France should have 68.1 million inhabitants on January 1, 2070 (i.e. 700,000 more than today), according to our partner The Conversation.
The French population should indeed continue to increase to a maximum of 69.3 million in 2044… before decreasing to reach 68.1 million in 2070.
This analysis was conducted by Laurent Toulemon, research director at INED;
Élisabeth Algava, statistician and demographer at INSEE;
Gilles Pison, anthropologist and demographer, professor at the Mnhn;
Nathalie Blanpain, statistician and demographer at INSEE.
The population projections recently published by INSEE announce the continuation of the demographic aging of France in the next 50 years.
All the scenarios lead to a significant increase in the proportion of elderly people by 2070. On what basis is this prognosis based?
Let's examine them by reviewing the different scenarios considered.
In November 2021, INSEE published new population projections for France by 2070. According to the central scenario – the most probable, and extending recent demographic trends – France would have 68.1 million inhabitants on January 1, 2070, compared to 67.4 million on January 1, 2021, i.e. 700,000 more.
The population would continue to increase to a maximum of 69.3 million in 2044 and then decrease to 68.1 million in 2070.
Doubling of those aged 75 or over by 2070
Between 2021 and 2070, the population only increases after the age of 75 (Figure 1): it doubles at these ages, life expectancy increasing and the generations born before 1946 being replaced by those slightly more numerous born at the end of from the baby boom to the mid-1990s.
Evolution of the population of France between now and 2070 according to different scenarios © Laurent Toulemon, Élisabeth Algava, Nathalie Blanpain, Gilles Pison, 2022, Population & Societies, n° 597
Between the ages of 60 and 75, the numbers remain more or less the same.
On the other hand, below the age of 60, they decrease by 10%.
The central projection is supplemented by 26 alternative scenarios combining different hypotheses for changes in fertility, mortality and migration.
The central scenario assumes a fertility rate of 1.8 children on average per woman, ie a level close to that of today;
mortality continuing to fall at the same rate as during the 2010 decade;
and a migratory balance (entries less exits from the territory) of +70,000 people per year.
According to the “high” (2.0 children) or “low” (1.6) fertility assumptions, the population in 2070 varies by more or less 4 million around the 68 million inhabitants of the central scenario;
similarly, depending on whether net migration is set at 20,000 per year (“low” hypothesis) or 120,000 (“high” hypothesis), it varies by plus or minus 4 million.
The variations in terms of the evolution of mortality have a more limited impact: more or less 2.4 million.
In total, by combining the high or low assumptions of each component, the range goes from 58 to 79 million inhabitants in 2070 (Figure 2).
Evolution of the population of France between now and 2070 according to different scenarios © Laurent Toulemon, Élisabeth Algava, Nathalie Blanpain, Gilles Pison, 2022, Population & Societies, n° 597
The uncertainty about the numbers varies according to age (Figure 3).
It is strongest for the generations not yet born in 2021. For example, the number of 0-19 year olds in 2070 is 14 million according to the central scenario, but with a wide range, from 11 to 17 million , depending on the low and high scenarios, i.e. plus or minus 25% around the central projection.
Age pyramid of France in 2021 and 2070, according to the low, central and high scenarios © Laurent Toulemon, Élisabeth Algava, Nathalie Blanpain, Gilles Pison, 2022, Population & Societies, n° 597
On the other hand, for people aged 75 or over, who are therefore already born in 2021, the extreme scenarios lead to figures of 10 to 14 million in 2070, i.e. more or less 18% around the central projection, 12 million.
It is essentially the mortality assumption that causes the number of people aged 75 or over to vary between 2021 and 2070.
But whatever the scenario, their number increases very sharply (by 89% in the central scenario), life expectancy increasing and the generations born between 1969 and 1994 replacing the hollow generations born before 1946.
Higher uncertainty for births than for deaths
The central scenario leads to an annual number of births decreasing by 80,000 (-10%) by 2070 compared to today's level (740,000 births in 2020; 660,000 in 2070) (Figure 4a).
On the other hand, the annual number of deaths increases by 160,000, from 610,000 in 2019 (before the Covid-19 pandemic) to 770,000 in 2070, i.e. an increase of 25% (Figure 4b).
Annual births and deaths in France according to different scenarios © Laurent Toulemon, Élisabeth Algava, Nathalie Blanpain, Gilles Pison, 2022, Population & Societies, n° 597
These numbers vary by scenario, with a wider range for births than deaths.
