German Chancellor Olaf Schulz's visit to Ankara in the middle of this month marked the first direct contact of the new German leadership with Turkey since Schulz took power.
During the era of former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Berlin played a vital role in shaping Turkish-European relations, and keeping channels of dialogue open between the two sides in the darkest conditions and crises between them.
Schulz now hopes that Merkel's legacy will help him not only continue the process of containing Turkey and maintain a stable level of relations with it, but also look to take advantage of its position in the Russian-Western conflict over Ukraine and use it in the framework of the strategy of deterrence and dialogue pursued by the West with President Vladimir Putin.
Over the past decade, Turkish-Western relations have continuously deteriorated, leading to a crisis that almost led to its complete collapse last year, when Ankara threatened to expel the ambassadors of 10 Western countries in response to a statement calling for the release of detained Turkish businessman Osman Kavala.
In the last two weeks, Ankara has been a destination for European politicians, including Schulz and Polish President Anzı Duda.
Presidents Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Joe Biden also spoke by phone, and they are also scheduled to meet on the sidelines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) leaders' summit in Brussels on the twenty-fourth of this month.
At this time, Ankara and Western capitals are showing increasing signs of their willingness to mend relations and adapt to the great challenges posed by the Russian war.
Over the past decade, Turkish-Western relations have continuously deteriorated, leading to a crisis that almost led to its complete collapse last year, when Ankara threatened to expel the ambassadors of 10 Western countries in response to a statement calling for the release of detained Turkish businessman Osman Kavala.
The deterioration in relations reflected the different worldviews of Ankara and the West.
While Westerners view China's rise and Russia's growing regional role as a threat to their supremacy in the post-Cold War order, Ankara sees this as a sign of a shift toward a multipolar world order and a gradual shift in the center of power from West to East.
This approach prompted Turkey to adopt a new approach in its foreign policy based on a balance between East and West.
While Turks and Westerners sought to live with and manage their differences rather than address them, the Russian invasion of Ukraine upended the geopolitical calculus of all countries of the world, including Turkey, Europe and the United States.
The more the war brought about major shifts in Europe and the United States' priorities and prompted it to focus on the new security challenges posed by the Russian threat in Eastern Europe, the more it highlighted Turkey's importance to the West and vice versa.
In fact, Turkey sees the rise of China and Russia in exchange for the decline of the West as an opportunity to strengthen its strategic independence in foreign policy from Westerners rather than a threat to it.
This difference in worldview has created a challenging environment for Ankara and the West.
On the one hand, Moscow took advantage of the strained Turkish-Western relations during the second half of the last decade and sought to increase the rift between Ankara and the West.
On the other hand, Turkey has become excessively dependent on Russia to secure its interests.
Ankara relies on its understandings with Moscow in northern Syria to ensure that its military presence is not endangered, and the two countries also have a joint military deployment in Karabakh within the framework of peacekeeping forces to ensure the peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia after the recent war.
Currently, Moscow is sponsoring the process of normalizing relations between Ankara and Yerevan.
Moreover, the two countries have important economic relations for Ankara, which depends on millions of Russian tourists who bring billions of dollars annually to Turkey, as well as cooperation projects between the two countries in the field of energy and others as well as defense cooperation.
Unlike the West, Ankara adopts a relatively balanced policy in the current conflict.
On the one hand, it supports Ukraine with drones, but it has not been involved in the West's current efforts to arm Kyiv.
On the other hand, it opposed the Russian attack on Ukraine, but it did not engage in the sanctions imposed by the West on Moscow.
However, this position does not hide Turkey's growing concern about Russia's expansionist policies, especially in the Black Sea region.
Since Russia launched an attack on Georgia in 2008 and annexed Crimea in 2014, the balance of power in the Black Sea has been under great strain.
The current war poses another dilemma for Turkey: how to balance continuing its support for Ukraine with not jeopardizing its relationship with Russia.
