Egypt was strongly present in Tunisia's political crisis, or rather its "unconstitutional coup", not in the chauvinistic sense that still controls some Egyptian elites as the most important and influential countries in the region, but in terms of the experience that can be drawn after 2013, and it was said that the "Ennahda" movement entered In the National Dialogue in 2014, benefiting from what happened to the Brotherhood in Egypt the previous year.

On the other hand, it can be said that the non-Islamic Tunisian elites have contributed to the formation of their awareness and position on the "Tunisian coup", which led to the Egyptian experience of extreme authoritarianism.

In other words;

The position rejecting the decisions of Tunisian President Kais Saied from some secular parties has contributed to the authoritarian nature of the Egyptian political system after 2013, and the outcome of the crisis in Tunisia will have repercussions on the awareness and awareness of a sector of Egyptian activists.

The 6/30 elite and the Tunisian crisis

Over the past few days, I have followed the position and evaluation of the symbols of 30/6 - who were opposed to the Brotherhood in power - of what is happening in Tunisia, and I have noticed that the terrible silence is predominant, as the event has been largely ignored despite the importance of its implications for the future of the Arab Spring and the depth of its impact on the Egyptian situation. And most importantly, from my point of view, it represents a historical opportunity for review and self-criticism of this trend, unless it dispenses with this review, which can be honestly said that the volume of what was written and written by researchers and Islamic symbols on evaluating the performance of Islamic political movements far exceeds what was written and written On evaluating the performance of the so-called civil currents in the Arab Spring.

We cannot offer any revolutionary advice or guidance to our sisters in Tunisia because we are going through a period of defeat, decline and isolation, and we must admit that

The Egyptian civil current has divided into 3 positions, which I think represent the main trends within it: the first is ignoring silence - as I presented - which is predominant; There is neither a blog nor a post, as if the event did not concern them from near or far, and the second position is to restore the state of polarization once again by showing the similarity between the position of the Renaissance and the position of the Egyptian Brotherhood. It was not the norm. It was a self-critical stance, and if he did not declare it, it helped him in this review process that although he emphasized Ennahda's bearing responsibility for the situation in Tunisia, his concerns about the future of the democratic path were the dominant or the most comprehensive perspective that evaluated It includes what is happening in Tunisia, with what this means from the ground on which it can be built to overcome the secular Islamic polarization towards a new polarization revolving around the position on democracy.

I think that what the Tunisian experience will end up with, and the positions of the various parties in it, can help give this thesis an impetus in the Arab region.

Morning and Khalil

What gives these two symbols the importance that their political currents have extensions in Tunisia, whether within parties or civil society institutions. But I imagine that their positions will be part of the general debate within these currents, which is what we note in Kamal Khalil’s post, which confirms at the beginning, “We cannot offer any revolutionary advice or guidance to our brothers in Tunisia” (because we) are going through a stage of defeat, decline and isolation, and we must admit that …” He proceeds from the Egyptian experience to put it in front of Tunisian activists “But what we can say is that there are repercussions that will definitely happen; Associated fallouts are like chain links."

The leftist leader - who entered into a severe confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood after they came to power despite the cooperation between his current and them before 2011, and entered the prison period of the current regime, enumerates the essence of this series aimed at building a new dictatorship that will revolve around the fight against terrorism "after the decline of The authority is in a fist; terrorist operations will begin, and the task (from the viewpoint of the new authority) will become: Confronting terrorist acts. Internal terrorism and against external interference.

This requires amending many laws. The right to demonstrate must be restricted, the right to strike must be confiscated, and new regulations for prisons and pretrial detention must be enacted...etc. This spiral will not set boundaries between terrorism and peaceful opposition, and this spiral will aim to liquidate political life and close the public sphere in the desert. And the key."

And we come to the most important point in his position, which is - in my view - the heart of the review and self-criticism process when he says, "You will not aim to ban a specific faction, but rather ban everyone." As for Mr. Hamdeen Sabahi - the former presidential candidate and one of the leaders of the Salvation Front 2013 - his position evolved between the first (July 26) and the second day's blog posts. In the first, his eyes were only on democracy, "My heart is with Tunisia - the revolution that survived all the revolutions of the Arab Spring, hijacked by the counter-revolution."

