Islamic political parties between spring and autumn

Many have written about the decline of political parties with an Islamic reference at the present time, whether in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco or Yemen.

Almost the dominant feature of what was written is that they are writings outside the context of the political game or political dynamics, whether local, regional or international, on the one hand, and on the other hand, they are writings outside the general framework of these parties. This is not a mistake in itself, but it often does not address the picture from all its parts, and the writer may fall into a subjective evaluation as a result of his ideological motives or personal desires; Consequently, most of these writings became more like a political or intellectual debate, and their purpose was merely to respond and invalidate the opinion of opponents. They are writings - according to Abed Al-Jabri - "Responses and Responses to Responses." Knowledge was the victim.

These parties fall within the framework of the human experience that hits and errs, advances, delays, wins and fails. Describing these parties as Islamic or with an Islamic reference does not mean that they are infallible and sanctified. Imagining that the Islamic project is protected from heaven, or that it carries a sacred stick for change, or is capable of transcending the limits of reasonable;

A misplaced conception, and its owner falls unknowingly in the infallibility of thought and the sanctity of human discourse.

Some of these parties tried to separate the political party and its political entitlements, and the advocacy group and its advocacy duties in concept and practice, but this was not sufficient as long as the awareness of the electoral blocs is far from the tense and accelerating political reality of its coercion.

These parties came for the sake of identity and defending Islamic values ​​and principles that were almost extinct following the extinction of the Ottoman Caliphate that carried it. They had justifications and justifications for their establishment and establishment, and they continued to gain their legitimacy and expansion in their society based on these justifications.

Its intellectual visions and political slogans developed and declined from one stage to another, from the call for the caliphate state (Rashid Rida), to the establishment of the concept of the Islamic state (Hassan al-Banna, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and Abdul Wahhab Khalaf). Khomeini), then the civil establishment of the Islamic state (Al-Ghannouchi, Al-Turabi, Al-Qaradawi, Muhammad Emara and Muhammad Mahdi Shams Al-Din), then came the stage of calling for the civil state, which is the stage of restoring rationality and political realism by starting from the civil political national meeting, while the previous launch was from within the religious meeting. .

This latest development and its entitlements - which is a positive development calculated for the Islamic political parties - was not accompanied by a development in the societal popular awareness that embraces these parties;

The masses affected by the Islamic rhetoric and sentiment have not yet realized the extent of the political constraints of these parties that entered power, so they have been accused of treason, apostasy on their principles, political stupidity, or loss of strategic sense.

Some of these parties tried to separate the political party and its political entitlements, and the advocacy group and its advocacy duties in concept and practice, but this was not enough as long as the awareness of the electorate blocs is far from the tense and accelerating political reality of its compulsions. The meaning of his saying: “If the Arabs had been given the choice between two states: secular and religious, they would vote for the religious state and go to live in the secular state.”

Here the nation and the parties before it need thinkers who carry the torch of enlightenment in society, among the masses and within the parties, who, according to Muhammad Khatami, lay the social and political rules on the basis of logic and interest.

frenzied media campaign

The low societal awareness was accompanied by an unjust media campaign - sometimes from within the Islamic rank - accusing the Islamic parties of disavowing what they were striving for.

Here, these parties fell into the trap of misinformation, and before them the masses;

Today’s media is very different from yesterday’s media, as the latter was elitist, while today’s media is populist, and the ordinary street man has turned into a media man who owns his Facebook page, YouTube channel, tweets on Twitter, and followers.

The picture today, as Abdel-Fattah Moro says, changes the convictions of entire peoples, while the Friday sermons that he has been giving for years have not changed anything.

Madeleine Albright, the US Secretary of State under President Bill Clinton, described CNN as the sixth member of the Security Council;

Given its global influence and influence, it is clear what Al Jazeera has done in contributing to raising awareness and mobilizing the street in the Arab Spring revolutions.

Islamic parties today need to change their view of the means of communication and influence;

Communication is no longer unilateral, so the rule of Ben Ali, Mubarak, Ali Saleh, etc., continued for decades, as long as the media is a single television channel that addresses the people.

