The situation around the entry into NATO of Sweden and Finland is turning from a triumph of American will into a real farce.
While the leaders of the two northern European states pretend that they are already with both feet in NATO and all they have to do is sit in the Brussels chair, Turkish President Erdogan says there is no chair.
And he will not be until they fulfill his conditions on the Kurdish issue.
And without the Turkish “approval”, the alliance will not even be able to consider the application for the entry of Sweden and Finland.
It is not surprising that for such behavior Turkey is torn apart by Western experts, journalists, politicians and deputies.
Erdogan is called an enemy, a representative of Russia in NATO (after all, Moscow does not need an expansion of the alliance), a saboteur and, in general, a stranger to the West.
That is why the idea is heard more and more often that Turkey needs to be expelled from NATO, that it has no place in the Euro-Atlantic gentlemen's club.
There is a certain logic in these statements.
In NATO, key decisions are made by consensus, which means that the member countries of the alliance should have the same approaches to key security issues, including the need to expand and further contain Russia.
Or the approaches may be different, but at the same time all member countries obey the will that the United States politely imposes on them.
Turkey does not meet these requirements.
The basis of Erdogan's foreign policy behavior is maneuvering between West and East, as well as constant attempts to capitalize on this maneuvering.
Tacking requires a second center of power, which is why the Turkish president says he has no intention of breaking off relations with Vladimir Putin.
Maneuvering also requires the second center of power to have sufficient power - therefore, the Turkish president does not intend to play to weaken Moscow.
Therefore, he does not comply with US sanctions, and Turkish companies are now negotiating to fill the vacuum in the Russian market left by the departed Western firms.
Finally, maneuvering requires sovereignty - which is why Erdogan pursues his line and rarely succumbs to American pressure.
As a result, it turns out that Turkey in NATO is not just a burden, but a real hindrance.
Ankara can block the decisions of the alliance if they do not meet its national interests.
Moreover, the Turks can become role models - after all, the current decisions of the alliance (for example, to intensify confrontation with Moscow) do not meet the national interests of most of the member countries of the organization, which are simply afraid to oppose American will.
If Erdogan's demarches continue to go unpunished, then the fear of others will gradually disappear, replaced by a desire to bargain and protect their national interests.
This means that in order to avoid an unpleasant precedent, the Turkish leader must be demonstratively punished, and best of all through expulsion from NATO.
Let him protect himself from external threats, of which Turkey has more than enough (in fact, of all the neighboring powers, only Azerbaijan is friendly).
It would seem that a completely logical decision, but two serious obstacles stand in its way: procedural and geopolitical.
The fact is that there is no procedure for excluding a member country from NATO.
Neither full and final, nor even partial (in the form of suspension of membership or deprivation of the right to vote).
A state can withdraw from the alliance only of its own free will (for which it makes an appropriate decision, negotiates the conditions for withdrawal for a year, after which it leaves the orderly ranks of NATO allies).
And Erdogan’s Turkey, although it regularly spoke about the possibility of leaving the alliance (for example, when the United States imposed sanctions against it), did not take a step towards the door.
She didn't even get up from her chair.
And not only because of the large number of external threats, but also because of the notorious strategy of making money on maneuvering.
Just as this strategy requires maintaining a high level of relations between Ankara and Moscow, its implementation also requires cooperation with the West.
In particular, the presence of Turkey in the North Atlantic Alliance.
In addition, as the story with Finland and Sweden has shown, Erdogan's ability to block the work of NATO gives him a serious instrument of pressure on the United States and the West as a whole.
So why would he voluntarily throw away this important and necessary tool?
Formally, there is no way to change this situation - in order to rewrite NATO's statutory documents, the consent of all member countries, including Turkey, is needed.
Yes, in practice, Western countries could include their selective attitude to international law and somehow initiate a vote to exclude Turkey, but even in this case, a positive decision must be made by consensus of all member states (except Ankara, of course).
And there will be no consensus, simply because the United States will vote against excluding Turkey.
And they will do it not for ideological, but for geopolitical reasons.
Yes, Ankara is a problematic partner.
Yes, Erdogan is too sovereign.
Yes, Turkey undermines the stability of NATO by its actions and teaches its allies bad manners (ie sovereignty).
However, on the other hand, its army is the second largest in NATO.
It is an outpost of the alliance in the Middle East.
She and she alone is capable of creating real tension in the southern underbelly of Russia - in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Finally, it should not be tritely allowed to go on a free foreign policy voyage outside NATO, because without American control (even if it is partial), Erdogan can become too dangerously close to the enemies of the United States.
Finally, the expulsion of Turkey from NATO will demonstrate the weakness of Washington and the final loss of its ability to train its allies.
That is why Turkey, despite all its sabotage in the history of Finland and the Czech Republic, will not be expelled from NATO.
They will simply agree with her in an amicable way on the removal of all objections.
The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editors.