Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has openly announced his country's disapproval of Sweden and Finland joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), after the latter two announced their desire to do so against the backdrop of the Russian war on Ukraine.

Turkish terms

In what seemed to be a direct result of the Russian war on Ukraine, both Sweden and Finland abandoned their decades-old policy of neutrality (since the beginning of the 19th century in the case of Sweden) and submitted formal applications to join NATO.

NATO considers this step as a blow to Russia, which was one of the reasons for waging the war on Ukraine to stop the alliance's expansion policy to the east, and one of its goals and conditions for stopping it is Kyiv's adoption of a policy of military neutrality between Moscow and NATO.

According to Article No. 10 of the 1949 Washington Treaty founding NATO, member states have the right unanimously to invite additional (European) countries to join on terms that were added to some criteria later, which means that the two northern countries need the approval of all NATO member states, including Turkey.

However, the latter announced through its President Erdogan on May 17 its opposition to the membership of Sweden and Finland in the alliance.

He explained that the main reason for his country's refusal is the support of these two countries for terrorist organizations, referring to the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which has been waging a separatist war against Turkey since 1984, and figures affiliated with the Gulen group accused of carrying out the failed bloody coup attempt in the summer of 2016.

Ankara realizes that it has an unprecedented negotiating card with the two countries on the one hand, the United States on the other hand, NATO and even the European Union on the third.

Turkey is not only arming here with the veto it is currently raising against the two countries, but also with its performance during the Russian-Ukrainian crisis before and during the war, which increased its importance for the Alliance now and in the future within any security arrangements for the European continent.

The Turkish president criticized the two countries' failure to take a "clear and decisive stance against terrorist organizations", as well as their imposition of an arms embargo on his country against the backdrop of its military operations in Syria.

Erdogan specifically accused Sweden of turning into a "hotbed and shelter for terrorism", in reference to its clear support for groups affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers' Party, such as the participation of its Minister of Defense - via video conference - in a conference of the "Syrian Democratic Forces", as well as the reception of its foreign minister with a delegation from her in Sweden.

Erdogan said that the annexation of Stockholm and Helsinki to NATO in their current status "takes it out of its framework as a security organization, and turns it into a place where terrorist representatives are concentrated."

In addition to these two factors, i.e. the support for organizations classified as terrorist and the embargo on the supply of arms to them, it seems that there are other important factors in shaping the Turkish position.

The first is the position of NATO and the United States in particular on Turkey in the last few years, including the refusal to sell it a defense missile system such as the Patriot and the imposition of sanctions on it, and even the timid talk from some parties about the possibility/necessity of removing it from the alliance.

As for the second factor, it is the Russian position, or rather how Moscow received the decision to annex the two countries. Since the beginning of the crisis, Turkey has been keen not to clash with the latter, although it condemned its war against Ukraine, but without cutting off communication with it and without participating in imposing sanctions on it, and even playing the role of mediator between the two countries. sides.

Veto?

Turkey and Erdogan himself had previously said months ago that it supports the policy of NATO expansion with the aim of promoting peace in the world, but today it expresses a clear and firm position regarding Sweden and Finland after they submitted an official application for accession.

Indeed, Turkish officials openly and frankly express their dismay at what they see as double standards in NATO and the West in general, as the two countries are intended to join NATO and Ukraine to the European Union at lightning speed, while “Turkey is left to wait at the door of the European Union for decades.”

The Turkish president said that officials from the two countries will visit his country within days, calling on them not to "go through the trouble of traveling and visiting" to persuade Turkey to modify its position by merely giving verbal promises, stressing that his country "will not be bitten twice" in reference to its approval of Greece's return to NATO in 1980. .

Ankara hints that its position is stable and will not change easily, and refuses to be pressured into passing the accession of the two countries without addressing what it considers to be at the core of its national security.

Although Turkish researchers and media professionals referred more than once to the precedent of the Greek "veto" on the accession of East Macedonia for a full 10 years, the current situation appears to be different from several angles.

There are noticeable differences between North Macedonia and Sweden and Finland, and the context of the Russian war on Ukraine and the intense tension between Moscow and NATO are strongly present in the second case, which refers to a more insistent decision by NATO to include the latter two.

Where the United States and its allies feel that there is a historical opportunity to continue expanding in the shadows of the war, to secure the two countries from the supposed “Russian danger” as well as to contain Moscow in the long run. Therefore, there is a noticeable endeavor not only to annex the two countries, but to speed up the transitional period to the minimum possible level. time and procedures, as well as giving them security guarantees during this period.

On the other hand, Ankara realizes that it has an unprecedented negotiating card with the two countries on the one hand, the United States on the other hand, NATO, and even the European Union on the third.

Turkey is not only arming here with the veto it is currently raising against the two countries, but also with its performance during the Russian-Ukrainian crisis before and during the war, which increased its importance for the Alliance now and in the future within any security arrangements for the European continent.

It can be said that Turkey’s declared conditions can be dealt with positively and appease Ankara regarding them, in terms of lifting the arms embargo, withdrawing support for Kurdistan-linked groups and cooperating with them in the Gulen group file, so what is at stake for the two countries will push them to try to reach an understanding with them in one way or another.

Perhaps the statement of NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg that "Turkey has made it clear that its intention is not to prevent accession" and that "I am sure that we can address Turkey's concerns without delaying the accession process" is in this context.

On the other hand, some of the outstanding issues between Turkey and the United States are solvable, such as the project to develop its "F-16" fighters and bypassing the Russian S-400 deal without sanctions and others, as the two sides had already They established a communication channel to discuss it, and Ankara hopes to reach mutually acceptable solutions with Washington soon.

Finally, Russia itself is no longer on the same previous position of rejecting Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO and threatening if that happens, as Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated a few days ago that their accession to NATO “does not constitute a direct threat to Russia,” threatening a response in the event of “expanding the infrastructure.” NATO military forces, including the two countries.

Such a position gives Ankara relief in the event that it takes a decision to agree to membership without seeing it as a step directed against Moscow, in addition to the time allowed by the current Turkish rejection of Russia in a scenario similar to its decision to close the straits to ships after launching the war.

In conclusion, the Turkish refusal to include Sweden and Finland in NATO is not final but rather conditional, which means that there is a process of dialogue and negotiation that will take place between the two parties, and even between Turkey on the one hand and NATO and Washington on the other.

It is expected and assumed that Turkey will get an acceptable price before it lifts its veto against the accession of the two countries, which everyone considers an important and landmark step and the time factor in it is very sensitive.

Here, it is worth recalling the Turkish President's saying, "NATO expansion is as important as our sensitivities are respected." Therefore, the visit to Ankara of a diplomatic delegation from the two countries will be a preliminary indication of the ease or difficulty of the negotiation and dialogue process between the two sides.