By Berlin account

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz made his choice on February 24: he finally finished off Russian-German relations and went into conflict with Moscow.

For which he is now being punished ... but not by the Russians, but by the Germans.

38% - this is exactly the current approval rating of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz among the German population.

Even the old, airy President Joseph Biden has a higher rating in his country (43%), and Scholz is a normal, healthy person who has just taken office.

And not just one who has entered, but full of ambition to take the empty throne of the leader of the European Union.

With such figures, of course, we are not talking about some kind of occupation of the throne, but about the banal preservation of the chancellor's chair.

However, Scholz has only himself to blame for these figures - they were the result of his conscious choice in the Russian-Ukrainian issue.

The fact is that German Chancellor Olaf Scholz became the second leader of the FRG in a row, who had to make decisions that were crucial for the whole of Europe.

In 2014, his predecessor, Angela Merkel, made the wrong choice.

First, she tried to “squeeze” Ukraine from Russia through support for the “Maidan”, and then she actually buried many years of Russian-German cooperation by trying to become holier than the Baltic elites, that is, to lead the anti-Russian camp in the EU and lead it along the path of introducing anti-Russian sanctions for Crimea and Donbass.

Perhaps then the Bundeschancellor considered this the right step - she hoped that with its help she could increase Germany's influence on European affairs and oust France from the post of political leader of the EU.

However, in fact, the opposite happened: having suffered billions of dollars from breaking a number of ties with Moscow,

Germany never acquired subjectivity.

Simply because the German leaders, accustomed to relying on American managers, were not ready for it.

Scholz, on the other hand, found himself at a crossroads on February 24, 2022, and also chose a course to deepen the confrontation.

He froze Nord Stream 2, talks about the need to abandon Russian energy sources, develops some kind of sanctions against Moscow, insists on moderate assistance to Ukraine and generally says that Russia cannot be allowed to win in Ukraine.

Again, at first glance it may seem that the course is fully justified.

Firstly, because such is the instruction of the Washington Regional Committee.

Secondly, under the sauce of resistance to Russia, Scholz also wants to increase the subjectivity of Germany, but not in political terms (as was the case under Merkel), but in military-political terms.

Calling the ongoing events Zeitenwende (turning point) in his famous speech, the chancellor proclaimed a course for a sharp increase in the German armed forces.

The only problem is that the German society did not appreciate this Zeitenwende.

In fact, the chancellor began to turn into a stranger among strangers and a stranger among his own.

Yes, the population of Germany sympathizes with Ukraine: public opinion polls show that the Germans perceive Russia's actions as a direct threat to themselves.

At the same time, however, they see where resistance to this threat is leading Germany.

Soaring energy prices have already hit every German family.

And the questions raised in the press about whether it is now necessary to wash seven times a week, only exacerbate the feeling of some kind of financial hopelessness.

But there will be more.

Chancellor Scholz opposes an immediate ban on imports of Russian hydrocarbons, but says they should be phased out within the next few years.

And considering that Germany will not find a replacement for Russian gas (neither in terms of quantity, nor in terms of price level), the chancellor is actually talking about the de-industrialization of Germany or at least a sharp rise in the cost of industrial products in a country whose economy is export-oriented.

Experts have already calculated that in the event of refusal of Russian gas in Germany, there will be a drop in production in the amount of €220 billion in two years, which only exacerbates the sense of hopelessness already in business.

It would seem that another group of people should be satisfied with the chancellor - one for which Atlantic solidarity and adherence to progressive values ​​​​is more important than washing in the shower and wages.

However, Scholz also failed to become his own among the pack of liberal globalists demanding to wage war for Ukraine to the last European.

Simply because he is not revolutionary and radical enough to impose the most severe sanctions against Russia here and now.

“For many, the matter is already clear: Chancellor Olaf Scholz turns out to be a pathetic procrastinator (a person who puts off all important things for later. -

), which cannot justify either the expectations of its citizens or the desperate desires of Ukrainians in the supply of weapons, ”writes the Berliner Zeitung.

“There is a turning point, but the country is still the same,” resents Thomas Bagger, who will soon take the post of German ambassador to Poland.

The situation for Chancellor Scholz is complicated by the fact that, unlike Merkel (who was the undisputed queen of the German political mountain), Scholz has a coalition government in which his authority is by no means unquestioning.

And before the start of the Russian special operation, it was difficult for him to find a language with partners - the Free Democrats and the Greens, and now, when they feel the chancellor's rating is falling, the degree of their ambitions and radicalism will only increase.

For example, in Der Spiegel there is already a huge laudatory article about the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the representative of the "Greens" Annalena Burbock, where she is described as a strong, as well as ideologically and gender-correct leader.

Almost a future chancellor.

And if she (or another representative of the ruling coalition) really challenges Scholz's leadership, then this will be fair.

The Chancellor will pay for his mistake on the all-important Berlin bill.

The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editors.