Possibility for manipulation

But the Americans could have succeeded in Afghanistan. By itself, the plan of action for the spring of 2020, when the first really significant rumors began to leak out about full-scale negotiations with the "Qatari office" of the movement, which is considered a terrorist organization in Russia, looked, though not very elegant, but quite realistic. The Americans leave safely, leaving behind a seemingly powerful army and special services, without much noise transferring weapons and military equipment to friendly factions among the Taliban *, maintaining contacts at the level of shadow players (including special services) in charge of various specific areas of business, including drug trafficking, on which during the American presence have made hundreds of billions of dollars.

The Taliban, in "gratitude", agree to a "transitional government" and "inclusiveness", inherit at least part of the army and the apparatus of the special services and state administration.

And most importantly, they clearly indicate that their main interest is expansion to the north and east and settling scores with national minorities, which would shift instability away from directions dangerous for the United States, primarily Pakistani.

The best cadres of American diplomacy and special services, led by the most cynical American political manipulator Zalmai Khalilzad, who knows a lot, James Cunningham, were sent to reach an agreement with the Taliban.

Well, one can only guess about the participation of representatives of the venerable CIA, although William Burns, a competent diplomat and intelligence officer, was even noted formally in this story.

The results confirm this: the US-Taliban accords of 2020 were already in fact an agreement on the transfer of power to the Taliban.

But in a format acceptable to the United States and without the extremes that accompanied the "first coming".

And this, in essence, suited everyone, including the Taliban themselves.

It is enough to look at how the extremists have been strenuously correcting and correcting their image, diligently reproducing the American agenda, from women's rights to caring for national minorities.

So far, only ecology is lacking, but I think it's just a matter of time.

In other words, the situation in Afghanistan was supposed to show the world a new "human face" of the Taliban movement, which in part happened.

This is quite noticeable from the international reaction.

But there were two nuances.

Nuance first. In addition to the “human face of the Taliban,” a new face of America was revealed to the world, which hardly anyone liked. No, of course, there is excessive dramatization in the story of the flight of the Americans from Kabul, although the stories that dolls depicting living people falling off the landing gear were specially dropped from American planes should be treated with mournful silence, asking the question: "Why?" Yes, no deep tragedy for the United States happened either geoeconomically or politically. For now, anyway. But let's not forget that the US withdrawal from Vietnam, which ended two years before the “fall of Saigon,” which was included in the annals, became the source of a severe crisis for the United States, not because it had any economic consequences.And the very collapse of the South Vietnamese regime just turned out to be the cherry on the cake of America's social problems that have been growing since the late 1960s.

The Saigon catastrophe strengthened the Watergate effect, demonstrating the depth of the crisis of American statehood in the context of ideological confrontation with the USSR, which won a grandiose victory.

Only a very ideologically motivated person can deny the current internal crisis in the United States. And the crisis of the management system, although it has not reached the "watergate level", is approaching it. And therefore, let the "new face of America" ​​not be the icing on the cake, but it may well turn out to be a "taste enhancer" capable of determining the attitude towards the United States and its obligations not only in Asia (which is natural), but also in some places in Europe, so moreover, the helplessness of the European countries is even more evident. We would venture to suggest that it will sharpen the demand for an alternative ideology, for a component of the confrontation with the United States, which is currently absent from both China and Russia. And this is now completely not in the interests of the United States - they just lacked the ideological struggle, they were too accustomed to acting in conditions of an ideological monopoly.

The second nuance. The US allies in Afghanistan did not integrate into the new system of government, as it was supposed, but simply fled. And sometimes in the literal sense of the word. No, this is not about President Ashraf Ghani, who seems to be one of the most disgusting figures in modern history.

And even A.-R. Dostum and not living on interest from the memory of Masoud Jr.'s father. With them, everything was clear long before the start of the July-August collapse. But such people as Abdul Rahim Wardak (a person who is very alien to the CIA), Ali Ahmad Jalali (nominated already at the time of the complete collapse to the role of head of the transitional government, which was clearly a homework), Yunus Qanuni (who privatized the representation of national minorities) and an eternal participant any murky combination of globalized swindler Abdullah Abdullah should have entered the "transitional government." Which would be easily manipulated by the Americans.

And vice-president Amrullah Saleh, the only one in the completely decayed Kabul regime who had at least some military potential of his own, should have stayed afloat.

But the collapse was such that even these characters, who were supposed to guarantee the controllability of the American scenario for the transfer of power to the Taliban, rushed to hide in all directions.

And the "inverted front offensive" planned by the Americans, followed by strangling the Taliban in their arms and "channeling their energy" to the north and slightly to the east, turned into chaos at the Kabul airport.

From the unfortunate cunning plan of the Americans, we repeat, in its own elegant and strategic way, four main conclusions can be drawn, which, I think, will have great consequences.

First.

You can develop any political schemes and combinations and even institutionalize them through elections and other tinsel of globalization, but if the people have no connection with the elite, if society is loyal to the elite, the price for all these institutions, including dressed up special forces in jeeps, is a broken tanga.

Or a cent.

Or a penny.

Depending on the region.

The state is a constant interaction with society, multiplied by development, and not a heap of simulacra.

Even Americans cannot control real processes in today's world with the help of simulacra.

Second.

Americans retain the ability to develop and politically work out complex combinations in a format, if not a "big game", then close to it.

But they can no longer provide "field support" for these combinations at the same level of quality.

Affected by the too long period when they controlled the chaos with someone else's hands. 

But this also means a significantly greater degree of permissiveness for American special services field workers.

And this is a risk, including for Russian citizens.

The less begins to be obtained due to political and informational manipulations, the greater the need for more stringent measures, the faster they are used.

Especially when the "center" is a mess.

And, apparently, in the "center" of the Americans - a mess.

Third. Military power matters, but only when it is used within the framework of a “grand development strategy” in which the entire society feels a part. In principle, this thesis was proved by the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, but since then new illusions have appeared. Military power in the conditions of clan and political disintegration of society disintegrates with it, which we observed in the last 72 hours of the life of the Kabul regime. And no drones will help.

Fourth. The archaic, coupled with justice, becomes a completely competitive ideology, locally already defeating postmodernity, albeit an imitation one. But, alas, there is just a critical amount of such “imitation postmodernism” in the world. And there is a possibility that "Talibanism" in the modern version will be adopted by many forces, including those not related to Islam. And this will become a powerful global challenge, which cannot be avoided by Russia, and even more so by countries portraying its allies in Eurasia. 

The above, however, does not mean that the United States will not be able to return to its cunning plan in one form or another. If anything, they retain the main hook for engaging with the Taliban: international recognition. And it is like air necessary for the Taliban, and even more so for the partners of the Taliban in Islamabad and Beijing. And even more, the Taliban and their partners need the consolidation of power, the transformation of the movement from a coalition into a state, and this is unlikely to succeed without internal squabbles. That the last time the Taliban came to power, frankly, did not succeed. And the possibilities for manipulation are now quite open. And here the Americans are masters.  

I think we should compare the situation not with 1975 and the fall of Saigon, but with 1979 - with the anti-Shah Islamic revolution in Iran.

It was transformed through the use of now quite understandable technologies with the active participation of the Americans from anti-imperialist to anti-Soviet.

With clear consequences for our country.

One of them was the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in December 1979.   

* "Taliban" - the organization was recognized as terrorist by the decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of February 14, 2003.

The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.