The struggle for the position of Mufti of Syria between the regime and the opposition

Syrians, as well as others, were preoccupied with the republican decree issued a few days ago by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad regarding the position of Mufti of the Republic. The decision provides for the expansion of the powers of the so-called "Scholarly Jurisprudence Council", which was established by a republican decree in 2018, and which seized parts of the powers of the position of Mufti of the Republic, which was organized by the previous 1961 law on the rule of the Al-Assad family who belonged to the Alawite minority, but the new decree amended the 2018 decree by dropping The position of the Mufti was entirely, to be replaced by the so-called “Scholarly Jurisprudence Council”, which includes in its membership figures from various sects, and the Minister of Endowments considers this “Syria’s leadership” in the region, and a “renewal” of Islamic thought!

It is true that the last decree did not provide for the abolition of the position of the mufti, but he neglected to mention it on the one hand, and transferred his powers to what he called the “Scholarly Jurisprudential Council” on the other hand, and this means - in practice - ending the position and the Supreme Council for Ifta, and the Mufti of the Syrian governorates following it, which is a step which sparked a lot of controversy.

The abolition of the position of the Mufti is part of the regime’s post-revolution arrangements and the victory that has been achieved from his point of view and that of his allies, especially the Iranians, to whom he owes his survival.

According to this political perspective, the religious factor is merely a servant of the regime, which is rearranged and adapted in a security and strategic manner in the interest of the regime and its allies after dissolving the restrictions of the pre-revolution majority.

This step can be viewed from three perspectives:

The first: the

personal perspective, whether from the point of view of Mufti Ahmad Hassoun’s personality, which is hated by the Syrian public, or from the perspective of the personal conflict between the Minister of Awqaf Muhammad Abd al-Sattar al-Sayyid and the isolated Mufti Hassoun. But the matter is beyond personal considerations; It deals with the position of fatwa, its structure and functions, and the conflict between the two personalities is old and extends for years, and between the two personalities there are more similarities than differences between them; Especially since both of them used to compete in the service of the regime and outbid the other, and both of them grew up on the farm of the Assad family.

The second: the

doctrinal perspective that reads the scene from the angle of the formation of the “Scholarly Jurisprudence Council,” which includes Shiite, Druze, and Alawi figures, men and women, along with members of the regime’s entourage from among the Sunni sheikhs, a matter that aroused the ire of the Syrian Interim Government and the Syrian Islamic Council, which saw that “the abolition of the position of The Mufti is a service to the Wali al-Faqih.” The two sides saw in it a change in the Syrian identity and a curtailment of the role of the Sunni majority in favor of Shiite references affiliated with Iran.

The third: the

political perspective that refers to the scene’s arrangements at a stage called “Assad’s victory” in his battle with the Syrian revolutionaries, who he calls various descriptions, especially since the head of the “Scholarly Jurisprudence Council” - the Minister of Endowments - was clear in his opening speech for the first meeting held by the council in a year 2019 when he said that the meeting of the Preparatory Committee aims to “consolidate the concepts of national unity and take the hand of the sons of the nation, regardless of their diversity, to confront the ideology of the enemies of the Zionist nation, the takfiri extremists, the followers of political Islam and the Brotherhood of Satan, who continued to sow discord to tear the nation apart and disperse its power away from its goals,” and that it proceeds From al-Assad’s saying, “The imams of sects left us schools of jurisprudence and did not leave us sects,” meaning that the council is clear in two goals:

The first:

Re-arranging the Syrian religious scene in light of the conflict with the jihadist organizations, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the revolting crowd, which he describes as terrorism. Minister Sayyid and Mufti Hassoun were among the most prominent advocates of these ideas.

The second:

the sectarian dimension that inhabits the mind and conscience of the regime and its Iranian and Russian supporters since the beginning of the Syrian revolution, and they are all occupied by the arrangements for the sectarian situation inside Syria in the post-victory stage, because in that are the battle’s merits and a future guarantee of not repeating what happened, especially since al-Assad previously stated unequivocally that Syria has become more homogeneous after the devastating war waged by the regime and its sectarian militias (Syrian, Lebanese, Iraqi, Afghani and others) against the Sunni majority, killing and displacing (hundreds of thousands of martyrs, millions of displaced people and refugees).

It is clear - in my opinion - that the whole issue is part of the political action of the regime, under which the details and other considerations fall.

The abolition of the position of the Mufti is part of the regime’s post-revolution arrangements and the victory that was achieved from its point of view and that of its allies, especially the Iranians, to whom it owes its survival.

According to this political perspective, the religious factor is merely a servant of the regime, which is rearranged and adapted in a security and strategic manner in the interest of the regime and its allies after dissolving the restrictions of the pre-revolution majority.