In this place where Ankara's ability to maneuver is diminishing, the active role of NATO is a lever for Turkey to balance its relations with Russia.
For Europe, Turkey's role is important to it in its search for alternatives to get rid of its addiction to Russian gas.
Supporting energy cooperation projects between the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean and involving Turkey in them would help Europe in the long run to find alternative sources of Russian gas.
The war provides an opportunity to reshape Turkish-Western relations from a perspective that balances the need of both sides for each other in the face of emerging geopolitical challenges and Ankara's need to preserve its relationship with Russia.
For Turkey, a member of NATO that has struck a delicate balancing act between Kyiv and Moscow, the war poses difficult choices.
In the short term, Ankara can continue this balance while focusing on floating itself as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine.
However, this ability will diminish the longer the war continues, the course of which will determine the future of Ankara's maintenance of this balance.
A strong and united NATO support for Ukraine, along with Russia's military setbacks, would provide the best opportunity to strengthen Ankara's commitment to Ukraine and the alliance.
Turkey will remain a strong NATO ally, but its relationship with the United States remains a major obstacle to its consistency with NATO policies.
Since President Biden took office, Ankara has proposed forming a joint committee with Washington to resolve the crisis caused by Turkey's purchase of the Russian S-400 system and its removal from the US F-35 fighter jet project.
The Biden administration also expressed its willingness to discuss the project to sell Turkey F-16 fighters as a solution to the conflict.
Moreover, Washington recently withdrew its support for the "Mid-East" project to transport Israeli gas to Europe via Greece and southern Cyprus, in isolation from Turkey.
It also supported the efforts of Ankara and Tel Aviv to normalize relations between them.
On the other hand, Greece is becoming more inclined to dialogue with Turkey to resolve their long-standing differences over maritime borders and islands.
As for Europe, Turkey's role is important to it in its search for alternatives to get rid of its addiction to Russian gas.
Supporting energy cooperation projects between the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean and involving Turkey in them would help Europe in the long run to find alternative sources of Russian gas.
These steps may seem important to open a new path in Turkey's relations with the West, but they are not sufficient without considering some of the major problems that require a solution, such as the issue of US support for Kurdish units in Syria and US sanctions on Turkish defense industries.
Although Ankara supports the reactivation of NATO, the obstacles to this are realistic and many.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, NATO's priorities are no longer confronting Russia.
Now, the United States is seeking to re-align the priorities of the alliance towards the Russian threat, which creates a problem for Turkey, which is trying to create a space for it between its commitments to the alliance and its national interests that require it to maintain the relationship with Russia.
Meanwhile, it remains unclear whether the new US commitment to Europe's security will last into the future.
During the era of former President Donald Trump, transatlantic relations deteriorated dramatically.
Now under the Biden administration, Washington is seeking to restore these relations.
As for Europe, it is thinking more about reducing its dependence on the United States to secure its security interests in the future.
Moreover, the formation of parallel NATO blocs within the alliance limits its effectiveness on major issues.
France is strengthening its defense cooperation with Greece to confront Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean, as well as the United States' marginalization of the European Union in the agreement it concluded with the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia to provide the latter with nuclear submarine technology.
In addition, the issue of the US military presence in Greece, which creates another problem in Turkish-US relations.
Ankara believes that the United States is looking for Greece as an alternative to Turkey and seeks to encircle it from the western front.
In the foreseeable future, Ankara and the West will try to focus on areas of cooperation and perhaps try to address some of the major differences.
However, the new relations that can be produced by the current global transformations, will not be similar to past periods for two main considerations: First, the classic definition of the Turkish-Western partnership that began with Ankara’s accession to NATO was motivated mainly by fear of the Soviet Union, but Turkey’s view Russia today is different than it was in the past.
Second, Turkey's tendency towards achieving strategic independence in its foreign policy from the West is pushing it to reduce its dependence on it in many security, political and economic fields.