After the resounding fall of the Moroccan Justice and Development Party (Bijidi) in the elections of September 8, 2021, or its “dropping” as some like to call it, several interpretations and readings with different references appeared in the media, in which we did not find all of them who succeeded in presenting the appropriate problem of the topic, and who was asked the appropriate question whose answer approach will lead to an understanding of what happened and an anticipation of what is to come in the future.
In our opinion, all these readings fall under the heading of what we termed in this article as "the entrance to the external factors".
On the other hand, we present a new entry for a new reading, which we called the "self-criticism approach", based on reformulating the question posed in order to understand why the Justice and Development Authority responded to attempts to exclude it easily and in such a tragic picture?
The entrance to the external factors
This entry depends on the interpretation and understanding of the state of the “PJD” after the elections of September 8, 2021, on external factors, turning a blind eye to the subjective reasons, believing that the partisan entity was at its best, or at least it was not weak enough to make it fall into such a state. The unexpected picture.
In the sense that the party's organizational readiness was able to achieve better results, if it did not give it first place for the third time in a row.
This interpretation is based on invoking a number of external conditions.
Entrance to self-criticism
The approach we adopt to try to understand what happened calls for correcting the problematic issue. In other words, we stress the necessity and vitality of reformulating the question posed, in order to avoid any deviation from the topic, which will miss the opportunity for understanding and evaluation required in this case.
Therefore, the question that should be asked is not: Who brought down the Baijidi?
Or what are the methods and tools adopted by the opponents of the Baijidi to bring him down?
But the appropriate question for the situation under our understanding, and which should be asked, is: Why did Al-Bijidi not withstand the attempt to overthrow him?
Or why did the Bejedi respond to the attempted projection with such a dramatic image?
Al-Bijidi appeared in the battle for the elections of September 8, 2021, devoid of the elements of steadfastness and resistance.
Which was confirmed by his descent to the bottom in the form of free fall.
Or, let's say, his opponents knocked him down by a knockout, after which he was unable to put up any resistance.
If this party had lost dozens of its parliamentary seats, and similar chairs of the territorial councils, or rolled to the second or third place, the situation would be different.
And then we will understand that external factors intervened to remove him, but he showed considerable resistance towards them.
The first thing we need to focus on, then, in our view, is the completion of the appropriate process of formation. In our opinion, focusing on the first question is a kind of evasion from confronting oneself with burning and blatant questions, which would push towards providing answers that will lead to a kind of evaluation and self-criticism that will unveil severe imbalances and flaws, but will also refer to the required development of the partisan self. Accordingly, the real question that must be asked is: Why did the fall in such a dramatic way that no one expected? In other words, why did the Justice and Development not show any significant resistance to that overthrow? Has Justice and Development lost all or most of the elements of resilience in the face of attempts at exclusion or even eradication that never stopped?
The "utopian" idealism in the distribution of wealth, and in expressing the patriotic spirit through harsh policies on the party, is based, in our opinion, on a miscalculation of the power of the middle class and its ability to change the attitudes and attitudes of the weak and poor classes that benefit from the government's social policies.
These are, in our opinion, the real questions that must be asked, and not commenting "defeat" on denouncing the means and methods of opponents, both legitimate and illegitimate.
Political action, as it is well known, automatically leads to a conflict of interests, and it is not imaginable that political opponents will remain idly by, watching their castles crumble in succession, and their positions will be lost from them at every electoral entitlement.
The bitter truth is that al-Bijidi had the opportunity to participate in government for 10 years, but he did not take advantage of it to fortify his position in society, and to deepen his roots among Moroccans.
Which, in my opinion, is embodied in the following deductions and errors:
Rivalry with the middle class
Since the first government of Abdelilah Benkirane, Al-Bijidi has worked on what he called the equitable sharing of the country's wealth, so he directed towards the fragile and poor classes with unprecedented social programs, and continued to develop them until it ended in the form of the framework law for social protection, which will constitute a major social revolution in Morocco after the completion of its activation by The new government is at the end of its term.
But on the other hand, the justice and development governments made decisions that were difficult and painful for the middle class (pension reform, weak wage increases, regional recruitment...), ignoring the political impact of this on the party itself, and even underestimating it at times, as party leaders have always stated that they are ready to sacrifice the party from For the higher interests of the country, and that the popularity of the party based on the courtesy of certain social groups is undesirable, and does not deserve any attention from them.
This, in my opinion, is a kind of immersion in idealism or utopia separate from societal reality, as there are no parties in the free world that do not pay attention in their decisions to their popularity, or to increase the chances of them returning to exercise power again, no matter how noble their goals and policies are biased in the public interest.