The relationship between Arab political systems (or what is sometimes called “the state”) and religion took different forms in the light of the post-colonial state and the struggle for power, but some changes occurred in these patterns after the revolutions of the so-called Arab Spring with the expansion of the system of the guardianship of the jurist in the region (From Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq all the way to Syria), the Syrian religious scene in particular has become divided into 3 types:

The first pattern:

converting religion into a “tool” of the ruling power tools, and making structural adjustments to it to fully control it, and ensure that what happened is not repeated. The system includes the category of sheikhs who benefit from the system, whether to serve their personal interests (such as Hassoun) or to serve their advocacy groups (such as the Kaftaru groups and the Islamic Conquest Institute). Personal, but it does not constitute the ceiling of his aspirations. In this pattern, the arguments for defending the homeland, standing in the face of foreign and Zionist conspiracies, and protecting sectarian diversity (to justify sectarian and demographic changes) come to the fore.

The second type:

the religious opposition, some of which was based on armed conflict with the regime (such as the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood), and some of them left Syria to protect themselves from the regime (such as the Zayd group and the other sheikhs they seek refuge in), and therefore the opposition does not necessarily refer here to a revolutionary thought or action. However, it is benefiting - in general - from the revolution, and it wants to restore the historical influence of the scholars in the society that the sectarian regime of the Assad family has denied it from, which has lasted until now for nearly half a century.

In this pattern, the statements of revolution, opposition, and defense of religion, society, and the targeted religious identity are at the fore.

The third pattern:

Retirement to the regime and revolution alike, and this path was taken by a number of scholars and sheikhs, especially among academics such as Sheikh Nur al-Din Ater, may God have mercy on him and others.

The recent republican decrees that reorganize religious affairs fall within the first of the three types, and seek to:

First:

Nationalizing and taking over the debt directly through the Ministry of Awqaf; Represented by Muhammad Abd al-Sattar al-Sayyid Hassoun’s archenemy, in which Bashar al-Assad himself becomes a religious reference and theorist for the renewal of Islamic thought, and his ideas and perceptions become the subject of study and a source of inspiration, as it appears from the activity of the Ministry of Endowments, which is guided - religiously - with his guidance. Rather, the Minister of Awqaf prepared an interpretation that he called “the comprehensive interpretation” and made among its features “the refutation of Brotherhood and Wahhabi thought,” and that “the imams left us jurisprudential interpretations, not sects,” which is what al-Assad said previously. The second issue of the electronic magazine issued by the "Scholarly Fiqh Council" is an answer to the intellectual competition that was held on Bashar al-Assad's religious ideas! And I previously - in the study of "The Assad Regime, Mufti 2011-2012"- That she monitored the beginnings of al-Assad’s assumption of the religious position by defining the true religion of the sheikhs, and asking them to abide by his religious perceptions, a role that will grow later, up to this last decree.

Second:

Abolishing the position of Mufti is part of a broader policy of the regime and its Iranian allies (although Hassoun was close to them) related to rearranging religious affairs to keep pace with large-scale changes that occurred in Syria after the revolution, especially after the stabilization of the war 2018. In the past decade, the funeral process has been strengthened The invention of religious shrines (there is an item on the official website of the Ministry of Endowments under the title “Religious shrines” that has not yet been activated), and the establishment of dozens of Shiite schools run by Iranians or references affiliated with them, in which large numbers of young people have graduated, marriage institutions, relief institutions, and institutions Military attracts generations of young people and gives them many privileges. This led - and will lead - to a qualitative shift at the level of the sectarian and sectarian map in Syria after the revolution.

In this context, these actual changes had to be accompanied by an official framework that accommodates them. Thus, the insistence on the idea of ​​“sectarian pluralism” and a departure from “sects” to “juristic jurisprudence” entrusted to the “Scholarly Fiqh Council” that includes a number of Shiite sheikhs, Alawites, Druze and others is understood. It is true that the Ministry of Awqaf did not specify who the members of the council are or how many members of each component, but the photo published by the Syrian agency SANA and the website of the Ministry of Endowments clarifies part of the scene through the uniforms of those who appear in the photo, at least.

On the one hand, the decree appointing the "Scholarly Jurisprudence Council" and then the decree expanding its powers and abolishing the position of mufti import Lebanon's sectarian experience in an attempt to reward its sect and satisfy other sects in return for curbing the Sunni majority that has been fragmented. The abolition of the position of the mufti coincided with the opening of a College of Christian Theology in Damascus based on a decree issued in 2019, owned by the Melkite Greek Catholic Patriarch of Antioch and All the East.