Today, the Internet, Facebook and Twitter have become a strong competitor to satellite channels, and most young people have become correspondents in their pages, channels, and tweets.

Today, the media has become a dialectical and dialogue relationship between the media and public opinion. This relationship explains many international transformations, including the Arab revolutions, for example.

The Brotherhood of Egypt was accused of (the brotherhood of the state, the state of the Brotherhood), and the truth is that neither the state nor the Brotherhood entered the state.

This became clear later on after the "coup of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi."

And the accusation of normalization that pursued the Moroccan Justice and Development, even though it is a royal sovereign decision.

The question here is: Could the Justice and Development Party have rejected this decision?

If we assume that the answer is yes, then it is certain that the party will pay an expensive bill, the first of which is the creation of a confrontational relationship with the king and state institutions in Morocco (the Makhzen).

The Islamic parties did not keep pace with this development and media diversification. Rather, they delayed a long time and gave way to their opponents, leaving them to devour her body until the wounds bled, unconcerned and indifferent to the consequences of this deadly weapon.

Ruling after the revolution is expensive

One of the reasons for the decline of Islamic political parties is that they came to power after the revolution, that is, after the roof fell on its residents, which requires building the state and achieving the aspirations of the masses, in addition to confronting the wave of the counter-revolution. This has cost the ruling Islamic parties a lot.

It inherited countries without an army, no media, and no central bank.

In addition to waiting for the masses to achieve their aspirations.

The success of the revolution is not just the fall of the regime, or, as Mandela says, "not just pulling the trigger, but a movement aimed at establishing a society of justice and equity."

This meaning is confirmed by Al-Monsef Al-Marzouki, who says, "The empowerment phase will not succeed without radical changes in our values, in our mentalities, and in our political and social institutions."

This heavy legacy inherited by the Islamic parties burdened them, in addition to a powerful wave backed by money, weapons and international resolutions directed against these parties to bring them down and thwart them.

deep state incursion

One of the reasons for the decline of Islamic parties is the incursion of the deep state, and the deep state - according to the American historian Creek Cranden - is: a hidden, conspiratorial government, deep in the bowels of the state, represented by centers of power that work against national interests.

The most prominent center of power in the deep state is the strength of the army;

Arab regimes were founded mainly on the strength of the army, not the strength of the masses.

Thus, the militarization of the state takes place, and the political role of the military institution is overridden.

If the army in many Arab countries represents (the army of power), there is another image represented by (the authority of the army), when the army splits the stick of obedience to the authority and rises above it, hence the phenomenon of military coups, by which Arab societies are known.

In the second picture, the image of (the army’s authority), the military turns into politicians and civilians, and then a ruling military elite appears, called Yazid Sayegh (the officers’ republic), which administers power in two ways, according to Abdelilah Belkeziz: Either it runs directly through an explicit military rule, Or run it from behind a curtain by putting a fictitious political figure in the forefront, and holding the keys to the decision by the great generals who are the only ones who are responsible for the solution and the contract. In both cases, the forms were many, and the ruling was one.

As a result of the equation of (the army of power) or (the authority of the army) in the Arab countries, the state of law and law has been absent, constitutional institutions and civil society formations have been eliminated, and the political and intellectual elites that struggle to popularize and deepen the democratic spirit have been absent and marginalized, in addition to preventing or besieging organizations and unions. And the failure of political parties in all fields of life. As a result of the army’s interference in the political, cultural and social life in Arab countries, the army’s relationship with the political sphere will remain a turbulent and existing one, its work in the cracking of the Arab political sphere, until the success of the Baath movement, the renaissance and progress in these societies in the birth of a modern civil state.

In front of the power centers of the deep state (the army, money and the media), the ruling Islamic political parties failed, and this failure was the result of the strength and cunning of the deep state, accompanied by the weakness of the Islamic parties when they handed their noose to these forces, whether they realized this or not;

There are many reasons, one failure.

Arab Restricted Democracy

One of the reasons for the decline of these parties is the restricted Arab democracy. Democracy, although it is the best human experience to manage conflict and rule the masses, the democracy of the Arabs applies to the words of the American poet Ungar, “whore democracy.”

