Immediately after the Russian military action against Ukraine and within its territory, the latter made a direct request to Turkey to close the sea straits in front of the Russian Navy.

This request, which was expected, re-drawn attention to the Turkish straits and the sensitivity of Turkey's position in the current crisis and its accurate calculations.

In the event that Turkey is a party to the war, it has full powers to decide what it wants regarding the straits, and the same is the case in the event that it is deemed to be facing an imminent danger of war, and if the League of Nations or the majority of the signatories to the agreement could force it to reconsider its decision.

Montreux Convention

The Sèvres Agreement of 1920 included a great injustice against the Ottoman Empire, and therefore the Turks fought a war of independence and copied it with the Lausanne Agreement of 1923, which formed the map of the nascent Turkish Republic and its relations with other countries and parties, with the exception of Article 23 of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, which was subjected to subsequent discussions and negotiations and took its final form. in the Montreux Convention.

The agreement - signed by Turkey on July 20, 1936 with Bulgaria, France, Britain, Australia, Greece, Japan, Romania and the (former) Soviet Union - consists of 5 main chapters distributed over 29 articles in addition to 4 annexes.

The first chapter dealt with the status of merchant ships, the second for warships, the third for aircraft, the fourth for general provisions, and the fifth for final provisions in some details, including the term of the agreement (20 years, with the exception of the general principle related to freedom of navigation) and how to terminate or amend it.

Ankara is keen on the agreement, its application, and keeping it away from controversy, as it is considered a complement to the Lausanne Agreement and thus one of the “foundation documents of the Republic” for it, as well as because it recognized its full sovereignty over the straits that are the key and gateway to the Black Sea Basin, and granted it wide powers that include closing the straits on the parties in cases of war However, some criticism is also directed at the agreement on the grounds that its financial return to Turkey is low due to the reduction of traffic tariffs.

The first chapter provides for complete freedom of passage for commercial ships regardless of any details related to them in cases of peace (Article 2), and in cases of war to which Turkey is not a party (Article 4), as well as ships belonging to countries not involved in the war in the event that Turkey is a party them (Article 5).

As for the second section, it regulates the passage of warships in cases of peace and war, and perhaps the most important thing is to limit the passage of those belonging to countries from outside the Black Sea basin, so that the weight of any of them does not exceed 15,000 tons, nor their number 9, nor the period of their stay in the Black Sea 21 days, Nor is the total weight of all ships 45,000 tons, subject to prior permission from Turkey (Articles 14 and 18).

In the event that Turkey was a party to the war, it has full powers to decide what it wants regarding the straits (Article 20), and the same in the event that it considers that it faces an imminent danger of war (Article 21) and if the League of Nations or the majority of the signatories to the Convention can pay it to reconsider its decision.

complex calculations

Despite the passage of decades of it and the change of the international system and the balance of power in the world and the region more than once, the Montreux Convention still exists and is respected by all parties without radical changes to it.

Turkey has always been keen to implement the terms of the agreement, reminding them and calling on the parties to respect it, given the powers it grants it to it that it does not want to lose on the one hand, and its preservation of the security and stability of the Black Sea Basin on the other.

However, tension increased with time in the Black Sea basin, as it included one country within NATO (as opposed to Russia) with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War;

It is Turkey, while it now includes 3 with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the alliance in 2004, as well as two countries closer to the West and seeking to join NATO with tense relations with Russia, namely Ukraine and Georgia.

From this perspective, the recent Ukrainian crisis is a real challenge to the Montreux Convention and a complex one for Turkey's calculations, as it is a crisis between two of the basin countries, in addition to NATO's indirect involvement in the crisis, which means that the Black Sea may be one of the war fronts.

Therefore, Kiev specifically asked Ankara to implement the Montreux Convention and prevent Russian military ships from passing through the straits.

What are Turkey's options?

In the first place, there is a need to characterize the current developments, is it a "war", a "military escalation" or a partly Russian "military operation" in Ukraine?

Some see avoiding describing "war" as a way out of Turkey's embarrassment over the decision of the straits.

This may have been possible in the early days, but with the arrival of Russian forces on the outskirts of the capital, Kiev, it will be difficult for Turkey not to describe what is happening as a war.

If it was actually a war, Turkey would be faced with 3 main cases according to the agreement.

If it is a party to the war, it has the right - according to Article 20 - to stop shipping through the straits completely without exception, but this is not the case here and it does not seem to be a likely possibility in the foreseeable future.

The second case is for Turkey to feel that it is “threatened by an imminent danger” of war, and here - according to Article 21 - it will have the right to prevent the passage of the military units of the warring parties, except for the ships that had left the Black Sea basin and wanted to return to their ports.

More than that, this article gives Turkey the right not to grant this right (the return of ships) to the state that it deems to have caused the activation of this article, even if Turkey’s decision in such a case is restricted and can be - by the decision of a two-thirds majority of the League of Nations (no longer existing) or a majority Signatories to the agreement - dissuade them from their actions.

The third case is a war between two or more countries in which Turkey is not a party and does not feel that it is in imminent danger because of it, and it is similar to the current situation.

Here, according to Article 19 of the Convention, Turkey has the right to prevent warships from the warring countries from passing through the straits, but this does not prevent the "return" of ships to its ports.

Turkey will be keen on the almost literal implementation of the Montreux Convention, which means - if the developments are described as war - preventing the passage of warships through the straits.

This is theoretically, but in practice, Russia can always send its naval forces from outside the Black Sea to the interior of it because it is “returning” to its ports, and it seems that it is a loophole in the terms of the agreement in favor of Russia in this case.

In conclusion, in sensitive and extremely complex circumstances such as the current one, Turkey will be more keen on the strict implementation of the agreement, regardless of its opinion on the events and the parties to the conflict, unless it is a major party to it.

So that any loopholes or errors in the application will open the door to criticism of it and possibly demands to amend the agreement.

This has happened previously in previous stations and crises, especially by Russia, which is something that can be repeated, and Ankara seeks by all means to avoid it;

The pressure towards amending the agreement, due to Turkey's failure to implement it accurately, in addition to the major geopolitical changes in the Black Sea basin since its signing, could cause Turkey to lose the cards of great power that it has enjoyed and benefited from for decades with regard to navigation in the Black Sea.

Despite all the developments in the previous years, the latter remained a calm area in general, and in terms of relations, competition, and balance between Russia and Turkey in particular.

In conclusion, this is related to the texts of the Montreux Straits Convention and Turkey’s options in implementing it, but the latter certainly seeks to avoid having to take difficult decisions in this regard, due to the accuracy and complexity of the situation with Russia, Ukraine and NATO, as well as the possible repercussions of the war and Turkey’s decision on it.

Therefore, it continues its attempts at diplomatic communication with both Moscow and Kiev, and insists on the possibility of hosting a summit between their presidents, or at least their foreign ministers. Perhaps it is asking Russia behind closed doors not to open the Black Sea front and avoid escalation there so as to avoid having to take such a sensitive decision.