This idealistic "utopian" tendency in the distribution of wealth, and in expressing the patriotic spirit through harsh policies on the party, is based, in our opinion, on a miscalculation of the power of the middle class and its ability to change the attitudes and attitudes of the weak and poor classes that benefit from the government's social policies.
The party did not actually succeed in estimating the power of the middle class in society, and did not pay attention to its centrality, and relied on rooting within the lower classes of society, and it miscalculated, as the middle class was able to form an anti-public opinion, and to build and spread a negative image of the Baijidi that convinced even those groups of its correctness. The fragile and poor that the party sided with in unprecedented social policies.
Rivalry with the conservative class
The conservative class in Moroccan society has always considered a vital extension of the Justice and Development Party by virtue of its issuance of the Islamic reference, and it considered it the best lawyer for the family, the issues of the Islamic nation, religion, the Arabic language and other elements of Moroccan identity, but it lost its support due to the weakness of its pleading according to its perspective on some These issues are at the station for discussing linguistic alternation in Law Framework 51/17 related to reforming the education, training and scientific research system, and in the case of the tripartite signature to normalize relations with "Israel", and during the ratification of the law on medicinal uses of the cannabis plant.
With these positions, Justice and Development has launched a fierce rivalry with the conservative class in Moroccan society, and lost one of its most important strongholds and a significant part of its electoral base, and deepened an internal rift between its members themselves, which was clearly manifested when the head of the parliamentary team suddenly resigned from his duties, and when the same leader resigned from the presidency The party’s parliament, as this also appeared in the form of a rebellion within the parliamentary team led by the well-known MP Al-Maqri Al-Idrisi Abu Zeid, in addition to the strong outputs of former Secretary-General Benkirane, which had a strong resonance within the party and the traditional electoral base for justice and development.
Rivalry with party frameworks
Prime Ministers Benkirane and Saad Eddine El Othmani, as well as a number of prominent party ministers, have always boasted about not enabling party cadres, including engineers, university professors, experts, and others, to reach positions of responsibility in administration and public contracting.
From this, they sought to highlight the party's Tehranism, integrity and impartiality in the service of the public interest.
In this context, they worked to empower frameworks from different ideological walks and even from other party affiliations.
This trend, on the one hand, created a state of anger and heartbreak among a wide range of party cadres and experts, because they were denied job promotion, not because of their incompetence, but because of their affiliation with the party, and the desire of the ministers and the prime minister to push back the suspicion and accusation of appointing those close to themselves, and on the other hand pushing This behavior of other frameworks from outside the party to refrain from joining it for fear of exclusion, marginalization and exclusion that their colleagues who belong to the Justice and Development have met.
Rivalry with the media
The party assumed the responsibility of the Ministry of Communication in the first government, and continued to lead the government for two terms, but it did not invest intelligently in media and communication, except for well-known party mechanisms, and was also unable to build bridges of cooperation, friendship and trust with media professionals and journalists, in addition to creating a special media pressure force. with this party.
The Justice and Development Foundation was based on the exceptional communicative ability of former Secretary-General Benkirane, who was dragging behind the website and the party Facebook page, and did not pay attention to accomplishing the required.
The party slept “in honey,” as they say, and when it woke up from its slumber after Benkirane got off, it found itself outside the worlds of media and communication.
Perhaps the crisis of Adalah Media today is one of the main headlines of that failure.
The party did not make any effort during the 10 years of the measure to consolidate its foot within the artistic family as an influential force in society, except for its nomination of the artist representative Yassin Ahjam in the parliamentary term of 2011, and what the latter did regarding the artist’s law, although many artists expressed their sympathy with the party And their support for him, especially during the mandate of Benkirane government.
As for the rivalry that will take a long time to overcome, Benkirane attacks the media in a way that no political leader has ever understood and appreciated the vital function of the press and the media in political life, when he described them with slanderous descriptions, and underestimated their value and their ability to create an influential public opinion.
I think that Benkirane, who is a media person and a distinguished communicator, did not succeed this time in managing the conflict with a media body that had been completely co-opted in favor of a certain party whose political ingenuity he felt was a sweeping force that was inevitably coming.
Also, the current “Osmani” Secretary-General did not invest well in the capabilities that were allocated to him as prime minister to consolidate the relationship with the media body. Rather, he notes that he worked with a kind of deadly “hobby” in this field, which caused him to make influential communication errors, which have plagued him throughout his tenure, It had a bad impact on his image in the collective imagination of Moroccans, and on their attitudes towards his person and his government policies alike.