The democratic transition was thorny, but with all its shortcomings, it is easier and more secure than the monopoly of any party in power and the exclusion of the rest of the partners or parties. His second post went in the same direction as he set him on the democratic path, and an attempt to build a more structured position for the event. Tunisia, which is "at a crossroads", hopes it "will not drag it into a slippery slope," as he put it. Despite the ambiguity of the Tunisian position, it does not suggest that the reasons for the hope of avoiding the slide have a chance of success, which cannot be confirmed, "but it can be strengthened."

His position - as I mentioned - is determined by the future of the democratic path in it, as it is the last stronghold of the Arab Spring. But he builds it on 4 foundations: the first of which is the Tunisian people, who will not “barter the deserved livelihood for the deserved freedom. It is an important position from the perspective of the experience of Abdel Nasser 1954-1970, whose social contract was based on the barter between them, and the second is the existence of a sane and balanced civil bloc, and it is imagined that one of its poles will play The considered ones, the Tunisian Labor Union, played the role of mediator as it played before, which by the way is what the Egyptian experience in 2023 lacked - that is, the role of mediator, and third: it sees that “the experience of the revolution in Tunisia - unlike the Egyptian one - was characterized by its ability to coexist between the parties and the search for compromise solutions without Falling into the illusion of victory by knockout, which is what the Tunisian teams need now.

Finally, he criticizes the experience of Ennahda and offers it a number of advice, but not from the grounds of secular Islamic polarization, but based on a political calendar;

It "bears the greatest burden in the failure of the system of government, and it must recognize its responsibility, and most importantly, be aware of the lesson of the Brotherhood in Egypt; the repetition of the fourth tragedy in Tunisia is the bumpy slide that should be avoided, it is a waste of forbidden blood, a storming of the path of democratic development, and a severe blow to the only surviving revolution." So far, from the revolutions of the beleaguered Arab Spring.

Fischer and Daoud... Different Liberal Positions

Ezz El-Din Shoukry Fischer, the famous novelist and advisor to Beblawi, the Egyptian prime minister after the 2013 coup, and Khaled Daoud, a journalist in Al-Ahram and former head of the Constitution Party, give us two examples of the liberal stance on the Tunisian crisis.

The former had a clear and decisive position even before this crisis long time ago, when he said:

Al-Shobaki’s article reduced the problem to the responsibility of the Renaissance, as if it implicitly referred to the responsibility of the Brotherhood in Egypt, and the belief that what President Qais Saeed is doing is to renew the political system and remove the danger of the Renaissance. Represented by the Renaissance Movement and its allies.

In Tunisia, as in the case of its neighbours, autocracy is not the solution, describing the decisions taken by the Tunisian president as a “constitutional coup apparently aimed at replacing the fragile democratic system with one-man rule” and discussing through multi-level arguments and through the cases of Egypt and Saudi Arabia how “one rule might lead to to restore stability and achieve a number of short-term achievements, but it cannot solve the country's more entrenched problems."

While Fischer does not mention in his article the issue of Islamists, which he previously called for declaring coexistence between them and the secular for a quarter of a century, Khaled Daoud, with his participation in the article of his friend Amr Al-Shobaki, advisor at the Al-Ahram Center, which he published in Al-Masry Al-Youm, calls for secular polarization once again. .

Al-Shobaki’s article reduced the problem to the responsibility of the Renaissance, as if implicitly referring to the responsibility of the Brotherhood in Egypt, and the belief that what President Qais Saeed is doing is to renew the political system and remove the danger of the Renaissance. represented by the Ennahda movement and its allies. Without discussing fears of the possibility of reproducing dictatorship again, "the moment has come to renew the Tunisian political system and amend the electoral law so that the country can complete the path of building a state of law and democratic transition."

And so on; The different positions of the Egyptian elites towards the Tunisian coup need to draw detailed maps, because it is one of the future manifestations regarding the democratic issue and the secular Islamic polarization. And if in this article I am able to observe the secular trend in its position on the Tunisian crisis, however, following up on the position of the Islamists is extremely important, especially in terms of its ability to transcend the discourse of victimhood that can get stuck in it and never get out of it. This discourse - which is the most dangerous from my point of view - may cast a shadow over the position on the democratic issue, in other words, the position of the Islamists must be based on self-criticism that stems from what he called the narrative of the Arab Spring and not a review of the position on the democratic issue.