During the past few years, Ankara and Tel Aviv issued signs that their relations might improve without concrete results crystallizing for many reasons.

But what was recently issued - from Ankara in particular - indicates that the matter has become a matter of time, and it seems that "Israel" is more responsive this time.

Diplomatic relations between Turkey and "Israel" were frozen in 2010 following the latter's attack on the "Marmara" ship bound for the besieged Gaza Strip, and although the two sides normalized relations between them in 2016, they did not return to what they were before.

With the violent response to the return marches in Gaza and the transfer of the US embassy to Jerusalem in 2018, Turkey withdrew its ambassador from Tel Aviv and declared the Israeli ambassador persona non grata on its soil.

Since then, news has been leaked to the media about meetings between the two countries or the possible development of relations between them, without realizing this on the ground.

Signals

On the ninth of this July, Ankara appointed a cultural attaché in its embassy in Tel Aviv, for the first time in 11 years, that is, since the Marmara ship accident, which meant that culture and tourism may be the door through which bilateral relations will enter a new stage.

On July 12, that is, only 3 days after the appointment of the cultural attaché, the Turkish president called his newly elected "Israeli" counterpart, Isaac Herzog, congratulating him, and they discussed bilateral and regional issues, in which they emphasized that their two countries have "great potential for cooperation in various fields." According to Erdogan's tweet, he stressed in a second tweet that "continuing communication and dialogue with Israel - despite all differences of opinion - is of great importance."

For his part, Herzog said that he and Erdogan stressed that relations between the two sides "are of paramount importance to the security and stability of the Middle East region," and that they agreed to "continue dialogue in order to improve relations" between the two countries.

Given the formulations used by both sides, and the continuation of the 40-minute communication - as reported in the media - and being the first of its kind in years, it can be said that it is a clear indication of the imminent development of relations between the two sides - or at least - an indication of a clear Turkish desire in this direction. .

A spokesman for the ruling Justice and Development Party in Turkey, Omer Celik, said that the contact between the two presidents resulted in a "framework regarding the need to take steps" between the two sides regarding dialogue on contentious issues, as well as cooperation files such as trade and tourism, stressing that there will be "more concrete steps". with Tel Aviv.

In additional evidence, the new "Israeli" president participated in an exhibition on Turkish coffee organized by the new cultural attache in West Jerusalem, and said, "If we gather at one table with coffee, we can move our region to a better future through cultural cooperation and in various fields."

motives

In December 2020, news spread that Turkey had appointed its ambassador to Tel Aviv as part of a diplomatic appointment campaign, and some reports mentioned the name of the ambassador who had been chosen.

It was not done at the time, but it was understood that it was acceptable in principle for Ankara, and perhaps some technical details are pending between the two sides.

By searching for the reasons and motives for this Turkish change, it seems that the new US President Joe Biden is a common denominator for a number of regional developments that included Turkey and other parties.

This includes the hydration of Turkish-European relations, and Ankara’s endeavor to open a new page in its relations with a number of Washington’s allies, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, the UAE.

The occupying power is no exception to this, as there appears to be a conviction in Ankara that developing relations with the latter can ease tension with the White House, which is a priority for Turkey at the moment.

The file of the eastern Mediterranean has become a clear priority for Turkish foreign policy recently, and here two importance to Tel Aviv from Ankara’s point of view appear: The first is the possibility of demarcating the maritime borders with it, which will strengthen Turkey’s position in the face of Greece, especially since it still lacks partners in the issue, if What excluded its agreement with the Libyan Government of National Accord in 2019, especially since the course of developing relations with Egypt (and thus the possibility of demarcating maritime borders with it) seems slow.

As for the second importance, it is the disruption of the axis facing it in the eastern Mediterranean led by Greece, especially since the occupation is a fundamental pillar in this axis on the one hand, and it has an impact on some of its other members on the other hand.

There is also a clear focus on aspects related to culture, tourism and trade on the one hand, because they do not represent contentious issues between the two sides, but rather gains for both, and on the other hand, due to their importance in light of the recent decline in Turkish economic indicators, especially in light of the Corona pandemic.

What facilitates the matter and helps to get off the tree of tense relations, is that the new "Israeli" government ended - at least temporarily - the phenomenon of Netanyahu and his rule, which Turkey saw as an opportunity - apparently - to hold him responsible for the previous deterioration in relations, and thus the possibility of opening a new page with the new government. , especially that the Turkish official discourse emphasized that its problem is with the "Israeli" government and its policies.

prices

Given all of the above, it seems that a decision has been taken in Ankara to develop relations with the occupying state, "Israel." Perhaps the most important indication of this is Erdogan's aforementioned contact and his transgression of the official diplomatic dimensions to talk about "regional issues of common interest" and other things, as well as The response of the other party to the words of Herzog until the moment.

It is not yet clear at what speed relations between the two sides can develop, but before that it is not certain that Tel Aviv is interested in accelerating this path and the extent of its readiness for it, especially that Celik said - in response to a question regarding the exchange of ambassadors - that "the Israeli side is not ready yet." .

But in any case, if we go to assess that the decision has been taken, and that the rest are just details related to time, form, and tools, a development to one degree or another will occur in the near future on the relations between the two sides, which prompts the question about the costs that will be paid for this.

In the first place, it is likely that there will be no price inside Turkey for such a step, although there is no political pressure or popular demand towards developing relations, as some opinion polls indicate that the Turkish street is not enthusiastic about this step at the level of supporters of the ruling party and the opposition alike. whether; It is seen that the Turkish street follows the political decision in similar tracks more than it makes, especially when the decision is presented in the context of national security, support for the economy, and so on.

On the external level, there is a price that Ankara will pay from its image and credibility in the region, especially in front of the Palestinians, for 3 main reasons: First, that it has always portrayed itself as the strong (and sometimes the only) defender of Palestinian rights in the face of the policies of the occupation, which is inconsistent with the desire to The development of relations with him, and the second, its sharp criticism of the agreements to normalize relations between the entity and a number of Arab countries. The third reason is the timing of the matter after the Battle of Saif al-Quds, and the crimes committed by the occupation during which it provoked a high-ceilinged Turkish position and rhetoric on both the official and popular levels.

Perhaps it is logical to ask about the price that the occupation may demand in the hands of developing relations, especially since Ankara seems more willing and eager to do so, and it is more conservative and deliberate.

Another question is attached to him regarding the Turkish relations with the Palestinians, especially the resistance factions, and to what extent they can be affected by the expected rapprochement between Ankara and Tel Aviv, especially since Tel Aviv's declared conditions for rapprochement are matters related to Hamas, for example.

In conclusion, it is expected that the first steps will include the development of tourism, commercial and cultural relations, on which the two parties can build subsequent steps.

But it is not certain that the relations between them will go on a positive path, in addition to returning to the previous state of the alliance, which is very unlikely, especially in light of the stability of the "Israeli" policies towards the Palestinians, especially in Jerusalem and Gaza, which is expected to have a declared reaction of Turkey. on her.

But if there is a return to a political track between the Palestinians and the "Israelis" under any name, this may help to speed up the process of developing these relations, which Erdogan referred to in his tweets, and raised the possibility of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas' visit to Turkey in the same period of the aforementioned contact. These are all indications of a new phase that seems to be imminent.