary to expand student exchange programs and stimulate Russian tourism to move east and south.

It would be right for the domestic media to cover events in key non-Western countries more, educating the Russian elite and the general public about the economic realities, politics and culture of these states.