The lines of contact between the various parties to the conflict in Syria have witnessed a ceasefire for nearly two and a half years, as a translation of the common understandings between the guarantor states that have always emphasized that "the conflict has no military solution."

The last of these assurances was during the 18th round of Astana talks, which was held on June 16, 2022.

The guarantor countries, namely Russia, Iran and Turkey, have, since 2017, considered that tripartite cooperation and coordination will lead to a reduction in the use of military force between the parties to the conflict in Syria as a tool for a solution, which has already been achieved after the 15th round of Astana talks in mid-February 2020.

However, this reduction was not the result of a breakthrough or even progress in the political discussions, whether at the level of guarantors or at the level of the local conflict parties, but rather due to the significant change in the rules of engagement after Turkey announced the launch of "Operation Spring Shield", which was the first clash Direct military with the Syrian regime forces.

That is, when the possibility of a military confrontation between Turkish forces and Iranian and Russian forces increased;

De-escalation was necessary not only to prevent collision;

Rather, it is to ensure the continuation of the tripartite coordination mechanism between the guarantor countries.

After the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine in February 2022, the rules of engagement were subject to change again, and this time in southern Syria as well. Iranian forces increased their deployment and military activity in the governorates of Hasaka, Raqqa, Aleppo, Idlib, Daraa, Quneitra and Suwayda, while the Russian forces changed their missions to become responsible About controlling security and stability only;

After it was concerned with the management of combat operations as well.

Also, the Turkish forces have become more dependent on the use of unilateral force in Syria to ensure the national security of their country, after they relied on the tools of joint action with Russia, such as patrols, observation points, and others.

The opposition factions may have an unmissable opportunity to regain their presence in locations they lost years ago, or at least take a step forward and establish advanced bases to regain the strategic cities they lost, such as Aleppo, Manbij and Tal Rifaat in the north of the country and Daraa and Quneitra in the south.

In turn, the Israeli forces have intensified their military activity against Iranian and regime forces in southern Syria;

As a result of the decline in coordination with the Russian forces, the activity and spread of Iranian forces increased.

This included an increase in the number of Air Force sorties and ground incursions into the disengagement zone (1974).

For the first time, in June 2022, the Russian forces carried out an air strike at the Al-Tanf base in southern Syria against the opposition factions backed by the International Coalition, which is a noticeable change in the rules of engagement between the two parties that were determined in the framework of the de-escalation agreement (2017).

The apparent change in the rules of engagement in Syria since the end of 2021 and its climax after the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine may cause a resurgence of conflict between local forces and even the possibility of a clash between foreign forces.

This does not mean abandoning the channels of communication and coordination between the military parties, but rather the possibility of reducing reliance on them, similar to all the hostilities that erupted between the Astana 1 and Astana 15 talks, in which the regime forces, with the support of Russia and Iran, managed to control more than 63% of the map of influence.

The motive for using military force is the desire and willingness to always test ways to expand or reduce the difference in power between local and international actors, and thus redraw the map of control and influence anew.

Under the current circumstances, the biggest change will happen in favor of the Syrian opposition at the expense of the Syrian Democratic Forces and the regime forces.

The opposition factions may have an unmissable opportunity to regain their presence in positions they lost years ago, or at least take a step forward and establish advanced bases to restore the strategic cities they lost, such as Aleppo, Manbij and Tal Rifaat in the north of the country and Daraa and Quneitra in the south.

It seems that there is a real return to the military solution, not for the purpose of decisiveness, but with the aim of establishing a new formula to ensure stability and security.

For example, the spread of Iranian militias in southern Syria has become a factor undermining stability and any regional projects, such as the implementation of the Arab gas pipeline, which aimed to deliver electricity to Lebanon from Egypt, which may require changing the rules of engagement and the use of military force in Daraa.

Aleppo is also not outside this context, as the Iranian militias have spread in an unprecedented manner in its surroundings, and have increased the operations of support and assistance to the Syrian Democratic Forces in the northern countryside of the city, in a way that has increased Turkey’s security concerns and concerns.

In the event of a clash between the two sides, Ankara will often try to change the rules of engagement to expel the Iranian militias from the economic capital of Syria to secure the safe zone that it is working to complete its establishment.

In any case, the use of military force remains contingent on the ability to understand the changing rules of engagement and the willingness to maneuver or test ways to use such force.

The opposition factions will have an opportunity to be an active party in light of the new demarcation of the rules of engagement.

The conflict and the military solution is nothing but preparing for new situations and calming again before de-escalation and returning to the security and diplomatic channels of communication and coordination.

In any case, the change in the rules of engagement in Syria gives a strong indication that there is no immediate political solution, and that the ceasefire regime that has been in place since 2017 has not been able to move to a sustainable settlement or constitute an opportunity to build confidence in a meaningful political process. credibility.

The political solution is not only linked to the parties to the conflict sitting at one dialogue table, but rather to settling differences between international powers, which in turn must push for practical measures to build confidence between the Syrian regime and the opposition regarding a ceasefire, the release of detainees, the disclosure of the fate of the missing, the return of refugees, and other matters. supra-negotiable issues.

This requires the desire of the international actors in Syria to find a sustainable solution.

There have been similar attempts before, but that desire has not been transformed into a final agreement or procedural policies that are translated through a Security Council resolution or through a credible political process with a specific timetable and clear agenda, and before that, the confidence-building process.

As a result, changing the rules of engagement in Syria again and the return of the high pace of escalation or the use of military force does not mean that this may create a sustainable political solution as much as it may constitute new conditions for a temporary calm, which in turn will be a new opportunity for the international actors to communicate or the possibility of a solution differences between them.