Rivalry with artists
The party did not make any effort during the 10 years of the measure to consolidate its presence within the artistic family as an influential force in society, except for its nomination of the artist representative Yassin Ahjam in the parliamentary term of 2011, and what the latter did regarding the artist’s law, although many artists expressed their sympathy with The party and their support for it, especially during the mandate of Benkirane government.
But the fatal mistake, unfortunately, that inaugurated a new stage of the quarrel with the artistic family, was the one that Benkirane made in his last exit when he considered them mere mercenaries offering publicity to those who pay the price, inflicting great moral damage on them.
Rivalry with political parties
I always ask myself this question: Why do all parties of all kinds scramble for justice and development?
If you ask this question to any member of the Baijidi, he will answer you simply that the reason is his difference with them in the way of political action that contradicts their self-interest, or because most parties lack their political decision and comply with the instructions of some parties.
I may well understand it, or believe it contains a good deal of truth.
But another question confronts me, which is: How long will this situation continue?
Is it not possible to invent compromise solutions that guarantee this party a normal life among the rest of the political actors?
Is al-Bayjidi always right in the policies he proposes while others are wrong?
Despite all that, al-Bijidi made many mistakes towards the rest of the parties, especially when he addressed them with a harsh speech that categorized them with the "demons".
I do not think that a "large" party in Morocco has not had its share of the attacks and "attacks" of Al-Bijidi.
Even when one of them strives to approach him, he encounters great opposition and resistance, either from the leadership, or from the general membership.
Unfortunately, this tendency to exaggerate self-glorification and belittle others is common to the generality of the so-called political Islam.
For all this, I think that the stage requires deep thinking to devise appropriate answers to those burning questions. Otherwise, the isolation of this party will deepen and continue, unfortunately.
The inability to gain the full confidence of the system
The party, especially Benkirane, has always been keen to send messages of reassurance to the regime, so that it often seemed more royalist than the king, but the party has always remained the focus of apprehension and fear due to the mistakes that Benkirane himself has been making by sending “vague” messages, imbued with much populism. excessive.
Letters understood as a kind of duplicity of discourse that could be more than interpreted, and an expression understood as a kind of "manifest" regarding the party's role in maintaining stability during the democratic spring revolutions.
Therefore, what is required today is to work on a clear and institutional discourse towards the system and the monarchy, based on clear contracts, whose legitimacy derives from the constitution itself.
A clear, uncluttered speech that is not open to negative interpretations.
Inability to normalize relations with businessmen
The party made many and qualitative efforts in this direction, and the Moroccan enterprise of all kinds benefited a lot from it, but that class and that field remained reluctant to establish the liberal parties’ feet in it for a long time.
Conclusions and suggestions
I do not think that overcoming the state of downfall that the party is living under today will be done only by presenting a new political thesis, despite its necessity and importance, nor by calling Benkirane to lead the party again, or by referring the founding generation to retirement and replacing it with young leaders.
It is true that the renewal of the leadership is required while preserving continuity, and that a political thesis appropriate to the stage is urgent to frame the political action of the party, but before all that, or with it, attention must be given to devising appropriate answers to overcome the disputes and defects referred to previously, and to achieve the required reconciliation with components of society It has its weight and influence in making public opinion and mood.
Justice and Development today, we believe, needs a quiet session with oneself, in which he re-reads his experience in managing public and local affairs, away from the pressures of the moment of electoral defeat.
A session in which he directs his intellectual effort to the self, its components, and its adopted policies.
I personally believe that he is called today to make a qualitative theorizing effort on the subject of reference and the methods of activating it on the ground.
In this context, it is necessary, in my estimation, to get rid of the pressure of traditional models in management and governance, as well as openness to modern models of good governance, and the management of the battles of peaceful transfer of power.
I believe that a qualitative effort and also a distinct boldness are required today to rid the Party of the state of "bipolarity".
Qutb Benkirane and Qutb Othmani.
One of the things that have exhausted and weakened the party in a terrible and unprecedented manner is the trap of this false bipolarity.
Al-Bijidi derives his strength and distinction from the reformist idea that he embodied, and the noble values that he is imbued with, but when he turned from them to centering on people, he lost his attractiveness to a wide range of silent members of his.
In my opinion, the two people together should get off the locomotive quietly and give way to a new leadership with a new thought and a new approach that transcends the aforementioned disputes, and brings the party out of its deadly isolation, and not only with a new political thesis.