Four problems posed by the experience of the Arab Spring to the Islamists, and the Tunisian lesson came to re-emphasize them.
First: Islamists and the question of democracy
Since the Islamists' escalating entry into the political sphere in the mid-1980s, they have been asked questions related to issues of democracy, public and individual freedoms, and the position of women and minorities, especially religious ones, within the framework of citizenship. They gave multiple answers in this regard, and their main objective was to try to reconcile Islamism - in its intellectual and legal senses - and democracy. The experience of the Tunisian Ennahda movement represented the “model answer” in this regard, but the experiences of Egypt (2013) and Tunisia (2021) may raise the question of the feasibility of entering and committing to this path or the feasibility of the entire democratic issue.
It is noted in this regard that the Egyptian experience in which the Brotherhood’s response has taken 3 approaches: the first is violence on a political - not religious ground - and it was an exception that extended for limited years, and the second is an attempt to restore the January revolution again, and the third approach is the most important - because it has What seems to be the prevailing response - it proceeds from pacifism, and is trying to restore the democratic path once again. I reviewed some of the discourses of Muslim youth from Egyptians abroad about their vision of the Tunisian crisis, and I found that the mainstream views it from a political and not ideological/identities perspective, that is, not Islamist/secular. This does not mean that there are no voices looking at the crisis on the grounds of identity, but it is marginal. Their perspective was also characterized by maturity and the ability to pick up the mistakes in which the Renaissance occurred; The attitude of young women and Islamic youth towards the Egyptians, which needs to be followed up, and I have dedicated a separate article to it because of the future importance it represents for the Islamists’ relationship with democracy.
Here, it may be useful to discuss Ennahda’s position on the crisis, as it also supports the crystallization of the position of the Egyptian Islamists and in the region as a whole, where 3 things are noted: the emphasis on the need to resume the democratic path and return to constitutional legitimacy, and the second is the escalating voices calling for self-criticism and apology to the Tunisian people and the resignation of the leadership responsible for That (compared to the Egyptian case, this discourse has been absent, and if you find some of its vocabulary, it was very late and lacked credibility), and the third and last is not to engage in a wide-ranging confrontation with the authority of Qais Saeed, unlike the Egyptian case.
One of the characteristics of this discourse is that it separates from classes, in the sense that it is not aware of class contradictions and does not occupy any weight in its priorities.
It is in its nature that it penetrates all classes with a desire to express the whole society, and as Wael Gamal sees in his paper “Lost Capital” that “these movements claim to represent the whole of society, and they avoided all approaches that might highlight class differences or social conflicts
Second: Islamists and the social issue
It is also noted that the increasing entry of them into the political sphere has raised questions of freedoms of all kinds, but the questions related to the social/economic issue that the left was expected to insist on were not raised with the same force, perhaps because the left has weakened and witnessed radical transformations since the fall of the union The Soviet Union in the late eighties of the last century, and a significant segment of it allied itself with the tyrannical regimes in an existential confrontation against the Islamists, seeing that its main contradiction is with them and not against the regimes, despite the neoliberal projects that those regimes carry in opposition to the left’s bias in this matter.
Here is a note worthy of consideration, that Islamic intellectual production regarding the social issue stopped with the “socialism of Islam” by Al-Sabai in the mid-sixties, and that the programs of the Islamic parties - as many studies confirm - were dominated by the neo-liberal tendency, but the explanation for the weakness of the social component in their practice Which deserves to stand in front of it for a long time, and I presented in an article an exemplary explanation for this weakness based on 5 elements, namely:
1. Advocacy discourse
One of the characteristics of this discourse is that it separates from classes, in the sense that it is not aware of class contradictions and does not occupy any weight in its priorities.
It is in its nature that it penetrates all classes with a desire to express the whole of society, and as Wael Gamal sees in his paper “Lost Capital” that “these movements claim to represent the whole of society, and have avoided all approaches that may highlight class differences or social conflicts. This relative blocking has historically allowed The Brotherhood [and its offshoots of movements] could be a magnet for groups with discordant interests, which enabled these movements to attract diverse individuals.” However, at the same time, it made it fail to express its electoral base, which was mainly concentrated in the middle and lower classes, which lost it its popularity.
2. Advocacy discourse freed from the social ground and existing material relations
The scourge of opposition politics in the region is that it is of a preaching cultural nature.
It does not move on a social ground that seeks to change the balance of political and economic power and dismantle the structure of tyranny, exploitation and corruption.
Ethical discourse: the moral discourse transcends or squanders the talk about the social, political, economic, and even cultural structures that produce poverty, discrimination and class contradictions in society.
Therefore, there is no talk about public policies, especially if it is accompanied or mixed with talk about charity, alms and zakat.
Charitable work - in one of its aspects - alleviates social contradictions without changing the elements of economic power and wealth in society. In many Arab regimes, it has turned into an “unwritten” understanding with Islamists by allowing them to mitigate the impact of the neoliberal policies that these regimes followed since The 1990s, in contrast, the Islamists gain a great deal of support and political influence, especially in elections.
