When US President Joe Biden announced August 31 last year as the date for the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, his administration began talks with Ankara to play a role in securing and operating Kabul International Airport after the US withdrawal.

That moment seemed to be a serious opportunity to reset Turkish-American relations, which had not experienced long-term stability for years.

During an emergency NATO summit in Brussels last month, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan used this fateful moment in NATO's history to recall his country's important role in the alliance, and called on Western allies to end the arms embargo on Turkey.

However, that moment quickly dissipated after the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban's rapid seizure of power led to the toppling of the Turkish-US cooperation project.

In the aftermath of the Russian military attack on Ukraine on February 24, the momentum of communication between Ankara and Washington resumed, in light of the efforts of the Biden administration to unify NATO against Moscow.

On April 4, US Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Victoria Nuland visited Ankara, paving the way for activating the strategic cooperation mechanism between the two countries, which was agreed upon at the summit that brought together Presidents Biden and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Brussels last June.

The first direct result of Nuland's visit was the US State Department's presentation in a letter to Congress a positive approach to the project to sell F-16 fighters to Turkey, noting that providing Ankara with these fighters is in the long-term interest of NATO's unity and capabilities, as well as US national security.

The current US interest in repairing relations with Turkey stems mainly from Washington's need for a greater Turkish role in supporting Ukraine and confronting Russia.

On the one hand, the threat posed by Moscow and Europe's efforts to find an alternative to Russian energy makes Turkey more important to NATO and the European Union.

On the other hand, the United States is forced to mend relations with quarrelsome allies such as Ankara in order to unify the Western position.

Ankara already supports Kyiv, and has previously provided it with (drone) aircraft, but at the same time it appears wary of getting more involved in Western efforts to intensify pressure on Moscow.

In addition to avoiding participating in sanctions against Russia, Ankara was not a party to the Western process of arming Ukraine after the war, and instead preferred - and still is - to play the role of mediator between Moscow and Kiev.

During the emergency NATO summit in Brussels last month, President Erdoğan used this fateful moment in NATO's history to recall his country's important role in the alliance, and called on Western allies to end the arms embargo on Turkey.

Ankara has been complaining for years about the refusal of Western partners — including the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany and France — to provide missile defense systems as well as critical equipment such as tank engines, warplanes, drones and helicopters developed by Turkish companies.

The United States is also imposing sanctions on Turkey and expelling it from the project to manufacture advanced F-35 fighters because of its acquisition of the advanced Russian S-400 missile defense system.

Ankara and Washington now believe that the current situation presents an appropriate opportunity to reform their relations.

Recently, US officials revealed that Washington submitted a proposal to Ankara to supply Ukraine with the S-400 system it possesses in exchange for the lifting of sanctions, but Ankara quickly rejected it, fearing that this would affect its relations with Russia.

Nevertheless, the proposal opens a discussion in Ankara and Washington about practical initiatives that should be taken to find a solution to the crisis between them.

Since Biden took office, Ankara has renewed its offer to form a joint committee with Washington to resolve this issue, but it did not receive a positive response.

The belief at the time was that Biden was not yet ready to compromise with Ankara.

What is different today is that the efforts to repair relations are not on the part of Ankara only, but also on the part of Washington;

In an indication that the Biden administration is more eager to establish relations with Turkey than it was when he took office.

In addition to the issue of the S-400, there are many contentious issues between Ankara and Washington, including the US support for the Kurdish units in Syria, and the US refusal to extradite the opposition Fethullah Gulen to Turkey, and Washington has always played down these issues in the past.

Given that the current conflict highlights the West's need for Turkey to engage in a strategy of maximum pressure on Russia, this gives Ankara room to pressure Washington to find a settlement for these issues, or at least some of them, especially the issue of Turkey's return to the F-35 fighter jet project.

In recent months, the Biden administration took an encouraging step to repair relations with Turkey when it withdrew its support for the "Mid-East" project to transport Israeli gas to Europe through Greece and southern Cyprus, in isolation from Turkey. It also supported the efforts of Ankara and Tel Aviv to normalize relations between them.

However, achieving a serious breakthrough in the Turkish-American differences requires practical measures to rebuild trust between the two sides.

On the other hand, Ankara seems more interested in repairing its relations with the Westerners as a lever to balance its partnership with Russia, which tends to favor Moscow more.

But the American proposal regarding the "S-400" shows the heavy price that Ankara must pay in exchange for repairing relations with the United States.

Reforming relations with Turkey will be an important entry point for NATO in line with Russia's deterrence strategy, especially when it comes to an ally working to achieve a balance with Russia in the Black Sea region and other regions.

There is still a third path that the two countries can take to find a balanced settlement that ensures the United States a greater Turkish role in applying pressure on Russia, and in return ensures Ankara maintains a stable relationship with Moscow.

When Erdogan visited Kyiv last February, he agreed with his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, to provide the Ukrainian military with more Turkish drones.

This agreement is gaining importance for the United States as it helps Kyiv to resist the Russian attack for a longer period.

Moreover, Turkey's decision to impose restrictions on the transit of Russian warships through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits under the Montreux Treaty is consistent with the US and Western goals of restricting the movement of Russian naval power between the Black and Mediterranean Seas.

Ankara will not be able to go further in opposing the Russian invasion given its intertwined relationship with Russia in many areas, but its keenness to assert its Atlantic identity in this conflict makes its position vital to American interests.

Over the past years, Turkish-American differences have reduced opportunities for cooperation between the two countries in many areas, while Russia has exploited these differences in order to build a deeper partnership with Ankara.

Given that the current war makes restoring the unity and effectiveness of NATO an American priority, repairing relations with Turkey will be an important entry point for a coherent NATO in Russia's deterrence strategy, especially when it comes to an ally working to achieve a balance with Russia in the Black Sea region and other regions.

Although Turkey tends to adopt positive neutrality in the war, its ability to balance its partnership with Russia weakens whenever its relationship with the West and the United States in particular is damaged.

In contrast to past periods when there was no common ground for more effective Turkish-American cooperation, the Russian invasion of Ukraine constitutes a suitable environment for such cooperation in the future.

Democrats in the United States adopt a hostile rhetoric toward Erdogan, and consider his cooperation with Russia a threat to American interests.

But this view contradicts US policy toward other allies that have military ties with Russia.

Washington is still avoiding imposing sanctions on India after its purchase of the Russian S-400 system to ensure that it does not affect China's containment strategy in South Asia and the Pacific.

It would be wrong to continue punishing a powerful ally that has the second largest army in NATO and is a cornerstone of Russia's balance in many regions, such as Syria, the Black Sea, the South Caucasus, Central Asia and Africa.

For now, Biden will have to exert his influence on Congress in order to pass the fighter jet sale as the beginning of a new phase with Ankara.

In recent years, it has been believed that Washington and Europe are not serious about making progress in the relationship with Turkey, waiting for the upcoming Turkish elections in the middle of next year, as they believe that Erdogan will be defeated.

Betting on this assumption is no longer valid in the midst of the major shifts brought about by the war in the geopolitical calculations of the West and Turkey alike.