It cannot be said that the decision of the European Court of Justice, which rejected the appeal of Germany, which opposed the limitation of the OPAL pipeline capacity by 50% according to the Third Energy Package, was something completely unexpected for the domestic Gazprom and its European partners. Moreover, they were preparing for this decision both technically and legally. Nevertheless, of course, no one particularly concealed disappointment with the decision of the EU court neither in Berlin nor in St. Petersburg, where Gazprom's head office is located.

In fact, everything is quite simple: according to the requirements of the so-called Third EU Energy Package, all energy infrastructure facilities of the EU states must be independent of companies that produce electricity or energy resources.

With regard to the OPAL gas pipeline, this was expressed in the requirement to reserve up to 50% of the pipeline's capacity for pumping gas from some abstract "alternative suppliers", which is physically and technically impossible.

This is the first thing.

And secondly, it is simply absurd both in form and in the content of the demand itself, which looks all the more idiotic because OPAL is just a pipeline branch that receives gas exclusively through Nord Stream.

And he simply does not physically have any other entry points.

What can I say here: this litigation, unfortunately, is far from new.

Let us recall what we are talking about.

Back in early September of the year before last, 2019, the European Court of Justice, at the suit of the Polish company PGNiG, canceled the decision of the European Commission in 2016, which expanded Gazprom's access to the OPAL gas pipeline to its design capacity, considering it to violate the principle of European energy solidarity. After that, according to the decision of the EC, the supplier company could reserve 50% of the pipe's capacity on exclusive rights, and in addition receive the remaining 50% of its transit capacity through auctions with third parties. That, from the point of view of the European Commission - and not only it - was quite reasonable, especially in the conditions of the then emerging acute energy deficit, which the European subcontinent is now beginning to experience, as they say, in full growth. In order to understand this, one does not need to be seven inches in the forehead,it is enough to look at the schedule of filling European UGS facilities - there are now quite obvious signs of a really impending disaster. What's funny is that after the decision of the EU court, Gazprom simply shrugged its shoulders and even, there was a case, reduced supplies for the required interest, but the Germans were resolutely alarmed: Germany immediately appealed this decision, before the completion of the consideration of which the decision of the European Commission on the use of OPAL remained 100% in effect.until the completion of the consideration of which the decision of the European Commission on the use of OPAL by 100% remained in force.until the completion of the consideration of which the decision of the European Commission on the use of OPAL by 100% remained in force.

Now the Germans have been denied this appeal as well.

There is nowhere else to complain.

What can I say here: first of all, we probably need to immediately reassure both Russian suppliers (although they are so calm) and European, primarily German, consumers - the situation is, of course, unpleasant, but no more.

Nothing catastrophic happened: the decrease in the OPAL load last time only led to an additional load of the NEL gas pipeline, which is the western branch of the Nord Stream. And on April 1, already this year, 2021, for Nord Stream 2, the construction of an OPAL backup - the EUGAL gas pipeline - was also completed. Its differences are in its higher capacity, which is actually equal to the total capacity of the OPAL and NEL gas pipelines - 55 billion cubic meters per year. And at another point of delivery on the border of the Czech Republic - otherwise the same "two objects", only a view in profile. But, one way or another, there is no doubt that opportunities for technological and legal maneuver for receiving Russian gas from Gazprom's German partners remain in this kind of situation even under current conditions. Which, of course, does not mean at allthat the Germans will not sue or look for some - perhaps "asymmetric" or legal - solution further: the mood there is serious, and the Germans are practical people.

And sooner or later, but still get their way.

Secondly, no matter how sad it is to admit, we cannot influence the situation in any way: this is a dispute between the Europeans, a struggle for transit.

The Germans, our situational allies in the struggle for the energy markets of the European subcontinent, will either win in it, or they will have very serious problems with their own energy security.

In the meantime, let us note this separately, as the Ministry of Energy of Germany said, the question is not raised in this way.

And, in general, yes, this is true (after all, we are talking about a potential "dropout" of a maximum of 12.3 billion cubic meters, which is quite easily compensated for): it is unpleasant, in general, we will repeat ourselves, but far from fatal.

The most important thing here is not the decision of the European Court itself, but rather tactical “battles of local” European significance.

The main thing here is different: it is by no means accidental that the majority of analysts, on the one hand, were certainly confident in the inevitability of the completion of Nord Stream 2.

But, on the other hand, they were equally unshakably convinced that the struggle for the corridors for the transportation of Russian gas to Europe would inevitably continue after the physical completion of work on the arrangement of the Baltic Russian-European gas transportation system.

Well, what then is there to be surprised?

As, in fact, there is nothing surprising in the fact that the main pressure is now and will go not on Russia, but on Germany: and it would be strange if the Germans did not understand this either and did not prepare for this.

Everything is simple here - they always put pressure on the "weakest link".

And Germany, paradoxical as it may sound now, unlike the Russian Federation, here acts as a country with limited sovereignty.

And this sovereignty is limited not only by the base in Ramstein, but also by various "European institutions": it is through them that this "pressure on the weak link", apparently, will go purely tactically.

And in the case of the OPAL gas pipeline, the abstract expression “the price of sovereignty” for the Germans suddenly acquires a completely practical meaning: here it can even be calculated specifically in euros, it’s not tricky - lost profits, all the cases.

At the same time, what is most paradoxical, Germany also maintains these "over-sovereign European institutions", largely at its own expense.

And this element of national humiliation has not been canceled either.

As for the rest, of course, what happened must be taken philosophically: in the coming years, there will be many such events, both in one direction and in the other, around this Baltic German-Russian gas corridor project.

Once again: both in one and the other direction.

Retreat, offensive.

Tactical battles ...

This, in general, unfortunately, is normal: big "real politics", including in the energy sector, looks exactly like this.

As for us directly, Gazprom is reacting to what is happening absolutely correctly: they are “disappointed with the creation of artificial barriers for the effective use of investments in the European gas transportation system”.

Taking into account the rather strict requirement of the president on the priority of investments in domestic markets, this is a completely understandable and completely appropriate approach.

And these problems - the problems of relations within the European Union and their correct regulation - must be learned by our European partners to solve on their own: nothing personal, we just have slightly different priorities now.

And this is not our question.

The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.