Charitable work without changing the relations of power and wealth turns into a washing of sins, and sometimes a washing of reputation and money, and leads to dealing with social justice not by redistributing wealth, but through its mechanisms that lead to the continuation of what exists.
3. The paradoxical organization of its membership
The preservation of the organization has turned into a goal in itself, as it is the sacred tool whose mission is to achieve and implement Islam, and although many studies explain why Islamists spread in specific social segments of the middle and lower classes, the prevailing organizational culture - which draws the nature of the relationship between the individual and the group - It makes the organization a paradoxical tool for its members with their pluralism and their social and economic contradictions; As the individual does not have an independent existence within the organization, rather all aspects of his life are controlled through what is called education, and here is one of the major paradoxes; At a time when Islamists in power pursued neoliberal policies that revolved - in one of their philosophical foundations - around belief in the individual's abilities and capabilities for realization; The individual existence within the organization is crushed by multiple mechanisms.
It deepens the overcoming of social contradictions that the organizational consideration requires more continuous recruitment of members, which means an expansion of the joined social strata and groups. However, it is also paradoxical that this sacred organization separates from membership and even the people themselves [See an explanation of this point in Mahmoud Hadhoud: Brotherhood Ideology in Choosing the Revolution, in the book Self-Criticism of the January Revolution, issued by Dar Al-Maraya, Cairo last year] His ideological orientations are reduced to a limited number of temple guards called the leadership - or the founding fathers - which turns into an absolute, undefined entity possessing full knowledge of the interest of the organization And its members too, and they have a great willingness to confiscate internal democracy under arguments and claims based on the monopoly of their knowledge of the organization’s interest (consider Ghannouchi’s behavior in this regard).
4. A vague ideology mixed with pragmatism
The ideology based on the Brotherhood thesis is characterized by a number of features. Although it is based on the reference of Islam as a religion, the religious framework has always and always carried multiple aspects of interpretations and interpretations that often reach contradiction and competition among its followers. It is still taking place in the region now revolving around the multiple patterns of religiosity in society and in the region;
Especially that behind it there is a momentum of internal and external institutions, interests and connections.
The nature of the ideology emanating from religions is that it is open to various interpretations and interpretations, and interacts in a variety of ways with the contexts in which they move, and religious statements are used to justify choices and socio-economic biases, and in many cases the biases are adjacent without a sense of contradictions between them, where you find signs of social justice with a belief in the market free at the same time.
I understand the identity discourse in the context of the social issue as a way to civilized distinction and its ability to produce an independent development pattern (not only in its economic dimension, but also in its component and philosophy on which it is based) that rejects voracious consumerism and market principles as guiding values for our whole life, but I claim that without this Emancipation will not solve the social issue and we will not be able to bring about development.
The Brotherhood thesis, with its multiple formations throughout its extended history, has been keen not to choose specific economic, social or political policies unless it is compelled, as it has become aware of itself as an independent party outside society and the state and carries abstract ideas without social implications. Choosing specific policies, and she was not ready for this stage, so her faults became apparent and her bad ones became apparent.
Combined with this characteristic, practice is what defines the ideology of Islamists in general. Therefore, one of the methodological errors is that researchers have the ability to analyze texts without following practical practice. The practice of Islamists - in many cases - precedes the theoretical vision, and this makes the Islamic idea - for them - an empty, vague container with no specific content, and leads to their being affected by the contexts in which they work. In which. This has resulted in their ability to adjust their ideological positions to keep pace with the changes that are taking place.They moved (or more accurately, coexisted and coexisted) from Islamic socialism to capitalism to neoliberalism, and from anti-partisanship to belief in liberal democracy, and every time this was justified by religious sayings, but this led them at the same time to appear pragmatic, so their neoliberal policies cannot be explained. After 2011, except by their search for Western acceptance, and the illegal courtship of the big business class from the Mubarak and Ben Ali era, despite presenting themselves as patrons of the poor in the absence of the state (as Khalil al-Anani sees).
Neoliberalism - according to al-Anani - is what links Islamists to the outside world and the global economy, and I add that it also links them to local elites who are keen to deal with them because of their economic and political influence.
Herein lies the great paradox.
A large part of the Arab uprisings was a protest against the neoliberal policies of these regimes and the networks of privilege that arose under them, but the Islamists in power followed the same policies;
What led to their mass isolation made it easy for them to be besieged, protested, and eventually beaten.
5. The Predominance of Protest vs. Presentation of Policies
This feature does not pertain to Islamists alone, but extends to all Arab opposition forces in the pre-Arab Spring period. The regimes deprived them of the mere imagination of reaching the seats of power, and the uprisings in 2010-2011 surprised them, as they surprised everyone.
The matter was aggravated by the Islamists by depriving them of holding any significant positions in the state apparatus or their staying in exile for long periods, so they did not understand the meaning of the state and how its apparatus works, and they did not know the society from which they were absent for a long time, and they acted - in many cases - while they were ruling with the logic of the party. exhibitions or according to the mechanisms of civil society.
Conclusion: When the Islamists came to power, they did not have solutions for how to deal with the chronic problems of their countries, and they lacked a coherent socio-economic strategy.