All the scenarios also lead to a very significant increase in deaths between now and 2045: the large generations of baby boomers, who reach very high ages during this period, will be dying out.
Births and deaths in France from 1970 to 2070 (central scenario) © Laurent Toulemon, Élisabeth Algava, Nathalie Blanpain, Gilles Pison, 2022, Population & Societies, n° 597
From 2035, the number of deaths exceeds the number of births in the central scenario (Figure 5).
The natural balance (difference between the numbers of births and deaths), which has become negative, then widens and reaches -110,000 in 2070.
This balance varies greatly depending on the scenario: between -330,000 and +160,000.
But as all the scenarios include the assumption of a positive migratory balance (from 20,000 to 120,000 per year), the population is still growing in 2070 in some of them (11 out of 27).
A look back at 50 years of the evolution of projections
How have the assumptions on which the projections published by INSEE are based changed over the past fifty years?
They have changed a lot in terms of life expectancy (see here and here).
Evolution of life expectancy at birth in France since 1950, observations and projections (central scenario) © Laurent Toulemon, Élisabeth Algava, Nathalie Blanpain, Gilles Pison, 2022, Population & Societies, n° 597
Life expectancy at birth for all sexes combined was 72 years in 1970 (against ten years more in 2021: 82 years).
The diagnosis in 1970 was that it had almost reached or was close to its limits.
After having increased a lot at the end of the Second World War and in the 1950s, gaining almost 5 months a year during this decade, life expectancy progressed more slowly in the 1960s, this slowdown confirming the vision of a biological ceiling (figure 6 opposite).
The projection published in 1970, whose horizon is 1995, continues the upward trend in life expectancy, first at the same rate as in the 1960s, then at a decreasing rate.
The following projection, published in 1979, is more pessimistic and considers that life expectancy will increase even more slowly, then peak at 73.8 years in 2000, all sexes combined.
These two projections turned out to be far below the real evolution.
The observation that the ceilings, even when raised, are regularly exceeded after a few years leads to the abandonment of the very idea of a ceiling in the projections published from 1995. These extrapolate the recent trend over the entire projection period, without setting a limit.
They correspond fairly well to the trend observed so far.
Fertility: stable since the end of the baby boom
Central assumptions of demographic projections for France since 1970 for fertility and migration © Laurent Toulemon, Élisabeth Algava, Nathalie Blanpain, Gilles Pison, 2022, Population & Societies, n° 597
With regard to fertility, however, the projections have changed little in fifty years (see table opposite).
Apart from the projection published in 1970, significantly higher than the others (we are still in the baby boom period, even if it is coming to an end), the revisions are slight, and sometimes upwards, sometimes downwards. the decline, each time reflecting the recent trend in the fertility indicator.
The latter, which has been stable over the long term since the end of the baby-boom, indeed goes through periods of decline and rise, between 1.7 and 2.0 children on average per woman.
For net migration, the assumptions have changed significantly over fifty years: from 130,000 per year in the 1970 projection, the net drops to 0 in the following two (published in 1979 and 1986), in connection with the cessation of migration in 1973. It then varies from simple to double in the following projections, between 50,000 and 100,000 per year (see table above).
Our "DEMOGRAPHY" file
What do these new projections published by INSEE tell us?
They confirm the aging of the population in the coming decades, at a rapid pace by 2040, then slowing down thereafter.
If the size of the projected population by 2070 is strongly conditioned by the assumptions made, all the scenarios lead, without exception, to a significant increase in the proportion of elderly people by this horizon.
The extent of the variations between the scenarios recalls the uncertainties on the evolution of the population in the long term, while confirming the inevitable continuation of ageing.
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This analysis was written by Laurent Toulemon, director of research at the National Institute for Demographic Studies (INED); Élisabeth Algava, statistician and demographer at the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE); Gilles Pison, anthropologist and demographer, professor at the National Museum of Natural History (MNHN); Nathalie Blanpain, statistician and demographer at the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (Insee) (the last three mentioned are also researchers associated with the National Institute for Demographic Studies – INED).
The original article was published on The Conversation website.
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Declaration of interests
● Laurent Toulemon has received funding from the National Research Agency.
● Gilles Pison has received funding from the French National Research Agency and the American National Institutes of Health.
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