On the other hand, Hassoun’s blunt exaggerations in the regime’s cajoling and the background of the conflict between him and the Minister of Endowments came as an appropriate moment to frame this change legally and officially. Note that the "Scientific Fiqh Council" exercised the powers stipulated in the last republican decree several months before its issuance. On March 14, 2021, the Scholarly Fiqh Council issued what it called a fatwa that March 15 is the first day of the month of Sha`ban for the year 1442 AH, and on the tenth of July 2021 The council issued another fatwa that Sunday, July 11, is the first day of the month of Dhu al-Hijjah, and that July 19 is the day of Arafa. This means that the powers stipulated by the republican decree issued a few days ago in November include issuing fatwas, “setting the dates of the beginning and end of the lunar months, seeking and proving new moons, and announcing the consequent legal rulings” is a foregone conclusion, and something that started early. !

Third: The

Iranian Shiite influence and its expansion within the Syrian government institutions included many and varied sectors such as finance, business, reconstruction, military, political and social fields, and the recent decree on the position of the Mufti is nothing but his crowning, but rather sparked controversy due to its sensitivity and clarity, and because it is linked to issues of religion, identity and the Iranian sectarian project in the region . Iran followed the same path in the countries that it controlled after it dismantled their societies and established sectarian frameworks and entities to guarantee its interests in them. Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen are shining models, especially as we know from General Ahmed Hamadani’s memoirs that Iran has a strategic plan for Syria consisting of several points, one of which is related to the religious issue. And when Hassan Nasrallah (the Iranian representative in the region) saw it in 2013, he saw it as too early to talk about the implementation of the religious aspect.

Fourth:

The clientelistic space that arose from turning religion into a mere political tool imposed itself in these changes, and here Assad cannot say no to the Iranians, because he owes them his survival and victory. a religious security institution, and he built a network of personal relationships; To the extent that he had a great influence on Sheikh al-Bouti since the beginning of the revolution until his assassination. As for Hassoun, he falls within the category of persons benefiting from the regime for personal benefits and he does not have a religious group that sponsors or supports its interests. He also succeeded during Bashar’s rule in forming security and economic alliances with Aleppo’s traditional merchants and from During his son's partnership with Rami Makhlouf - the president's cousin - whom Hassoun once described as a good man, and we know very well that the Assad family's relationship with the Makhlouf family has recently undergone drastic changes.

Let us now return to the second type of relationship with religion, which is the opposition, as I found it a golden opportunity to fill the void left by the new republican decree.

The matter began with the sudden appearance of a mysterious invitation on behalf of a “group of activists” that sent a “letter to the Syrian Islamic Council” inviting it to appoint a mufti for Syria, and it was presented after the last Friday prayer, and there are many clues indicating the arrangement of this from within the Council itself, most notably:

These are evidences that indicate the existence of political arrangements (where the factor of time and connections, and the output in a popular representational format is an important issue) that go beyond the Ministry of Awqaf, as well as the ways of thinking of the Syrian Islamic Council, which has always stirred controversy and division with its movements and statements, and then is forced every time to issue explanations to calm anger .

The designation of the new mufti, Sheikh Osama Al-Rifai, has several connotations:

The future of the position depends on two central matters: the first: the performance of the person holding it in terms of religious and jurisprudential functions (and this is its subject in principle), and the conviction of the Syrians about this after the current enthusiasm associated with a wave of anger against the regime as a result of its recent measures has diminished more than the conviction of the idea of ​​appointing the new mufti. Second: The ability of the one who undertakes fatwas to maintain respect for him, his legitimacy and popularity in light of the corruption of a number of sheikhs, and their subordination to the institutions of power here or there, and in light of the waves of openness and criticism available in the post-revolutionary era, meaning that he actually enjoys scientific and political independence by not being captive to authority or A group or group of alignments between the components of the Syrian Council, which has recently witnessed internal tension as a result of a dispute among its members over the position of the Turkish authorities regarding the intention of the Turkish authorities to deport some Syrians, and to be more open, in line with the aspirations of the new younger generations, and more relevant to reality.

But the negative factor in the whole matter is that Syria has become divided between a regime that is a front for its interests, groups and allies, and an external opposition, each of which speaks in the name of all Syrians or the Republic of Syria. It is considered “pluralistic and diverse” and it is false in this, because its main function is to get rid of the idea of ​​the majority that has bedeviled the Assad regime, the Iranians and Hezbollah in the past decade, while the Syrian Council presents itself as “Sunni” in the face of sectarian trends that want to abolish the Sunni identity. .

Although this would reassure segments of Syrians of their identity and reference, its future effects will be negative inside Syria and on the image and symbolism of the Syrian religious discourse in general, which will be divided between different and conflicting religious and ritual formulations and fatwas that may lead to the emergence of new forms of religiosity!