Democracy came to the Arab region by a political decision and authoritarian preference and in the almost absolute control of the tyrannical ruling elites in the democratic arena. It was not a mass conviction like the case in the West, where the democratic approach was preceded by a wide and comprehensive enlightenment movement, which later paved the way for democratic regimes in which citizenship rights developed, Gradually, until I reached what I have reached today of sophistication and attendance. Consequently, Arab democracy will not bear fruit and eat until it is embodied in awareness as a culture before it is a political tool, meaning that it emanates from the bottom up, and from the base to the pyramid, not the other way around.

One of the reasons for the decline of these parties is the weakness of political practice. They were moderately trained to deal with complex issues and situations. They are parties that originated with advocacy motives, and gradually developed towards politics, until the events of the Arab Spring came and the accompanying rise of these parties through their broad mass base, and suddenly they found themselves in the ruling chairs and the dome of Parliament, and emerged from under the rubble - as Jassim Sultan says - bare-chested in the face of enormous challenges

Perhaps the Islamic political parties were deceived by the luster of Arab democracy, in which the tyrants believed only in order to monopolize it and with constitutional and democratic tools to renew several mandates for them in power. The candidate for succession should be a relative, so that the president's "family of the house" would have a reserved place at the center of the state. If these authoritarians and tyrants leave the "window" of the revolution, they return from the "door" of the deep state and the counter-revolution.

The penetration of the deep state and the entrenchment of tyranny in the joints of the state were not taken into account by the ruling Islamic parties, or they did not deal with that in its natural size, so they ruled without rule, and dominated without authority, so they did not have anything from their decision;

Neither the media nor the army nor the money are in her hands, on the contrary, she inherited an army that turned against her, a central bank without reserves, and a media without control, rather it is directed against it, rigged elections, and a blockage of the political horizon.

Weak political practice

One of the reasons for the decline of these parties is the weakness of political practice. They were moderately trained to deal with complex issues and situations. They are parties that originated with advocacy motives, and gradually developed towards politics, until the events of the Arab Spring came and the observed rise of these parties through their broad public base. And suddenly they found themselves in the ruling chairs and the dome of Parliament, and emerged from under the rubble - as Jassem Sultan says - bare-chested in the face of enormous challenges.

A politician is not enough for his personal characteristics and psychological readiness. Rather, he needs professional political training, a political environment and leadership styles. He masters the core of the political game (the exercise of power, authority and influence), and has a background in the psychology of the masses and the culture of society, and in building local, regional and international relations. While emphasizing that good intentions may lead to successive defeats if the politician does not make good use of the rules of the game. Although Al-Hussein bin Ali, may God be pleased with him, had a good intention, he and those with him were defeated, and he made a systematic error in his assessment of the readiness and strength of his followers in Iraq.How many well-intentioned Islamic political parties in some personalities, and the results were catastrophic, and the relationship of the Yemeni Islah Party with President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi is a witness to this. Mohamed Morsi’s intention in the political Abdel Fattah is a witness to this, as well as the Ennahda movement with Qais Saeed when they lined up with him in the second round of the 2019 elections.

The weak political performance of the Islamic parties made them lose many of their fans, and their popularity declined. This decline was exploited by the Houthis in Yemen against the Islah party, just as the Makhzen in Morocco exploited the decline in the popularity of Justice and Development, and the same happened in Tunisia;

Qais Saeed does not have the strength that would enable him to stand in front of the Renaissance, had he not taken advantage of the decline of the Renaissance to be strengthened by this decline against the Renaissance itself.

This weakness was accompanied by the cunning of night and day by the deep state. The Makhzen in Morocco, for example, has a great and not insignificant experience in taming parties, and it is a strong experience that a party that has no real struggle balance and a political age of a little more than 10 years can win (the Authenticity and Modernity as an example).

From this cunning, the deep state can present poisonous gifts to the parties in the form of files that are the cause of their death or illness.

These are the main reasons that led to the decline of Islamic parties, and this does not mean that there are no other parties in the structure of these parties. In addition to the above, there are administrative and organizational problems, problems in the selection of candidates and the centralization of decision-making, and differences that reach the point of conflict and media exchanges between the cadres of these parties that were not contained. , and other reasons.