Hitting the “model” and the failures of the self.. the Islamists of Morocco are an example

The state of emancipation from the authoritarian regimes that the Arab world is experiencing continues to face increasing and understandable setbacks. These regimes are not easy to accept their exit from power and influence, and it seems that they are trying to adapt themselves to the demand for change that the Arab people wanted at the beginning of 2011, but the state of adaptation to these demands is not It necessarily means adopting it, but rather building a system of circumventing it as much as possible, as rough as it was in Egypt or soft as is happening now in some countries.

At the same time, the entry of Islamists into the arena of competition for power, as part of their natural quest to influence the progress of their countries, posed a challenge to the authoritarian or authoritarian system that wants to monopolize power, so some regimes uprooted these Islamists, or reduced their role in a way that voids their access to governments of its content.

With these experiences, several lessons emerge that can be learned, and I will try to focus in this article on the experience of the Justice and Development Party in Morocco.

Various Arab regimes have “crushed” or “excluded” Islamists from power by force of arms or persecution and marginalization, as happened in several Arab countries, and it seems that the Moroccan authorities sought to strike the idea of ​​an Islamic “model” that can make change and build the state in balance with the identity and aspirations of the people life and values ​​associated with freedom and social justice, through a balance that puts the Islamists of Morocco at the forefront of governance, while they do not have the strategic decision nor the real power

The challenge of the demands of transformation to freedom and the pursuit of a state of democratic change, while at the same time the conservative identity commitment of the Arab peoples, constituted a challenge to the Arab regimes, and a challenge to the Islamists themselves in their dealings with the authority and the aspirations of the people from them, which led to the people’s election to them.

This popular support and credit stems from 3 main pillars:

As far as these premises to support the Islamists, it seems that the state of the imagined absolute idealism of the Islamists’ role in power that the public in the Arab world imagined clashed with the complex reality experienced by the Arab countries and the lives of these Islamists, especially in their dealings with the authority and the existing or new Arab political systems.

While the strategy of Islamists in several Arab countries was that slow change through power or in power is the only way out of the state of tyranny or weakness in the Arab countries, it seems that this bet was not always successful, due to structural factors linked to the interests of the tyrannical elites, and to the nature of The state of political fanaticism, competition, and political apprehension experienced by other political parties and led to exclusion or, in the best case, suspicious or conservative cooperation.

This is in addition to regional and international factors apprehensive about the Islamists’ access to power and the model they could provide, not to mention the objective circumstances that impede any party reaching “power” in the context of major transformations accompanied by great challenges such as rebuilding the system and the state, as happened in the Arab world with the events of the Arab Spring. And we saw through what happened how the Islamists risked entering the battle for power after the Arab Spring with a situation of slack, economic crises and instability, in an effort to obtain legitimacy, for their ambition for power and at the same time because they felt that they had to sacrifice for the sake of their countries.

On the other hand, while various Arab regimes have “crushed” or “excluded” Islamists from power by force of arms or by persecution and marginalization, as happened in several Arab countries, it seems that the Moroccan authorities have sought to strike the idea of ​​an Islamic “model” that can make change and state-building in balance. With the identity of the people and their life aspirations and values ​​associated with freedom and social justice, through a balance that puts the Islamists of Morocco at the forefront of governance, while they do not have the strategic decision nor the real power.

This case of modeling through which the state seeks to do two important things: First, to put people in a state of feeling the existence of an “imaginary” political competition for power, followed by a “subjective” or “partial” assessment of the performance of these parties, in which it is not clear from It has failed and those who have failed, while the system that holds the real power remains far from and above this dispute.

And second, hitting the popular base of the Islamists (or whoever the authority wants to hit) in a way that makes them less able to bring about or lead political change, not to mention the erosion of popular trust around them.

There is no doubt that this policy will not necessarily deceive the people, but the problem lies in if the movement or the political party adopts an approach of “good faith” in the authority or “adopting the slow struggle”, and it continues to be a tool to achieve the system of influential authority to its end by striking it itself!

With the reality of the continued existence of authoritarian regimes in the Arab world, and the case of some elites and leaders who did not accept the concept of the transfer of power, but rather began to use various tools to circumvent the popular will and try to strike it, especially with regard to the experiences of Islamists in power in the Arab Spring countries, it is not permissible to turn a blind eye. About some of the mistakes made by these parties and led them to a path marred by political and popular decline.

It seems that this is what happened in the Moroccan case, and before continuing to analyze the other lessons learned from the loss of the Justice and Development in Morocco to the last elections, we must realize that there are non-external factors (outside the party or the state), linked in context, reality, and internal mistakes made by these parties. Because, whatever it is, it is not an innovation of the parties and movements that are going through challenges, and they have failures, incorrect decisions, and internal organizational problems that have led them to a political and popular decline. Their Islamic identity does not mean that they are free from error.

In this context and with the policy of “hitting the model” followed by the Makhzen in Morocco, there are several mistakes committed by the Islamists of Morocco that contributed to the success (at least partially) in softly undermining their electoral experience and loss, and there are several objective reasons that explain the loss.

In the context of these mistakes, the PJD was unable to work to change the existing system in Morocco, or at least challenge it clearly. He was handcuffed with regard to a number of decisions that seem to have been issued by the Makhzen, and in its quest for some gains, the party has repeatedly conceded in the face of these decisions. To lose the militant soul calling for change, and to become the object of reckoning because it has come to represent power, and this led to people feeling let down. If you enter the authority and make people delude its existence, and at the same time that you do not have power in its management, even in the aspect of living, and at the same time you do not withdraw from power or show the reality of this to your constituents and not seek to adopt another path, its consequences will be dire and you will have “betrayed” your voters, and raised A ceiling that she did not succeed in achieving, and as much as was the popular betrayal, followed by public punishment.

Secondly, the battle of principles, values, propositions and programs is a fierce battle between the difficult reality and your constituency, and mainly with yourself. The issue of normalization with the Israeli occupation and local affairs that the party raised for years, but repudiated it and retreated from it, rather supported its opposite, all in order to achieve some interests or legitimacy from The regime has turned against it, and the party has lost itself, its base and principles, to be a loss whose impact will continue for a while and harm the people's confidence in it and the entire Islamic trend.

Third, parties and movements with an identity proposition in identity-divided societies can succeed, but in less divided societies, identity proposition alone will not remain feasible, unless it is accompanied by success in managing power and in implementing these parties’ vision and ideological and value principles emanating from their affiliation.

Finally, regardless of the contexts and the reasons associated with them, there must be a conviction that Islamists are not heresy in performance, and they can succeed and fail in managing public affairs, and the public will punish them accordingly. performance and circumstances.

In the end, it seems that the state of change in the Arab world will not be easy and has dynamics of push and pull, and with authoritarian regimes not allowing change to happen easily and using soft and coarse tools to thwart the experiment, they also seek to break and strike the Islamic model that could pose a challenge to them. But the question remains, how can these Islamic movements escape from the jaws of the authority and its tricks and succeed in coping with internal and external obstacles, and this seems a challenge that will not be easy to deal with by these movements, especially since they had and still have significant popular support.